{ "id": 1485018, "name": "Gingles v. Rogers", "name_abbreviation": "Gingles v. Rogers", "decision_date": "1943-11-08", "docket_number": "4-7143", "first_page": "915", "last_page": "921", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "206 Ark. 915" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "175 S.W.2d 192" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "222 S. W. 1064", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ark. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1587968 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/144/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 S. W. 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 Ark. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1367887 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/150/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ark. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900516 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/38/0181-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 584, "char_count": 11595, "ocr_confidence": 0.494, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8159019166662198e-07, "percentile": 0.7184623505076937 }, "sha256": "01c10c8f380dc7c5749482f81ee5cc06caade523634c260df36bfe0753de508c", "simhash": "1:ab960501d6dcaf79", "word_count": 1991 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:20:24.664732+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Gingles v. Rogers." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Grieein Smith, Chief Justice.\nAlternative questions are presented: First, did Circuit Court err in refusing- to transfer to equity the suit Jimmie C. Rogers filed for the purpose of having H. J. Gingles and S. N. J ones ejected from property the plaintiff claimed? Second, (if it should be held the motion was properly overruled) did Gingles meet the burden of establishing his affirmative defense that he had been in possession, holding adversely, for seven years ?\nRogers deraigned title from the heirs of J. F. Kennedy, they having, by warranty deed, conveyed to Lura Howard December 31, 1923. Subsequent conveyances by warranty deeds were Howard to Burnsides, Burnsides to Horace Lattin, Lattin to Jackson, and Jackson to Rogers. Property contended for in the complaint was Lots Nineteen and Twenty, Block Sixteen, Hillerest Addition to the Town of Bauxite. Damages amounting to $250 were alleged.\nThe answer contained a general denial. Specifically, it was asserted that Rogers did not acquire rights by reason of the Jackson deeds. There was also a denial that the other parties mentioned in the asserted chain had title. As a complete defense Gingles alleged that he took possession of the lots in 1932 and had since been in uninterrupted adverse possession as owner, and that Jones was his tenant. The seven-year statute was specifically pleaded.\nAn amendment to the answer alleged that on October 11, 1932, the defendant purchased the property from Junior Fowler and immediately took possession; that in the deed Fowler erroneously described the lots, but the land actually purchased was that in controversy. It was then said: \u201cThis court has no jurisdiction to cancel plaintiff\u2019s alleged deeds, which are a cloud upon defendant\u2019s title.\u201d There was a prayer for transfer to chancery and that the deeds be canceled and that title be confirmed in the defendant;\u2022 also that the defendant have \u201call proper relief. \u2019 \u2019\nIt thus appears that Gingles was in possession of Lots Nineteen and Twenty of Block Sixteen; and that in response to the suit in ejectment he first' relied upon adverse possession and a denial that Bogers had title; that he subsequently claimed to have purchased the property, but through error the description was of different lots in a different block; that without abandoning his adverse claim, Gingles asserted purchase from Fowler, and that he moved for transfer to chancery for the purpose of having Bogers\u2019 deeds cancelled, and that he pr\u00e1yed for \u2018 \u2018 all proper relief. \u2019 \u2019\nOne seeking to eject another must, of course, bring himself within the rule that, prima facie, a legal right to possession of the property must be shown. As was said by Mr. Justice Eakin in Wilson and Wife v. Springer, 38 Ark. 181, \u201cIn making out title by the party having the onus, he must do so either by force of the statute of limitations, or by showing claim of title from the government, or at least from a source common to both parties, which implies admission of title to that source, on both sides.\u201d Bogers purchased from Jackson and deraigned title to Kennedy, whose heirs conveyed to Howard in 1923. But Gingles denied that J. F. Kennedy had title. However, tlie cause went to trial without any objection having been made to the failure-of Rogers to deraign title from the \u2022government or a common source, and it will be presumed that the exception actually noted went only to the court\u2019s refusal to transfer to equity. The order is susceptible of no other construction.\nRogers, basing his rights on the deeds from Jackson executed in July, 1941, and April, 1942, was entitled to prevail at law in so far as the record title was concerned unless Gingles, who had waived his right to require deraignment to the government, or to a common source, could show \u2014 and it was necessary that this be alleged\u2014 that the Kennedy heirs and those in sequence down to Jackson, or one of them, did not have title. He relied upon a three-pronged defense. Two of them (adverse possession and the weakness of his adversary\u2019s title) were essentially of legal cognizance. The third (mistake in description) was equitable. AVas the last defense maintainable ?\nAssuming that Gingles bought of Fowler, there is nothing in the complaint or amendment to show that Fowler ever owned the property; dr, conversely, that if he claimed title it would be of such a character as to defeat, at law, the record title asserted by Rogers. Equity jurisdiction to quiet title, independent of statute, is, of course, available to a plaintiff in possession holding the legal title. \u201cThe reason,\u201d said Mr. Justice Hart in Gibbs v. Bates, 150 Ark. 344, 234 S. W. 175, \u201cis that where the title is a purely legal one, and some one else is in possession, the remedy at law is plain, adequate and complete, and an action of ejectment cannot be maintained under the guise of a bill in chancery. In such a case the party in possession has a constitutional right to a trial by jury. Pearman v. Pearman, 144 Ark. 528, (222 S. W. 1064) and cases cited.\u201d In the instant case Gingles was-the defendant in possession asking transfer to chancery for the purpose of cancelling the plaintiff\u2019s deeds as a cloud upon his title. The amendment does not, in terms, \"ask that the Fowler deed be reformed. If it be conceded that in effect the prayer was broad enough to indicate this purpose, we are then met with the proposition that if Fowler intended to deed Lots Nineteen and Twenty to Gingles, it does not follow as a matter of law that he owned them, or that his deed beclouded Gingles\u2019 title. The suit proper was such a clond if Gingles owned the lots, but on the face of the record as disclosed by the amendment it was possible for Fowler to have claimed from one source, for Rogers to have claimed as he did, or for Fowler to 'have sold without having title of any kind. The right to transfer to chancery must be tested by what the pleadings disclose at the time the court acts.\nWe conclude, therefore, that the court did not err in overruling the motion.\n\u2022Rogers testified that he contracted in 1936 for purchase of seven lots, including the two in question. Final payment was made in 1941, at which time he received a deed. There were two houses on the seven lots, one being-on Lots Nineteen and Twenty, Block Sixteen. When he made his contract with Jackson to purchase, S. N. Jones occupied the house on Lots Nineteen and Twenty and was paying rent to Gingles. Jackson, said Rogers, acquired the property in 1936- by purchase from Horace Lattin and sold it to witness the following day.\nJones testified that he lived in the house on Lots Nineteen and Twenty and had occupied them as Gingles \u2019 tenant \u201cseven years in February.\u201d- Jones\u2019 son-in-law, Sam Lattin, lived in the house before witness occupied it. To the best of Jones\u2019 recollection, Sam Lattin occupied the property two months \u2014 \u201cmaybe longer.\u201d Jones made the positive statement that \u201cAll the time I lived in the house continually \u2014 for seven years last February \u2014 and paid rent to Gingles.\u201d Rogers lived in a house within two hundred feet of the one occupied by Jones.\nSam Lattin testified that he occupied the property \u201cabout 1934,\u201d having rented from Gingles. He remained there until 1938. Jones \u201clater on\u201d moved into the same house with witness. Witness believed Jim Kesterson was a tenant before he moved into the house in 1934.\nJunior Fowler\u2019s testimony was that in 1930 he moved to the property in question, having bought it from Horace Lattin in 1929. The house was occupied by S. N. Jones, who was \u201cput off by the law.\u201d He lived there at two different times after buying, then sold .to Gingles in 1931. Witness received a deed from Horace Lattin, and, without having it recorded, \u201cturned it over to Mr. Gingles.\u201d He did not know what lots the deed called for, but the property claimed by Gingles was pointed out to him. Fowler later testified that he had the deed recorded. S.'H. Burn-sides had at one time owned the lots and measured them off when witness purchased of Lattin. The property, definitely, was that occupied by Jones at the time of trial and claimed by Gingles, but witness did not examine- the deed to see what lots were shown.\nSubstance of testimony given by Gingles was that he purchased from Junior Fowler in 1931. (The deeds to Lots Twenty-one and Twenty-two were subsequently introduced.) He held [Lots Nineteen and Twenty] continuously, having rented them most of the time, although \u201cthere was some little time during the depression they weren\u2019t rented, but they were-rented ninety per cent, of the time.\u201d Fowler lived on Gingles\u2019 Tiger Hill farm when he (Fowler) sold the lots to witness. Fowler secured employment at Bauxite: \u201cI had an opportunity to rent the farm, so made a deal with Fowler to move back [on the lots] and did not charge him rent.\u201d Witness had 'two or three tenants on the lots prior to occupancy by Jones: \u201cSome paid rent and some didn\u2019t. It was the latter part of 1931, 1932, and 1933. Vacant houses were numerous. I would rather have a tenant without pay than not have a tenant. Really, the first regular paying -tenants were Lattin and Jones, but all we.re tenants of mine and it was definitely understood that I was in possession. Lattin preceded Jones. I,have had possession continuously up to the present time.\u201d\nRogers, being recalled, testified that he had paid taxes on Lots Fourteen to Twenty, inclusive, since 1936.\nAdverse possession for seven years was not established by testimony of S. N. Jones. When Rogers\u2019 suit was filed September 9, 1942, miming of the statute was stopped, and seven years did not, according to this witness, accrue until the following February. If Sam Lat-tin\u2019s occupancy as established by Jones is added to the adverse period, the additional two months \u2014 or, as Jones expressed it, \u201cmaybe longer\u201d \u2014 is unavailing, for \u201cmaybe longer\u201d is too indefinite, .when considered in connection with the period this witness was attempting to establish, to reach hack to September of the seventh year preceding the February referred to. Nor are the facts aided by anything Sam Lattin testified to. lie claimed to have rented from Gingles \u201cabout 1934\u201d and to have remained until 1938. Later, he 'says, Jones (his father-in-law) moved into the house with him. All the time from 1934 to 1938 he paid rent to Gingles. Testimony of these two witnesses was such as to justify the jury in rejecting either version, or both; and since Gingles was an interested party and his testimony is not treated as being undisputed, it follows that appellant did not meet the burden imposed by his affirmative pleading.\nAffirmed.\nBurnsides\u2019 deed to Lattin was executed November 7, 1928, but not recorded until May 19, 1930. Lattin sold to Jackson Nov. 11, \u00cd936, and the Jackson deeds (there appear to have been two) were dated July 21, 1941, and April 11, 1942.\nGingles was the real party in interest as defendant, Jones having been his tenant.\nIt was stipulated that the deed record showed a warranty deed from Fowler to J. G. Kelley and H. J. Gingles covering Lots 21 and 22, Block Eighteen, Hillcrest Addition to the Town of Bauxite. It was dated October 14, 1932. July 24, 1933, Kelley quitclaimed to Gingles.\nRogers\u2019 complaint was filed September 9, 1942. Trial was had March 2, 1943. Jones\u2019 answer to the question, \u201cHow long have you lived on [the property in question?\u201d] and his answer, \u201cSeven years in February,\u201d had reference to the month preceding trial in March.", "type": "majority", "author": "Grieein Smith, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ernest Briner, for appellant.", "Kenneth G. Coffelt, for- appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Gingles v. Rogers.\n4-7143\n175 S. W. 2d 192\nOpinion delivered November 8, 1943.\nErnest Briner, for appellant.\nKenneth G. Coffelt, for- appellee." }, "file_name": "0915-01", "first_page_order": 935, "last_page_order": 941 }