{ "id": 1447003, "name": "Duke v. Helena-Glendale Ferry Company", "name_abbreviation": "Duke v. Helena-Glendale Ferry Co.", "decision_date": "1942-03-02", "docket_number": "4-6669", "first_page": "865", "last_page": "873", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "203 Ark. 865" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "159 S.W.2d 74" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "33 S. Ct. 703", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 3668085 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/228/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 S. W. 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ark. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1315991 ], "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/98/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ala. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "case_ids": [ 5711820 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala/228/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Am. St. Rep. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Am. St. Rep.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 So. 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ala. 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "case_ids": [ 3215039 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala/97/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 A. L. R. 1232", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 U. S. 200", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6139709 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/266/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 U. S. 130", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5647311 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/93/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 L. Ed. 972", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 U. S. 470", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3912539 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/281/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 U. S. 481", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3662292 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/223/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 U. S. 121", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 631826 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/237/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 U. 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R. 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Pa. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 P. 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Wash. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash.", "case_ids": [ 782211 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash/134/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 U. S. 50", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1501289 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/272/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 S. C. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N. W. 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ala. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 S. W. 2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10220657 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/149/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 N. E. 2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N. Y. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2041674 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/283/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 N. Y. S. 2d 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Misc. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc.", "case_ids": [ 891098 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc/173/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 S. W. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Tenn. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 8531606 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/177/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 A. L. R. 265", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 S. E. 2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 N. C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615766 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/218/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 S. E. 2d 466", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ga. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 211583 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/192/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 S. E. 908", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 U. S. 318", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3673819 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/233/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 U. S. 52", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3917932 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/281/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 U. S. 245", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8286855 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/241/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 U. 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E. 2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ga. App. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 1502030 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/62/0145-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1099, "char_count": 17625, "ocr_confidence": 0.53, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0519553722690678e-07, "percentile": 0.7554743539102087 }, "sha256": "cbe245de3d7afe94f8353bf9037e6b09b55ad5353dd2ebbc2a5c9dc1d9277095", "simhash": "1:84d6ee0382c648fd", "word_count": 3035 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T23:00:45.785345+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Duke v. Helena-Glendale Ferry Company." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Grieein Smith, C. J.\nIn sustaining a demurrer to the complaint of Pies Duke against Helena-Glendale Ferry Company, a question of law, and questions' of law and fact, are presented. First, we determine whether Phillips circuit court had jurisdiction of the subject matter.\nThe company\u2019s river boat, carrying passengers and automobiles, plies between its wharves on the Arkansas and Mississippi shores, and is therefore engaged in interstate commerce. Duke, an employe, was assigned the duty of supervising receipt of automobiles. He directed how cars should be placed on the boat, and collected fares, delivering proceeds to the cashier. In exchange, tickets were issued, and these were handed to passengers by Duke. He did not travel across the river.\nDuke alleged he was required to work periods in excess of so-called \u201cstraight time\u201d; that the uniform' wage he received was eleven cents per hour; that increased pay for overtime was denied, and that the accumulated debt was $473.35. An equal amount as liquidated damages was asked, with reasonable attorney\u2019s fee.\nThe Court Had Jurisdiction.\u2014Appellee thinks the Fair Labor Standards Act cannot be administered in a state court because of the penalty, in respect of which trial courts have no discretion; and this, it is urged, is an interference by the state with Title 28, \u00a7 371, HSCA, where exclusive jurisdiction is vested in federal courts for penalties and forfeitures incurred under laws of the United States.\nAppellee cites Anderson v. Meacham, 62 Ga. App. 145, 8 S. E. 2d 459, a decision clearly sustaining the contention that state courts are without jurisdiction. This, intermediate appellate court thought the employe, having elected to bring his action for a penalty, was restricted to a federal tribunal. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained. But in Adair v. Traco Division, the supreme court of Georgia refused to follow the court of appeals, notwithstanding it had declined to grant certiorari.\nIn holding that liquidated damages should not be classified as penalties within the meaning of \u00a7 371, Title 28, the Georgia supreme court said:\n\u201cThe only decision to the contrary broug\u2019ht to our attention by counsel (and our own investigation has found none other) is the case of Anderson v. Meacham. . . . \"We are not satisfied with the reasons given by the court of appeals for its ruling on this question, nor do the authorities cited by it convince us that the decision is correct. We must decline to follow it.\u201d\nIn the Tennessee case cited in the fifth footnote, (Tapp v. Price-Bass) Mr. Justice DeHaven, speaking for an undivided court, said that a reasonable inference to be drawn from the Fair Labor Standards Act is that congress intended to afford speedy, convenient, and inexpensive relief to employes who seek to enforce its provisions. \u201cTo this end,\u201d said the Justice, \u201cit was provided that action to recover the amount of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation, as the case might be, and an additional amount equal as liquidated damages, could be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction. To construe the words \u2018any court of competent jurisdiction\u2019 to refer to federal courts only, because of the presence of the words \u2018 as liquidated damages, \u2019 would, in our opinion, violate the spirit and intention of the Act and effectuate a result, in many instances, of hardship and inconvenience.\u201d\nIn referring to the right of an employe to collect more than actual wages, the Tennessee opinion says: \u201cAppellant\u2019s contention that the double amount allowed to 'be recovered under \u00a7 16(b), though denominated \u2018liquidated'damages,\u2019 is, in fact, a penally, and being a penalty is enforceable only in the courts of the United States, is without merit, because whatever its technical nature, congress, by giving it the express statute of \u2018liquidated damages\u2019 manifested a purpose to exclude it from the operation of [Title 28, USCA, \u00a7 371] which applies to suits for penalties.\u2019\u2019\nStringer v. Griffin Grocery Company, cited in the fifth footnote, was decided in February, 1941. It holds that, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, congress intended that all courts, federal and state, should have concurrent jurisdiction to hear controversies arising under the Act, leaving to complaining employes a determination of the forum in which suit should 'be brought. It was further held that an employe\u2019s action against an employer for unpaid wages or overtime, liquidated damages, and attorne3r\u2019s fee, is not an action for penalty, within the meaning* of Title 28, giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. The opinion was written by Chief Justice Bond of the Fifth (Dalias) district for an undivided court.\nCox v. Lykes Bros., 237 N. Y. 376, 143 N. E. 226, is cited by appellant. It is referred to in a number of the opinions where Title 28, \u00a7 371, is discussed. 189 N. Y. S. 268, 198 N. Y. S. 178, 204 App. Div. 442. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in an opinion concurred in by the entire court, construed \u00a7 4529, U. S. Revised Statutes, which allows recovery of double wages where the master, without sufficient cause, fails to pay seamen as directed.\nAn excerpt from the Cardozo opinion is: \u201cCongress has expressly said that the extra compensation, when due, \u2018shall be recoverable as wages.\u2019 This would seem decisive, without more-, that in determining the bounds of jurisdiction it is not to be classified as a penalty. There was no thought that the state courts, which have undoubted jurisdiction to give judgment for wages in the strict sense, should be shorn of jurisdiction to give judgment for the statutory incidents.\u201d\nA recent case involving jurisdiction was heard in Kansas City. It originated in a justice of the peace court. Wingate claimed he was entitled to $271.86 additional to compensation received, and an equal amount as liquidated damages; also attorney\u2019s fee. The cause was removed from a state court, and the proceeding in the federal district court was on motion to remand. A terse opinion was written by Judge Merrill E. Otis.\nAfter mentioning that the Fair Labor Standards Act was passed after .congress had enacted the legislation embraced within Title 28, $ 41, US-CA, Judge Otis said that no opinion had been called to his attention which held that the phrase \u201cany court of competent jurisdiction,\u201d as used in $ 16(b), 29 USO A, does not include a state court. All of the tendencies of' labor legislation, he said, have been to make available the remedies provided to those for whom the remedies were designed: \u201cThe amounts usually are small. The places in which federal courts are held are few. . . . If it was not intended that state courts should have jurisdiction of these cases, then congress made this Act of slight value to working men, who might easily bring suit in a justice court or other state court in the neighborhood in which they live, but who, if they had to go to some distant city to prosecute the case, would, in effect, be prohibited from seeking \u00e1 remedy. It was on account of such reasons that the language, \u2018any court of competent jurisdiction,\u2019 was used.\u201d\nForsyth v. Central Foundry Co., (Supreme Court of Alabama) is directly in point, but in addition to the general holding that state courts have jurisdiction of the character of litigation here involved, Mr. Justice Foster, in an opinion concurred in by three of the other six members of the court, held that a demurrer does not reach an item of damages claimed when other items in the same count are not subject to the defect. In substance, however, the case stands for the following proposition, as expressed in Headnote No. 14, Southern Reporter: \u201cAn Alabama court of general jurisdiction was a \u2018court of competent jurisdiction\u2019 within Fair Labor Standards Act for purposes of hearing employee\u2019s action against employer to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and attorney\u2019s fees under the Act, notwithstanding federal statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts of all suits for penalties incurred under laws of United States. \u2019 \u2019\nA North Western Reporter\u2019s headnote to Abroe v. Lindsay Bros. Co. (Supreme Court of Minnesota, Oct. 24,1941) is: \u201cState courts of competent jurisdiction may entertain actions by employees for liquidated damages for violation of Fair Labor Standards Act, requiring the payment of time and a half for overtime.\u201d\nWhile it is not accurate to say that liquidated damages are not in the nature of penalties, the Act of 1938 conferring power upon any court of competent jurisdiction does not contain phraseology indicative of an intent by congress to exclude state courts. If the national lawmakers had such design, it would have been very easy to insert the one additional word \u201cfederal\u201d\u2014making the provision read, \u201c. . . any federal court of competent jurisdiction. \u201d\nWas Appellant ,a Seaman\u00b6\u2014Ruling* C\u00e1se Law defines the word \u201cseamen,\u201d as the term is employed in Act of congress classifying them and conferring certain rights. Section 13(a) of the Pair Labor Standards Act expressly excepts seamen from provisions of the legislation. It therefore becomes necessary to determine appellant\u2019s status. Will he 'be relegated to rights conferred by Title 46, US'CA, or was the character of work assigned him such as to negative what appellee thinks is conclusive, as a matter of law, that he was a seaman because in collecting* fares, delivering tickets to passengers, and supervising the distribution of cars in movements from wharf to deck, he performed services essential to the company\u2019s main object\u2014that of transporting persons and goods in interstate commerce?\nAlthough \u201cseaman,\u201d says Ruling Case Law, originally included common sailors, the rights of those employed in maritime service have, under uniform rulings of many courts, been extended to include mates, pilots, pursers, surgeons, stewards, engineers, cooks, clerks, carpenters, firemen, and in general, all hands employed on the vessel in furtherance of the main object of the enterprise, except the master.\nWebster\u2019s Dictionary defines \u201clongshoreman\u201d as \u201cA laborer, as a stevedore or loader, who works about the whai\u2019ves of a seaport.\u201d\nIt is no longer denied that persons working on boats operated on inland lakes or rivers are, or may be, seamen. A quotation from \u201cShipping,\u201d Ruling Case Law, v. 24, \u00a7 198, is:\n\u201cMariners are none the less seamen because their vessels operate exclusively on inland waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction- of the United States, or between ports on the same state.\u201d\nWhere it is clear that the worker performs an act which gives impetus to movement of a vessel, it is not difficult to agree that such worker becomes a seaman technically, if not actually, because without the physical contribution so made, the boat or ship could not move, or at least it would not move with the same precision or facility. Longshoremen and stevedores are of this group.\nThe question occurs, Can one who does not travel with a vessel, and whose duties relate only to loading, as distinguished from one who contributes to its movements, become a seaman by the mere fact of employment and discharge of the limited duty?\nIn the circumstances with which we are dealing, Duke\u2019s acts relate to the financial status of trips from Arkansas to \u2022 Mississippi. Suppose, instead of working between wharf and boat, he had been a gatekeeper on top of the levee, where fares were collected, and where automobile owners were directed to park their cars on deck; or suppose appellant were in charge of appellee\u2019s office in Helena and arranged with travelers for their transportation across the \u2018water:\u2014could it be said that such ah one ipso facto became a seaman? We doubt the conclusion would be sound.\nEach Act\u2014that protecting seamen, and the Fair Standards Labor Law\u2014was intended as protection of those who without special legal remedies, were deprived of certain standards thought by the federal government to be essential to economic wellbeing, and each Act must be liberally construed in favor of the end sought to be attained.\nAs has often been said, lawful rights of the citizen, whether arising from a legitimate exercise of state or national power (unless excepted by valid legislation to that effect) are subject to concurrent enforcement in courts of the state or nation when such rights come within the general scope of jurisdiction conferred 'by the authority creating them, and this is true whether such authority is derived from the national constitution, or from a state\u2019s fundamental charter.\nIt is not without misgivings, and a realization that there is a twilight zone which separates \u201cseamen,\u201d so-called, from workers who are to be treated as a distinct class under the Fair Labor Standards Act, that we conclude (from admissions made by the demurrer) appellant was not a seaman.\nThe judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to permit the plaintiff to present his case.\nHelena-Glendale Ferry Company will hereafter he referred to as the company, and Duke will be referred to by name, or as appellant.\nSee \u201cFair Labor Standards Act of 1938,\u201d Act June 25, 1938, c. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 of U. S., Title 29, USCA, \u00a7 201, et seq.\nAppellee cites the following cases in support of the contention that jurisdiction is exclusively in courts of the United States: Helwig v. United States, 188 U. S. 605, 23SCT. 427, 47 L. Ed. 614; Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Schmidt, 241 U. S. 245, 36 SCT. 581, 60 L. Ed. 982; Collie v. Fergusson, 281 U. S. 52, 50 SCT. 189, 74 L. Ed. 696; O\u2019Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 318, 34 SCT. 596, 58 L. Ed. 980; Akers v. Inman, Akers & Inman, 11 Ga. Appeals 564, 75 S. E. 908.\n192 Ga. 59, 14 S. E. 2d 466.\nHart v. Gregory, 218 N. C. 184, 10 S. E. 2d 644, 130 A. L. R. 265; Tapp v. Price-Bass Co., 177 Tenn. 189, 147 S. W. 2d 107; Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., 173 Misc. 531, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 851; Terner v. Glickstein & Terner, 283 N. Y. 299, 28 N. E. 2d 848; Stringer v. Griffin Grocery Co., Tex. Civ. App. 149 S. W. 2d 158. [See, also, Michigan Law Review for January, 1941, and 27 Virginia Law Review, 328.]\n46 USCA, \u00a7 596.\nContinuing, the opinion says: \u201cThis conclusion is fortified when we search for the purpose of the statute. The purpose, or at least the predominant one, was not punishment of the master or owner, hut compensation to the seaman. Delay means loss of opportunity to ship upon another vessel. It means hardship during the term of the waiting, the sufferer often improvident, and stranded far from home. How much this extra amount should be would be often a troublesome question if it were left open in every case. Hence it might be advisable to have this indefinite element made definite by a general law with reference to which the parties may conclusively be presumed to have contracted, and which therefore should be taken to be the law of the contract.\u201d\nWingate v. General Auto Parts Co., 40 Fed. Supp. 364. [District court, W. D. Missouri, W. D., Aug. 5, 1941.]\nLawyers of this state will recall that Judge Otis delivered a scholarly address at the May, 1940, meeting of the Bar Association of Arkansas. It was entitled, \u201cThe Trial of Socrates,\u201d [or] \u201cA Modern Judge Looks at An Ancient Trial.\u201d Judge Otis closed with these words: \u201cAcross twenty-three centuries we can hear the rattle of the chains. And we can hear the last words [of Socrates] as the shackles are fastened to his limbs; can hear him saying: \u2018. . . we must go hence now; I to die and you to live. Which goes to the happier state is known only to God.\u2019 \u201d\n204 Ala. 277, 198 Southern 706.\n300 N. W. 457.\nHeadnote No. 12 to Atkocus v. Tucker, 30 N. Y. Supp. 2d 628 (Municipal Court of City of New York, Sept. 11, 1941) is: \u201cAn action under Fair Labor Standards Act against plaintiff\u2019s former employer to recover unpaid wages for overtime could be maintained in the Municipal Court of the City of New York.\u201d\n\u201cShipping,\u201d v. 24, \u00a7 198.\nTitle 46, USCA, \u00a7\u00a7 591 to 713. See, in particular, \u00a7 596.\n\u201cSeaman,\u201d as used in \u00a7 688, Title 46, USCA, includes stevedores and longshoremen. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 47 S. C. 19, 272 U. S. 50, 71 L. Ed. 157, affirming 134 Wash. 235; 235 P. 360; 238 Pa. 581; Hammond Lamber Co. v. Sandin, 17 Fed. 2d 760, 47 S. C. R. 767, 274 U. S. 756, 71 L. Ed. 1336; The Lillian, 16 Fed. 2d 146; Zarovitch v. F. Jarka Co., 21 Fed. 2d 187; Lloyd v. T. Hogan & Son, 219 N. Y. S. 750, 128 Misc. 665; Roswall v. Graves Harbor Stevedore Co., 231 Pac. 934, 132 Wash. 274. [These cases are cited by appellee.]\nMinneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211, 36 S. Ct. 595, 598, 60 L. Ed. 961, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 505, L. R. A. 1917A, 86; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Co., 237 U. S. 121, 35 S. Ct. 484, 59 L. Ed. 867; Galveston, H. & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 32 S. Ct. 205, 56 L. Ed. 516; Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm., 281 U. S. 470, 50 S. Ct. 374, 47 L. Ed. 972; Claflin V. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 23 L. Ed. 833; State of Missouri ex rel. v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200, 45 S. Ct. 47, 69 L. Ed. 247, 42 A. L. R. 1232; Raisler V. Oliver, 97 Ala. 710, 12 So. 238, 38 Am. St. Rep. 213; Middleton V, St. L. & S. F. R. Co., 228 Ala. 323 (5), 153 So. 256; 14 Am. Jur. 440, 441, \u00a7 247, note 17, et seq.; 21 C. J. S. Courts, \u00a7 526, p. 797, note 78, p. 798, note 4; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Hesterly, 98 Ark. 240, 138 S. W. 874, reversed (1913) 33 S. Ct. 703, 228 U. S. 702, 57 L. Ed. 1031.", "type": "majority", "author": "Grieein Smith, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Peter A. Deisch and K. T. Sutton, for appellant.", "A. M. Coates, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Duke v. Helena-Glendale Ferry Company.\n4-6669\n159 S. W. 2d 74\nOpinion delivered March 2, 1942.\nPeter A. Deisch and K. T. Sutton, for appellant.\nA. M. Coates, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0865-01", "first_page_order": 883, "last_page_order": 891 }