{
  "id": 1485126,
  "name": "McCain, Commissioner of Labor, v. Farmers Electric Cooperative Corporation",
  "name_abbreviation": "McCain v. Farmers Electric Cooperative Corp.",
  "decision_date": "1943-07-05",
  "docket_number": "4-7114",
  "first_page": "15",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:20:24.664732+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "McCain, Commissioner of Labor, v. Farmers Electric Cooperative Corporation."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Holt, J.\nW. J. McCain, Commissioner of Labor for Arkansas, through Koland M. Shelton, -Director of the Employment Security Division of the Department of Labor, by appropriate proceedings, sought to collect from appellee, \u201cFarmers Electric Cooperative Corporation,\u201d assessments made against it for employment contributions, alleged to be due under Act 391 of 1941. Appellee resisted payment on the ground that it Was organized under Act 342 of 1937, and that under this act and Act 414 of 1941, an amendment to Act 342, it is exempt from payment of the contributions sought to be collected.\nFrom a decree of the trial court sustaining appellee \u2019b contention comes this appeal. .\nAppellants say \u201cthe only question necessary to be determined is whether Act 414 of 1941 exempted the appellee from the payment of contributions due under said Act 391.\u201d\nThe parties here correctly refer to the contributions sought to be collected, as an excise tax. See Buckstaff Bath House Co. v. McKinley, Commissioner, 198 Ark. 91, 127 S. W. 2d 802.\nAct 391 requires contributions by employers generally for unemployment compensation. It specifically repeals Act 155 of 1937 which related to and provided for \u201cunemployment compensation, stabilization of employment and contributions by employees; etc.,\u201d and also Act 200 of 1939, which was amendatory of Act 155.\nAppellants rely on \u00a7 7 (a) (1) of Act 391 as authority for collection of the tax against appellee. That section is as follows: \u201cContributions shall accrue and become payable by each employer for each calendar year in which he is subject to this Act, with respect to wages for employment.\u201d Act 3'42 of 1937, under which appellee was organized, is \u201cAn Act relating to cooperative, non-profit, membership corporations organized to engage in rural electrification,\u201d and \u00a7 30 of this Act provides: \u201cCorporations formed hereunder shall pay annually, on or before July first, to the Secretary of State, a fee of $10 for each 100 members or fraction thereof, but shall be exempt from all other excise taxes of whatsoever kind or nature, except as provided in this Act.\u201d\nAt the same session of the Legislature of 1941, at which Act 391 was passed, Act 414 was enacted amending \u00a7 30 of Act 342 of 1937, and is as follows: \u201cCorporations formed hereunder shall pay annually, on or before July first, to the Secretary of State, a fee of $10 for each 100 members or fraction thereof, but shall be exempt from all other excise taxes of whatsoever kind or nature, except as provided in this Act. And further, shall be exempt from payment of assessments in any general or special taxing district levied on the electric transmission, or distribution lines or rights-of-way easements of such corporations. \u2019 \u2019\nAppellants argue that Act 391 impliedly repealed Act 414, and that appellee must contribute under Act 391. We do not think so. As has been noted, both acts were passed at the 1941 session of the Legislature, and the record of their passage, as stipulted by counsel, is as follows:\n\u201cNo. of Act Act 391 Act 414\nDate Introduced.........Feb. 6,1941 Feb. 11,1941\nFinal Passage.......,........March 11,1941 March 7,1941\nSigned by Governor March 27,1941 March 28,1941\nDate Act in Force.......July 1,1941 June 11,1941. \u2019 \u2019\nOn the record presented we are clearly of the view that it was the intention of the lawmakers to exempt, and that they did exempt, appellee from payment of the contributions, or tax, in question, and that Act 391 did not repeal Act 414. Certainty there is no specific repeal of Act 414 to be found in Act 391, and we think none is implied; nor do we find that the two acts are in any way conflicting. 'Both acts were enacted at the same legislative session. The general, well-established rule is that the repeal of statutes by implication is not favored. In Brown v. The Arkansas Centennial Commission, 194 Ark. 479, 107 S. W. 2d 537, this court said: \u201cNo principle of statutory construction is better settled in this state than that 'the repeal of statutes by implication is not favored. In the recent case of McDonald v. Wasson, 188 Ark. 782, 67 S. W. 2d 722, we quoted the following from 59 C. J. 905: \u2018The repeal of statutes by implication is not favored. The courts are slow to hold that one statute has repealed another by implication, and they will not make such adjudication if they can avoid doing so consistently or on any reasonable hypothesis, or if they can arrive at another result by any construction which is fair and reasonable. Also, the courts will not enlarge the meaning of one act in order to hold that it repeals another by implication, nor will they adopt an interpretation leading to an adjudication of repeal by implication unless it is inevitable, and a very clear and definite reason therefor can be assigned. Furthermore, the courts will not adjudge a statute to have been repealed by implication unless a legislative intention to repeal or supersede the statute plainly and clearly appears. The implication must be clear, necessary ancl irresistible.\u2019 59 C. J. 905 et seq. See, also, Louisiana Oil Ref. Co. v. Rainwater, 183 Ark. 482, 37 S. W. 2d 96; Boone County Board of Ed. v. Taylor, 185 Ark. 869, 50 S. W. 2d 241; Consolidated Indemnity & Ins. Co. v. Fischer Lime & Cement Co., 187 Ark. 131, 58 S. W. 2d 928; Curlin v. Watson, 187 Ark. 685, 61 S. W. 2d 701; Rightsell v. Carpenter, 188 Ark. 21, 64 S. W. 2d 101. All of these cases hold that in order for a later statute to repeal a former by implication there'must be such an irreconcilable conflict between the two that they cannot stand together,\u201d and in Merchants\u2019 Transfer & Warehouse Company v. Gates, 180 Ark. 96, 21 S. W. 2d 406, it is-said: \u2018Another cardinal rule of construction is that, where two acts were under consideration by the Legislature at the same time, and were passed at the same session, this strengthens the presumption that there was no intention to repeal one by the other. Mays v. Phillips County, 168 Ark. 829, 275 S. W. 5, 279 S. W. 366, and Standley v. County Board of Education, 170 Ark. 1, 277 S. W. 550\u2019.\u201d\nThe textwriter, in 25 R. C. L., \u00a7 180, p. 930, says: \u201cThe presumption against implied repeals is especially strong where provisions supposed to conflict were passed at nearly the same time; for, the presumption rests on the improbability of a change of intention, or, if such change occurred, on the probability that the legislature would have expressed it in a different act, with an express repeal of the first. Effect should be given, if possible, to statutes in pari materia, enacted at the same legislative session, and where two acts relating to the same subject were under, consideration and enacted at the same session of the legislature, the courts, it has been said, will exhaust all the resources of interpretation before coming to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them and that one repeals the other. Acts passed at the same legislative session are construed as one act on the same subject. And, instead of holding such acts repugnant, the courts will give effect to both, although in order to do so it becomes necessary to engraft one on the other, or incorporate the earlier into the later act, as an exception to its provisions.\u201d And in 59 C. J., \u00a7 533, p. 928, we find this language: \u201cThe principle that a repeal by implication is not favored by law is especially applicable as 'between two statutes passed at tbe same session of tbe legislature.\u201d\nIt will be observed that Act 414 re-enacts \u00a7 30 of Act 342 and adds an additional sentence which broadens its effect. In plain terms, it exempts appellee and similar cooperatives from the excise tax sought to be imposed here.\nThe fact that Act 414 was introduced after the introduction of 391, and Act 414 was signed by the Governor subsequent to the date on which he signed Act 391, strengthens the presumption that there was no intention to repeal one by the other.\nFinding no error, the decree is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Holt, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Luke J. Arnett, for appellant.",
      "Kaneaster Hoclges, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "McCain, Commissioner of Labor, v. Farmers Electric Cooperative Corporation.\n4-7114\n172 S. W. 2d 933\nOpinion delivered July 5, 1943.\nLuke J. Arnett, for appellant.\nKaneaster Hoclges, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0015-01",
  "first_page_order": 35,
  "last_page_order": 39
}
