{ "id": 1488258, "name": "Mitchell and Thurman v. State", "name_abbreviation": "Mitchell v. State", "decision_date": "1943-03-29", "docket_number": "4292", "first_page": "596", "last_page": "597", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "205 Ark. 596" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "169 S.W.2d 867" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "197 Ark. 1016", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725197 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/197/1016-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 A. L. R. 908", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ark. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719608 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/201/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 S. W. 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ark. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1314410 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/99/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 S. W. 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ark. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1909800 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/66/0110-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 247, "char_count": 3060, "ocr_confidence": 0.518, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.380125665320789e-08, "percentile": 0.39198231248231075 }, "sha256": "beaec02c877a2923ef7b9e1bd1c33a85f720f61084aad7e92ec8466443ed0381", "simhash": "1:31aabeb7e3701edb", "word_count": 535 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:00:03.571044+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Mitchell and Thurman v. State." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Griffin Smith, C. J.\nBy information it was charged that Paul Mitchell and Warren Thurman feloniously broke into a garage \u201clocated at 408% North Sixth Street, Fort Smith, Arkansas, and the property of Miss Eunice Lewis, \u2019 \u2019 with the intent to commit a felony.\nDuring trial it was .shown that the building was owned by Curtis Wright. Miss Lewis, a tenant, kept her automobile in a garage belonging to Wright. It was back of the residential property, and was entered by the defendants for the purpose of stealing tires.\nThe State moved to amend the information by eliminating the words, \u201cand the property of,\u201d and by substituting \u201coccupied by.\u201d The defendants objected and saved exceptions when the court ruled against them. This \u2014 the only error alleged \u2014 is relied upon for reversal.\nWe are cited to Reed v. State, 66 Ark. 110, 49 S. W. 350, and Wallace v. State, 99 Ark. 92, 137 S. W. 551. In the Reed case the indictment charged the defendant with having feloniously broken into a certain house \u201cbeing used and possessed by one John Head.\u201d- Description of the property was held to be sufficient, but the judgment' was reversed upon another ground.\nA headnote to the Wallace case is: \u201cProof that defendant, accused of burglary, broke into \u2018Jim Ward\u2019s saloon,\u2019 will not sustain an indictment for breaking [into] a house \u2018used and occupied by Till Shaw,\u2019 in the absence of any proof connecting such saloon with the house used and occupied by Till Shaw.\u201d While the opinion held the variance to be fatal, it was said: \u201cThe description of the house as \u2018used and occupied by Till Shaw\u2019 was sufficient, but proof of the breaking and entering of Jim Ward\u2019s saloon, not shown to have- been connected in any way with the house used and occupied by Till Shaw, and with which saloon Till Shaw was not shown to have any relation, does not sustain a conviction upon the indictment. \u2019 \u2019\nNeither case is authority for the rule sought to be invoked by the appellants.\nBut conceding that greater strictness was required under the older statutes, Initiated Act No. 3 of 1936 (page 1384 of the Acts of 1937) permits trial courts to authorize corrections as to form. While it is true that \u00a7 22 of the initiated Act directs that language of an indictment [or information \u2014 see Amendment No. 21] be certain \u201cas to the-title of the prosecution, the name of the court in which the indictment is presented, and the names of the parties,\u201d title, as used in the section, relates to the authority under which the proceeding is brought (as, for example, \u201cState of Arkansas v. John Doe\u201d)\u2014 and not to ownership of property alleged to have been stolen.\nIn the instant case the court properly permitted the information to be amended. See Bennett and Holiman v. State, 201 Ark. 237, 144 S. W. 2d 476, 131 A. L. R. 908; Johnson v. State, 197 Ark. 1016, 126 S. W. 2d 289.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Griffin Smith, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "E. M. Ditmon, for appellant.", "Guy E. Williams, Attorney General, and Earl N. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Mitchell and Thurman v. State.\n4292\n169 S. W. 2d 867\nOpinion delivered March 29, 1943.\nE. M. Ditmon, for appellant.\nGuy E. Williams, Attorney General, and Earl N. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0596-01", "first_page_order": 616, "last_page_order": 617 }