{ "id": 1485124, "name": "Stroud v. Gurdon Lumber Company", "name_abbreviation": "Stroud v. Gurdon Lumber Co.", "decision_date": "1943-12-20", "docket_number": "4-7185", "first_page": "490", "last_page": "498", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "206 Ark. 490" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "177 S.W.2d 181" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "4 Pac. 2d 690", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 S. W. 2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10289454 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/14/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Atl. 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Md. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 2160324 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/135/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ark. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1488131 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/205/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ark. 1069", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1488141 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/205/1069-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ark. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1488245 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/205/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 U. S. 724", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 364139 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/318/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 N. W. 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "260 Mich. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1861418 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/mich/260/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Pac. 933", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "91 Okla. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Okla.", "case_ids": [ 8884136 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/okla/91/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 N. E. 2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "273 N. Y. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2023043 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ny/273/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 N. Y. S. 2d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "256 App. Div. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.", "case_ids": [ 5237375 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ad/256/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 F. 2d 953", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1046037 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/107/0953-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 App. D. C. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "App. D.C.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "135 Atl. 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "3 A. L. R. 1336", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "174 Pac. 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "64 Colo. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "205 Ark. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1488131 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/205/0463-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 749, "char_count": 14148, "ocr_confidence": 0.479, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.025551487030643e-07, "percentile": 0.9067961105068287 }, "sha256": "3c66826443e4feb49a3b44e92ed4166c190be760628a2953ffc947bed92f2155", "simhash": "1:3b6bfd41060ea23f", "word_count": 2490 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:20:24.664732+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Stroud v. Gurdon Lumber Company." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Holt, J.\nSeptember 12, 1941, at about 5:30 in the \u25a0afternoon, Lawrence Stroud, husband of appellant, Annie Stroud, was killed, and appellant, Gilbert Bryant, was seriously injured, when a truck in which they were riding overturned on what is known as the \u201cKansas Road,\u201d near Gurdon, Arkansas.\nMrs. Stroud, as widow of Lawrence Stroud, and Gilbert Bryant, in his own right, filed claims before the \u201cArkansas Workmen\u2019s Compensation Commission\u201d for compensation under the provisions of the \u201cWorkmen\u2019s Compensation Law,\u201d (Act 319 of 1939). The claims were first heard before one of the commissioners and there was a finding and decision in favor of the appellees, Gurdon Lumber Company, and Lumbermen\u2019s Reciprocal Insurance Exchange,' its insurance carrier. Thereafter, upon appellants \u2019 petition for review before the full Commission, there was a hearing, which resulted in an affirmance of the finding and decision of the single commissioner. In apt time, appellants appealed to the Clark circuit court, where the claims were, by agreement, consolidated. for the purpose of trial, and upon the record made before the full Commission, the Clark circuit court \u201csustained and affirmed\u201d the judgment of the full Commission. This appeal followed.\nAppellants state the issue here in this language: \u201cAppellants\u2019 contention is that the undisputed evidence shows these claimants were injured while they were actively engaged in performing their duties as employees; that the injuries arose out of and in the course of their employment and the Commission and the Circuit Court erred in failing to so hold.\u201d\nThe Arkansas Compensation Commission found that Stroud and Bryant, at the time of the mishap, which resulted in the death of Stroud and the serious injury to Bryant, were employees of appellee, Gurdon Lumber Company, but that the death and injuries did not arise out of and in the course of their employment and denied compensation. This judgment of the Commission was affirmed by the Clark circuit court on appeal.\nThe question which we determine here is: Did the injuries to Stroud, which resulted in his death, and the injuries to Bryant, arise \u201cout of and in the course of their employment?\u201d The question is one of fact, and as indicated has been determined by the Commission and the trial court adversely to appellants\u2019 contention. On appeal here, unless we can say that the judgment of the Clark circuit court is not supported by substantial evidence; then by. previous holdings of this Court, it would be our duty to affirm.\nIn the recent case of J. L. Williams & Sons, Inc. v. Smith, 205 Ark. 604, 170 S. W. 2d 82, this court held: (Headnote 2) \u201cFindings of fact made by the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Commission are, on appeal, given the same verity as attach to the verdict of a jury, and this applies on appeal to the circuit court as well as to the Supreme Court from the circuit court. Act No. 319 of 1939, \u00a7 25.\u201d See, also, Baker v. Silaz, 205 Ark. 1069, 172 S. W. 2d 419.\nThere appears to be little, if any dispute, as to the material facts. Lawrence Stroud owned and operated liis own truck. He lived with his family about 12 miles . 'east of Gurdon, just north of the \u2018 \u2018 Kansas Road. \u2019 \u2019 For some time prior to his death, he had hauled lumber for the Gurdon Lumber Company from three lumber mills, including the Harrington lumber mill. For this service, he was paid $3 per M. He worked when he pleased. Stroud employed Gilbert Bryant as his helper and paid him 75c per load.. At the time of the injuries complained .of here, there was only one mill, the Harrington mill, from which Stroud could haul, the other two mills having closed down. In order to supplement his work, Stroud, prior to the mishap, had rented his truck to the Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company, for $1.50 per hour, to be used by it during the day, or until 4 o\u2019clock in the afternoon, when his truck, by agreement, was delivered by the Gas Company to the Texaco Filling Station at Gurdon, where it was serviced and made ready for Stroud, who then used it during the night in hauling lumber as above noted. It usually required the greater part of an hour to service the truck, and the Gas Company\u2019s driver of the truck (Easley), remained with it until Stroud came to the station and picked it up, (which he did a part of the time). If Stroud did not arrive at the station before the truck was serviced, Easley would drive the truck to Stroud\u2019s home and deliver it to him there.\nOn the afternoon that Stroud was killed and Bryant injured, Stroud left his home at about 3- p. m. to get his truck at the Texaco Station to haul lumber from Harrington\u2019s mill. When he reached the \u201cKansas Road,\u201d he was joined by his helper, Gilbert Bryant. They secured a ride with a man by the name of Thomas and rode with him for a short distance. They then got out and walked qntil they were picked up by another man, Herbert Jennings, and after riding for a short distance with him, they got out and secured a ride in a truck driven by a third man, Guy Langley, and while riding with Langley, the truck turned over before reaching Gurdon, killing Stroud and seriously injuring Bryant.\nStroud and Bryant were not working by the hour. The Gurdon Lumber Company had no control over them as to when they began or quit work, or the route traveled in pei'fonning their work. Stroud, for his own convenience and profit, had arranged with the Gas Company, for. a consideration of $1.50 per hour, to use his truck (the Gas Company furnishing its own driver, Easley) during \u25a0the day, until 4 o\u2019clock in the afternoon, when the Gas Company would deliver Stroud\u2019s truck to the service station in Gurdon to be serviced and then to be picked up by Stroud for night hauling of lumber from the Harrington mill. The Gurdon Lumber Company had not agreed to transport, and had made no provision for the transportation of Stroud and Bryant over the approximate 12 mile journey from Strond\u2019s home to the service station in Gurdon, or to or from their work. Appellee was not interested in how appellants reached their place of work.\nOn the day of the mishap in question, Stroud and-Bryant chose their own method of conveyance from Stroud\u2019s home to the service station. In so doing, they elected to ride with strangers who had no connection with the Gurdon Lumber Company. They knew that the Stroud truck would not be available to them until its delivery by the Gas Company to the service station at 4 o\u2019clock and until after the additional time required to service the truck and put it in condition for Stroud\u2019s night use.\nWe think it clear on the facts presented that the work of Stroud and Bryant did not begin until the Stroud truck was delivered to them, and since the truck had not been delivered when the mishap occurred, the injuries resulting therefrom did not arise out of and in the course of their employment with the Gurdon .Lumber Company.\nOn the facts as presented to the Commission, this case is clearly distinguishable from that of Hunter v. Summerville, 205 Ark. 463, 169 S. W. 2d 579, on which appellants strongly rely. Obviously, each case must be decided on the facts presented. That the Hunter case turned on the fact as found there, that the employer had agreed to furnish transportation to the employee to and from work, is clear from the last paragraph in that opinion, wherein this court said: \u201cIn view of the fact that the evidence in this case established that transportation to and from his work was a prerequisite to tlie appellee\u2019s engaging in the timber cutting, and that there was an implied undertaking by the employer to furnish this transportation, as well as a tacit acquiescence on the part of the employer in the custom of his workmen riding on his sub-contractor\u2019s truck when it was convenient to do so, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in sustaining the award made by the commission in favor of the appellee.\u201d\nAs w'e have indicated, no such fact situation is present in the instant case, since there is no evidence here that the Gurdon Lumber Company agreed to furnish Stroud and Bryant transportation to work.\nThe Court of Appeals of Maryland in Harrison v. Central Const. Corp., et al., 135 Md. 170,108 Atl. 874,- announced the general rule: \u201cWhen the injury occurs before the beginning or after the termination of work there are two general rules applicable to the question as to whether it arose out of and in the course of the employment. The first is that an employee while on his way to work is not in the course of his employment. The second is that where the workman is employed to work at a certain place, and as a part of his contract of employment there is an agreement that his employer shall furnish him free transportation to or from his work, the period of service continues during the time of transportation, and if an injury occurs during the course of transportation it is held to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment.\u201d\nAnd, in Royalty Indemnity Co. v. Madrigal, 14 S. W. 2d 106, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas held: (Headnote 2) \u201cWhere employe, after day\u2019s work has ended, proceeds to leave place of labor, choosing his own route and method of travel, master not having contracted to furnish him transportation, and for his personal convenience voluntarily mounts truck not property of nor under employer\u2019s control and is injured by mishap to truck not on premises of employer, injury was not received in \u2018course of employment\u2019 and is not compensable under Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law.\u201d\nThe text writer in 28 R. C. L., p. 804, \u00a7 93, says: \u2018 \u2018 The compensation act, it has been very generally held, does not authorize an award in case of injury or death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to which the public at large is exposed. * * * The employee gets up in the morning, dresses .himself, and goes to work, because of his employment; yet if he meets with an accident before coming to the employer\u2019s premises or his place of work, that is not a risk of his occupation, but of life generally.\u201d And, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Gore, et al., 152 Olda. 269, 4 Pac. 2d 690, said: \u201cIn the absence of an agreement, express or implied, to transport an employee to the place of work, the employer is not responsible for an injury sustained by the employee in trayeling to' the place of work.\u201d\nFinding no error, the judgment is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Holt, J." }, { "text": "Robins, J.\n(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case.\nIn my opinion,. when a workman lives at such a distance from his work that he must use transportation in order to get to his place of employment, the risk that he incurs while using this transportation, regardless of its form and regardless of who furnishes it, constitutes a hazard of his employment. Therefore, any injury that he sustains while being transported to or from his work arises out of and in the course of his employment, so as to be compensable under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law. This, as I view it, was the principle under-tying- our decision in the case of Hunter v. Summerville, 205 Ark. 463, 169 S. W. 2d 579, and it is supported by the great weight of authority in this country.\nSome recent cases in which this rule is clearly enunciated are: Industrial Commission v. \u00c6tna Life Ins. Co., 64 Colo. 430, 174 Pac. 589, 3 A. L. R. 1336; Rachels v. Pepoon, 135 Atl. 684; Williams v. American Employer\u2019s Insurance Co., 71 App. D. C. 153, 107 F. 2d 953; Sheehan v. Board of Trustees, 256 App. Div. 148, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 235; Bennett v. Marine Works, 273 N. Y. 429, 7 N. E. 2d 847; Sapulpa Refining Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 91 Okla. 53, 215 Pac. 933; Wearner v. Western Michigan Conference, 260 Mich. 540, 245 N. W. 802.\nThe recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the consolidated cases of Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., and Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Jones, 318 U. S. 724, 63 S. Ct. 930, decided April 19, 1943, while not controlling here, well reflects the trend' of judicial decision. In that case there were involved the claims of two seamen against the owners of their respective ships for compensation for injuries sustained by each of these seamen while they were on shore leave. The law applicable was thus stated: \u201cThat the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued\u201d (130 Fed. 2d 797). ''One of these sailors was injured by falling into a ditch as he was leaving the dock where his ship was birthed. The other was injured while he was traveling a roadway, on his way back to his ship, by being struck by a motor vehicle. In both cases the ship owners urged, as has been successfully contended by the employer and insurance carrier in the case at bar, that these seamen were not engaged in any work or on any mission for their ships or the owners thereof, and were injured as a result of peril to which the entire public was exposed. But our highest court held that the construction urged for disallowance of the claims involved was too narrow a one, and ordered allowance of the claims of both seamen. Mr. Justice Kutledge, speaking for the court said: \u201cCertainly the nature and foundation of the liability require that it be not narrowly confined or whittled clown by restrictive and artificial distinctions defeating its broad and beneficial purposes. If leeway is to be given in either direction, all the considerations which brought the liability into being dictate it should be in the sailor\u2019s behalf.\u201d\nThis court has frequently held that the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law should be liberally construed in favor of those whom it was intended to protect \u2014 the workman and his dependents. Application of a liberal construction of tliis law in the instant case would require, in my opin ion, the allowance of both of the claims involved.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Robins, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "McMillan & McMillan, for appellant.", "J. II. Lo oleado o and M. J. Harrison, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Stroud v. Gurdon Lumber Company.\n4-7185\n177 S. W. 2d 181\nOpinion delivered December 20, 1943.\nMcMillan & McMillan, for appellant.\nJ. II. Lo oleado o and M. J. Harrison, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0490-01", "first_page_order": 510, "last_page_order": 518 }