{
  "id": 1481706,
  "name": "West v. Todd",
  "name_abbreviation": "West v. Todd",
  "decision_date": "1944-05-29",
  "docket_number": "4-7375",
  "first_page": "341",
  "last_page": "345",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "207 Ark. 341"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "180 S.W.2d 522"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 503,
    "char_count": 7688,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.463,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.3581087868871945e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6349283297983782
    },
    "sha256": "12821d889e0866edf6c94efd9ddcd17b8a665ac1e09eaaf8f9492ffb1dd8efcc",
    "simhash": "1:adb668358e272487",
    "word_count": 1298
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:46:39.394631+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "West v. Todd."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "G-rieein Smith, Chief Justice.\nThe issue is whether H. R. Todd is entitled to participate in certain net profits earned by- the department store operated at Warren, Arkansas, by West Brothers, a partnership as to which Todd was not a member.\n\u25a0 Appellants AVest own a chain of stores. In 1939 Todd, who had been an assistant, was transferred to Texarkana as manager. In July of the following year he went to AVarren and took charge of the local business on order of S. E. Humphreys, superintendent.\nTodd\u2019s first employment by the partnership was at Natchitoches, Louisiana, where in 1936 he was engaged personally by H. O'. AVest as assistant manager. Todd testified that compensation was to be $100 per month, plus five percent of net profits. If made manager he was to receive fifty percent of the first $5,000 and twenty-five percent of all over, after advances had been deducted. As manager his salary was increased to $125 per month, and later to $150. He says there was no agreement for a definite period of time.\nTodd resigned, effective August 30,1942, a telegram . to that effect having been sent to the general office at DeRidder, La. The resignation was accepted with expressions of regret.\nNo claim for profit-participation was made until January 7,1943. Suit was then filed without prior notice, allegation being that earnings for the first seven months of the preceding year had been $6,153.09, the apportion-able percentage of which was $2,788.27, less collected salary of $1,050, leaving $1,738.27. An additional allegation was that the plaintiff would he entitled to twenty-five percent of August profits. The amount was then unknown, but at trial it was stipulated to be $678.76. By this computation the demand was increased to $1,907.96.\nAVhen it was shown that profits for the full year were $20,219.63, Todd enlarged his claim, and made the statement shown in the margin. The jury returned a verdict for $1,200, for which there was judgment.\nIt is difficult to harmonize some of the figures \u2014 a task not required of tlie Court. For example, Todd testified that \u201c. . . to July 31, 1942, the store had made $3,937.13 \u2014 in round figures $3,900 in eight months, $20,-000 in twelve months and according to the July 3.1 statement they owed me $1,968.57, less my drawing account of $1,050, or the net amount of $918.57.\u201d\nThe latter claim does not agree with $957.57 set out in a monthly statement. There are other differences.\nA. B. Tollett, who succeeded Todd, received a bonus of $4,268 for the last four months of 1942 because, as he says, \u201cI was in the store at the end of the year.\u201d\nThe only material difference between Todd\u2019s testimony and that given by West is that West says the year-end agreement was expressed, while Todd insists nothing was said about, the time his employment should continue.\nThe verdict seems to have been a compromise, not predicated upon any' definite figure. The jury had a right, of course, to believe Todd and to disbelieve West. Seemingly it did neither. Each witness was an interested party, and his testimony will not be treated as undisputed even if no conflict appeared.\nDid the jury have a right to interpret this contract?' That is its province in case of ambiguity. If not indefinite \u2014 that is, if the meaning, of what was said is so clear that reasonable minds would agree \u2014 then construction is for the Court. Eliminating West\u2019s testimony, we have Todd\u2019s statement that nothing' was said regarding the time he should serve, or when the bonus would be payable.\nIn circumstances such as we are dealing with it is important to know what meaning the parties placed upon the contract when it was made, or during performance, and this the Court (without aid of jury) should do if the conduct is susceptible of but one conclusion.\nAccording to Todd, and the balance sheet he used, net profits at the time he resigned were .less than five thousand dollars. In the light of all testimony, showing the most amicable relationships throughout, and the expression by West that Todd was an excellent manager, it is strange that if the claimant, had thought his contract contemplated payment of a bonus as here contended for, he would have waited four months before mentioning this view.\nSeemingly Todd, after December 31, ascertained that substantial profits had been made, and then concluded to place upon the contract the construction set out in the complaint. But even after that he changed positions. Not satisfied with the first contention that participation should be upon an eight months basis, he shifted to a contention \u25a0 that the much larger profits earned under supervision of his successor should be considered in deter- \u2022 mining his over-all apportionment. Under this construction, his contribution to earnings did not end with severance of the employment relationship, but was projected into the future in such a way as in effect to constitute a partnership in fact, though not at law.'\nIt is strongly indicated that Todd did not, when he resigned, regard the contract as one entitling him to participation in profits. In not at once asking that he be paid he inferentially assented to the construction now sought by West. However, Todd .disputes West\u2019s testimony. If, as appellee contends, nothing was said about the employment perio'd, there was sufficient ambiguity in this verbal arrangement (a conversation never clarified by writing) to justify the Court in having the jury say whether designation of a monthly salary, coupled with methods of payment and periodical statements showing bonus accruals, and a consideration of all other relationships, were sufficient to create in the mind of a reasonable man (and particularly one situated as Todd was) a belief that it was West\u2019s purpose to pay the bonus in the event of resignation before a year (any year) should end.\nBefore Todd testified, two witnesses were examined for the purpose of informing the jury that he was a man of good character, entitled to belief. Objection was made, overruled, and exceptions saved and brought forward in the motion for a new trial. It was a mistake to admit such testimony at that time. Pope\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 5199. Although conceded in oral argument that this was error, contention is that it was cured when West subsequently testified to Todd\u2019s good character. We do not think so. Reputation for truth and veracity in the community in which a witness lives is the matter of concern. Character may be different from reputation.\nIn any event it was not proper to prepare the minds of jurors with a build-up intended to convince them in advance of the plaintiff\u2019s appearance that here is a man whose word is guaranteed by good citizens \u2014 in the instant case one was a minister, the other a postmaster.\nFor the error in admitting this testimony the judgment is reversed; but the cause is remanded for a new trial. Todd may not recover an amount in excess of a percentage of profits earned while he was manager. It is so ordered.\nThe statement was: \u201cAccording to the figures stipulated (20,219.63), if the manager had completed a full year he would have been entitled to $6,304.90, against which his drawing account and borrowed money should be deducted. I claim I am entitled to two-thirds of that, less my drawing account, because I remained in the Warren store eight months, or the sum of $3,003.26.\u201d (In an amended complaint he asked for $3,112.50.) At one time in the testimony Todd said: \u201cAccording to the monthly statement furnished me July \u00e1l, I was entitled* to a bonus of $957.57.\u201d",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "G-rieein Smith, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "DuVal L. Purhins, for appellant.",
      "C. C. Hollensworth and Aubert Martin, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "West v. Todd.\n4-7375\n180 S. W. 2d 522\nOpinion delivered May 29, 1944.\nDuVal L. Purhins, for appellant.\nC. C. Hollensworth and Aubert Martin, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0341-01",
  "first_page_order": 379,
  "last_page_order": 383
}