{
  "id": 1449867,
  "name": "First National Bank at Paris v. Ihle",
  "name_abbreviation": "First National Bank v. Ihle",
  "decision_date": "1941-03-17",
  "docket_number": "4-6250",
  "first_page": "46",
  "last_page": "49",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "202 Ark. 46"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "149 S.W.2d 548"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "197 Ark. 1060",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8725442
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/197/1060-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "106 S. W. 2d 185",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "opinion_index": 1
    },
    {
      "cite": "194 Ark. 1155",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "opinion_index": 1
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 6531,
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    "pagerank": {
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    "simhash": "1:02040229adec0061",
    "word_count": 1094
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:41:33.899118+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "First National Bank at Paris v. Ihle."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Brieein Smith, C. J.\nThe case is similar to First National Bank at Paris v. McKeen, 197 Ark. 1060, 127 S. W. 2d 142. In the instant litigation appellee received from her customers two checks issued by 'Blue Ribbon Coal Company, drawn on appellant bank, amounting to $123.06. They were acquired by appellee in due course of business February 29,1936, and were part of a $422.09 deposit made Monday, March 2.\nLate in the afternoon of March 2 appellant received information that certain out-of-state checks deposited with it by Blue Ribbon Coal Company had been dishonored. The items comprising the deposit (referred to in the McKeen Case) were re-charged to the coal company\u2019s account leaving an overdraft, although a credit balance of $2,475.80 appeared on the bank\u2019s ledger.\nAppellee\u2019s bookkeeper testified to having made the deposit before noon. Nothing was said about conditional acceptance. The two checks in question were charged to appellee\u2019s account the day received and were returned to her the following afternoon.\nWhen asked whether checks deposited on former occasions had been charged back and their return accepted, appellee\u2019s bookkeeper said such checks would be taken to the bank \u201c. . . just as I took these checks \u2014list them and make a deposit. Later the check [if] found not to be good [would be] returned to us.\u201d Bank officials testified to the same practice.\nOn the statement furnished appellee monthly there was printed: \u201cAll items are credited subject to final payment.\u201d\nThe bank teller did not examine any of the thirteen checks comprising the deposit except 'as to indorsements, but on the contrary received the deposit ticket as prepared by appellee, and the checks, and entered the credit.\nOn the deposit, slip was a printed condition permitting the bank to recharge any item drawn on it not good at the close of business on day of deposit.\nThe court found that the charge-back occurred March 3. There is no testimony to support this finding, although it is conceded that the checks were not returned until the day after deposit.\nIn the McKeen Case the depositor testified that in his dealings with the bank \u201cThey checked [the list], and if there was- [a check] not good they would hand it back to me.\u201d On cross-examination this testimony was materially weakened by admissions of a different custom.\nThere is this statement in the McKeen Case: \u201cBy [the testimony of McKeen] it is sought to raise a legal presumption that the bank conditionally accepted Blue Ribbon checks. If such custom prevailed, it is immaterial whether items comprising the charge-back were cashed on Saturday, or were included in the Monday deposit. If, on the other hand, the right to charge arises solely on account of reservations expressed on the deposit ticket, such right must have been exercised not later than the close of business of the day of conditional acceptance.\u201d\nThe first headnote to the McKeen Case summarizes the opinion in this way: \u201cWhere a check is deposited in the bank on which it is drawn, the bank has the right, as against such depositor, to accept or reject it or to conditionally receive it, but if it is unqualifiedly accepted, and placed to the credit of the depositor, it cannot thereafter, in the absence of fraud or collusion, be repudiated. \u2019 \u2019\nThe question here is, Was there a repudiation of a completed transaction?\nIt must be remembered that the bank reserved the right, by its contract of deposit, to recharge bad checks during the day of receipt. That is what was done. Also, we are of the opinion that a custom of conditionally accepting appellee\u2019s deposits was show. In these respects the case differs from First National BanJc v. McKeen, supra.\nThe judgment is reversed, and the cause is dismissed.\nAppellee owns and operates the Economy Store at Paris.\nThe deposit consisted of thirteen checks. The deposit slip was made out by appellee\u2019s bookkeeper.\nIn response to a question by the court, appellee\u2019s bookkeeper testified it was the bank\u2019s policy, when a check was in doubt, to look up the amount in the account of the drawer.\nThe same notation appears on a \u201cpass book\u201d sometimes used by appellee.\nIt was McKeen\u2019s contention that the checks were cashed Saturday, February 29, with others, and that he received $898 in cash. On this point .the opinion states the evidence is not clear \u2014 that is, whether the checks were cashed on Saturday, or were, part of a deposit made on Monday.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Brieein Smith, C. J."
      },
      {
        "text": "ON REHEARING\nWe are asked to modify the opinion by rendering-judgment against John Schwartz and Bryan Nelson.\nIn appellee\u2019s complaints in the court of G. Carey, justice of the peace, it was alleged that a check for $62.63 was issued by the coal -company to Schwartz. A similar-check was issued to Nelson for $60.43. These checks were indorsed by the payees and cashed by appellee, who in her action against the bank asked in the alternative that the indorsers be made to pay.\nIn rendering judgments the justice of the peace captioned the causes \u201cMinnie Ihle and John Schwartz, and Minnie Ihle and 'Bryan Nelson, plaintiffs, against First National Bank at Paris, defendants.\u201d There was the recital that \u201c. . . after hearing testimony the court gives judgment for plaintiffs.\u201d\nThe bank\u2019s affidavit for appeal shows Schwartz and Nelson to be plaintiffs and the bank \u201cdefendants\u201d \u2014 the plural term having been used.\nIn circuit court Schwartz and Nelson are shown as defendants. If it be assumed (and this is probably true) that the judgments of the justice of the peace were improperly written through inadvertence and were cured by the circuit court, the fact remains that judgments in circuit court were in favor of Schwartz and Nelson. It was said: \u201cPlaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant, First National Bank, but not any sum from defendants, Schwartz and Nelson as indorsers of said checks.\u2019'\u2019 Again, there was the finding that \u201c. . . defendants, Schwartz and Nelson, are not liable on their respective indorsements to the plaintiff.\u201d\nWhile these judgments may have been erroneous, there were no appeals from the circuit court\u2019s finding of non-liability, nor was there a motion for new trial. Unless the alleged errors were called to the trial court\u2019s attention by appellee, there is nothing before this court for review, and we are without power, under our rules, to modify. Arkansas Democrat Co. v. Holiman, 194 Ark. 1155, 106 S. W. 2d 185.",
        "type": "rehearing",
        "author": null
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Arnett & Shaw, for appellant.",
      "Geo. A. Hall, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "First National Bank at Paris v. Ihle.\n4-6250\n149 S. W. 2d 548\nOpinion delivered March 17, 1941.\nArnett & Shaw, for appellant.\nGeo. A. Hall, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0046-01",
  "first_page_order": 64,
  "last_page_order": 67
}