{
  "id": 1453419,
  "name": "Bridgman v. Johnson",
  "name_abbreviation": "Bridgman v. Johnson",
  "decision_date": "1940-07-01",
  "docket_number": "4-5998",
  "first_page": "990",
  "last_page": "993",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "200 Ark. 990"
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      "cite": "142 S.W.2d 217"
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    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    {
      "cite": "110 S. W. 2d 487",
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      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
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    {
      "cite": "194 Ark. 1149",
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    {
      "cite": "97 S. W. 2d 439",
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    {
      "cite": "193 Ark. 32",
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    {
      "cite": "92 S. W. 2d 390",
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      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "192 Ark. 529",
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        1414933
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      "cite": "161 S. W. 201",
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    {
      "cite": "110 Ark. 284",
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    {
      "cite": "87 Ark. 230",
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  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 6361,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.527,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:22:40.186957+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Bridgman v. Johnson."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Holt, J.\nThe appeal is from an order of the chancery court enjoining constable Bob Tate of Whiteville township (Baxter county) from levying upon property of Agnes Johnson by virtue of executions issued by Brant Bridgman, justice of the peace, and requiring the justice to grant appeals. Nine judgments, varying in amounts from $15.65 to $116, had been returned against John M. Thompson and Agnes Johnson.. Only the latter has attempted to appeal.\nThe chancery complaint alleged that on August 22, 1939, appellee appeared in Justice Bridgman\u2019s court, by her attorney, and petitioned for changes of venue in respect of the claims then pending. The petition was overruled and judgments were rendered. In seeking injunctive relief it was averred that appellee experienced difficulty in executing appeal bonds, but \u201con September 21, 1939, about ten o\u2019clock p. m., her attorney went to the home of the justice of the peace and knocked on the door in an effort to file the bond and affidavit for appeal. The home was dark, and the attorney, being unable to arouse anyone by knocking, such attorney could not place in the hands of the justice of the peace the affidavit and appeal bond.\u201d It was then alleged that about nine o\u2019clock the following morning the bond and affidavit were tendered, but were refused by the justice on the ground that the time for appeal had expired.\nAppellee\u2019s contention is that, through no fault of her own, she was denied the right of appeal.\nThe meritorious defense alleged is that the judgments were on accounts due the several claimants by the Cotter Ice & Bottling Company; that although the business was owned by appellee, she had, prior to the time the obligations were incurred, leased the plant to Thompson and Freeman; that upon expiration of the lease it was renewed by Thompson\u201d . . . who was the sole operator of the Cotter Ice & Bottling Company at the time of the contracting of all the debts sued on; that same were contracted by John M. Thompson personally and individually and in his trade name, Cotter Ice & Bottling Company, but that this plaintiff at that time was in no way connected with the operation of the plant. \u2019 \u2019\nThompson is appellee\u2019s son. His insolvency was alleged.\nThe' complaint recites that when Justice Bridgman overruled appellee\u2019s petition for a change of venue, she refused to plead further, and \u201c. . . appeals in each instance were prayed in open court, and were granted.\u201d\nThe complaint in equity was demurred to. The demurrer was overruled; whereupon, the defendants elected to stand on the demurrer, and the injunction and mandatory order were issued.\nWe think the demurrer should' have been sustained. The so-called \u201cunavoidable casualty\u201d was due to appellee\u2019s inaction. There is nothing in the record to show why a change of venue was denied.\nThe law\u2019s requirement is that an appeal from a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace must be taken \u2018 \u2018within thirty days, and not thereafter. \u201d Pope\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 8475. Act 323 of 1939, which supplements \u00a7\u00a7 8475-77 of the Digest, provides that \u201cA party who appeals from a justice of the peace judgment . . . must file a transcript of the judgment in the office of the circuit clerk within thirty days after the rendition of the judgment.\u201d Prior to the 1939 enactment, responsibility for filing transcripts was placed upon justices of the peace. Pope\u2019s Digest, % 8479. .But, as was held in Carden v. Bailey, 87 Ark. 230, 112 S. W. 743, \u201cIt was the duty of appellees here to see that the transcript was lodged with the circuit clerk as the law requires.\u201d Hart v. Lequieu, 110 Ark. 284, 161 S. W. 201.\nA late case applicable to the instant controversy is Nowlin v. Merchants National Bank, 192 Ark. 529, 92 S. W. 2d 390, where the requirement that transcript be lodged with the circuit court within thirty days after rendition of judgment was held \u201cmandatory.\u201d In that case it was further said that unless the direction is complied with \u201cthe court is without jurisdiction.\u201d\nAppellee\u2019s inability to execute bonds did not prevent the affidavit from being filed and the transcript from being lodged with the circuit clerk. In the absence of bonds the judgments would not have been superseded, but the appeals could have been prosecuted.\nThere is no allegation that the justice of the peace collusively absented himself in order to prevent appellee from filing affidavit and bond.\nThe act of 1939 referred to, suprai, expressly provides that \u201cIf the transcript of the judgment is hot filed within thirty days after the rendition of the judgment, execution can be issued against the signers of the appeal bond.\u201d Certainly, if bondsmen may be proceeded against, the judgment debtor cannot have superior rights. There is no contention that the transcript was lodged with the circuit clerk within thirty days. The burden of filing the transcript is imposed \u201cupon the party who appeals.\u201d\nIn Martin v. Gray, 193 Ark. 32, 97 S. W. 2d 439, it was insisted that because the. tax collector of Stone county was \u201cswamped\u201d with applications for receipts during the last day of the period provided by law for their procurement, the requirements of the statute should be waived. In disposing of the question this court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Johnson, said:\n. \u201cAppellee\u2019s argument that the collector was overwhelmed with belated poll tax applications on the last day for payment and was unable to perform his official duties in issuing and delivering the receipts is without convincing effect. Viewed from either the collector\u2019s or the taxpayer\u2019s standpont the contention is without merit. The taxpayer is given approximately five months by the general law in which to procure his poll tax receipt. If the period were extended to ten months the same argument would be advanced. Procrastination has ever been availed of by the human race. A typical example is narrated in the Biblical parable of the \u2018Wedding Feast.\u2019 Excuses there were not accepted and the courts should not accept excuses where election laws are deliberately ignored and violated.\u201d See American Workmen Insurance Co. v. Irvin, 194 Ark. 1149, 110 S. W. 2d 487.\nThe decree is reversed, with directions to sustain the demurrer and to dismiss the complaint.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Holt, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "H. J. Denton, for appellant.",
      "Arnold Adams, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Bridgman v. Johnson.\n4-5998\n142 S. W. 2d 217\nOpinion delivered July 1, 1940.\nH. J. Denton, for appellant.\nArnold Adams, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0990-01",
  "first_page_order": 1008,
  "last_page_order": 1011
}