{
  "id": 1447005,
  "name": "Ward v. State",
  "name_abbreviation": "Ward v. State",
  "decision_date": "1942-03-16",
  "docket_number": "4250",
  "first_page": "1024",
  "last_page": "1029",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "203 Ark. 1024"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "160 S.W.2d 864"
    }
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    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    {
      "cite": "201 Ark. 1083",
      "category": "reporters:state",
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    {
      "cite": "259 S. W. 389",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "163 Ark. 232",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "cite": "10 S. W. 2d 370",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
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    {
      "cite": "178 Ark. 277",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    {
      "cite": "233 S. W. 1081",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
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    },
    {
      "cite": "150 Ark. 193",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T23:00:45.785345+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Ward v. State."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mehaeet, J.\nOn June 16, 1941, the prosecuting attorney in Polk county, Arkansas, filed the following information:\n\u201cI, Boyd Tackett, prosecuting attorney within and for 9th Judicial Circuit of the state of Arkansas, of which Polk county is a part, in the name and by the authority of the state of Arkansas, on oath, accuse the defendant, Russell Ward, of-the crime of rape, committed as follows, to-wit: .The said defendant on the 2nd day of June, 1941, in Polk county, Arkansas, did unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously, in and upon one Edith Graves, a female person, forcibly, violently, and feloniously assault and rape her, the said Edith Graves, and then there violently, forcibly, and against her will and consent feloniously did ravish and carnally know her, the said Edith Graves, against the peace and dignity of the state of Arkansas.\u201d\nThe appellant was tried and there was a verdict and judgment of guilty of assault with intent to rape and his punishment fixed at four years in the state penitentiary. Motion for new trial was filed and overruled, and the case is here on appeal.\nThe prosecutrix, Edith Graves, testified at length about appellant\u2019s criminal assault and that he raped her. Appellant testified that he tried to have intercourse with her, but that she consented to it.\nThe appellant contends for reversal first, because he says the prosecuting attorney asked the prosecutrix to state what the appellant said in the conversation with her about buying off the prosecuting attorney, and she answered: \u201cHe said.there was a guy\u2014if he could take $450 that he would take him to Murfreesboro he could buy off Boyd Tackett\u2014that you could buy him off any time you wanted to go down there.\u201d The court, hoAvever, said in this connection: \u201cI want to admonish the jury again they cannot consider any of this evidence on the charge of rape\u2014it is irrelevant testimony and you will not consider any commission of another crime not in this charge. \u201d\nIf there Avas any error committed in the asking and ansAvering of this question, it Avas cured by the prompt action of the court in advising the jury that they could not consider it.\nThe appellant does not call attention to any authority, but argues that the testimony could throAV no light upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and that it must be considered that the only possible function of the evidence and the only \u2019reason for its having been offered was to arouse the emotions of the jury and cause them to become prejudiced against the defendant. This argument is contradicted by the verdict of the jury itself. The prosecutrix SAvore positively to the commission of the crime by appellant, and Avhile he admits that he tried to have intercourse with her, he says it was with her consent. The jury found appellant guilty of assault with intent to rape. It, therefore, conclusively appears that their emotions were not aroused and they were not prejudiced against the appellant.\nThe next assignment of error relied on by appellant is in the court\u2019s permitting Dr. Redman to testify. Appellant says the effect of the testimony was to show that the prosecutrix was a chaste young woman. Of course, the introduction of this testimony was an effort by the prosecuting attorney to show that the crime of rape had been committed, and there was no question of her chastity raised at all; in fact, there was no effort to prove her chastity.\nIn this connection appellant calls attention to the case of Smith v. State, 150 Ark. 193, 233 S. W. 1081, in which case the state was permitted to prove the reputation of the witness for chastity although her reputation in that respect had not been assailed by the defendant. In the instant case, there is no effort on the part of the state to prove her reputation for chastity or in any way put it in issue. The court said in the case cited: \u201cIn the.present case the defendant did not introduce any evidence as to the reputation of the prosecuting witness for unchastity, or of illicit intercourse on her part. Hence the court erred in admitting the state to prove the reputation of the witness for chastity because her reputation in that respect had not been assailed by the defendant.\u201d There is no such issue in the instant case.\nIn the case of Bethel, et al. v. State, 178 Ark. 277, 10 S. W. 2d 370, referred to and relied upon by appellant, we find nothing 'to support the theory of appellant. In all these cases where it has been held error to permit the prosecution to introduce testimony as to the chastity of the prosecutrix, it has been where the testimony introduced and held erroneous was concerning, the reputation of the prosecutrix. There is no such question in the instant case; nothing- was said about her reputation for chastity. Moreover, the prosecution was attempting to prove that the crime of rape had been committed, and the jury evidently believed, from Dr. Redman\u2019s testimony, that the crime of rape had not been committed.\nThe third assignment urged by appellant for reversal is the admission of testimony concerning Peggy Waggoner. Appellant was asked if he knew Peggy Waggoner, and he answered he did not. He was then asked if he remembered paying a $1 fine in Mena when she jumped out of his car when he tried to rape her.. Objection was made to this question and the court said that he might answer it. He was then asked where this took place, and he answered: \u201cDown at Middleton\u2019s.\u201d When asked if he paid a $1 fine for that he answered that he paid a fine for leaving the scene of an accident. \u2022 When asked if she jumped out of the car he answered that she did, but denied that she stated she had been raped. Appellant specifically denied the questions asked about Peggy Waggoner and denied that he paid her to leave.\nIn the case of Mays v. State, 163 Ark. 232, 259 S. W. 389, the court discussed the questions asked appellant on trial, and the admission of testimony by the state to prove by a police officer that persons known by the police to be drag addicts were frequently seen at appellant\u2019s house. The court then said: \u201cWe think this testimony was incompetent and its admission prejudicial. It was, of course, proper to ask appellant, on his crpssexamination, touching his recent residence, occupation and associations, as affecting his credibility as a witness, but, as these matters were collateral, his answers, whether true or false, was the extent to which that inquiry could be carried, and the court should not have admitted independent testimony on the subject of appellant\u2019s associations, as there was no attempt to prove a conspiracy between himself and such persons, or any connection with the crime by such persons.\u201d\nIt is finally insisted that the venue was not proven. We think the evidence clearly shows that the offense was committed in Polk county. The court said in the case of Meador v. State, 201 Ark. 1083, 148 S. W. 2d 653, in discussing \u00a7 3853 of Pope\u2019s Digest, which is a part of Initiated Act No. 3, adopted by the people at the 1936 general election: \u201cUnder this act it is not necessary to allege the venue of the offense, as was required prior to its passage. Section 26 of this act provides that \u2018It shall be presumed upon trial that the offense charged in the indictment was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, and the court may pronounce proper judgment accordingly, unless the evidence affirmatively shows otherwise. \u2019 \u2019\nThe record in this case shows that the appellant had a fair and impartial trial, and that no reversible error was committed. There was no evidence introduced or anything said or done during the progress of the trial \u2022that tended in any way to inflame the minds of the jury or cause them to return a verdict based on prejudice or passion.\nAs to whether the witnesses told the truth was a question for the jury. They pass on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony, and this court cannot reverse a verdict if there is any substantial evidence upon which to base it,\nWe have reached the conclusion that there was substantial evidence to support the verdict in this case, and the judgment is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mehaeet, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "J. F. Qu-illin, for appellant.",
      "Jack Holt, Attorney General, and Jno. P. Streepey, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Ward v. State.\n4250\n160 S. W. 2d 864\nOpinion delivered March 16, 1942.\nJ. F. Qu-illin, for appellant.\nJack Holt, Attorney General, and Jno. P. Streepey, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "1024-01",
  "first_page_order": 1042,
  "last_page_order": 1047
}