{
  "id": 1481825,
  "name": "C. J. Horner Company v. Holland",
  "name_abbreviation": "C. J. Horner Co. v. Holland",
  "decision_date": "1944-05-29",
  "docket_number": "4-7373",
  "first_page": "345",
  "last_page": "349",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "207 Ark. 345"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "180 S.W.2d 524"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "112 S. W. 2d 416",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "195 Ark. 435",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        8721430
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      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/195/0435-01"
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    {
      "cite": "201 Ark. 675",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8723556
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      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/201/0675-01"
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    {
      "cite": "315 S. W. 2d 270",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "195 Ark. 994",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8725841
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/195/0994-01"
      ]
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:46:39.394631+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "C. J. Horner Company v. Holland."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Holt, J.\nAppellee sued appellant for damages resulting from an injury to a Neon sign owned by appellee and extending from the front of his property. Appellee alleged that on April 30, 3943, appellant\u2019s truck, while being driven by an employee engaged in appellant\u2019s business at the time, negligently ran into a Neon sign belonging to appellee, doing damage in the amount of $300. Appellant answered with a general denial of liability and further defended on the ground that appellee was guilty of \u201ccontributory negligence in hanging the sign over the public highway, and that portion of the street paved and used as a public highway, contrary to law, etc.\u201d By agreement, the cause was submitted to the trial court sitting as a jury, and there was a finding in favor of appellee in the amount of $136. From the judgment comes this appeal.\nFor reversal, appellant contends first, that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict and specifically appellant argues that its truck driver, Holland McLean, was not driving the truck at the time appellee\u2019s sign was damaged; that McLean was not engaged in any business for appellant at that time, and that, in fact, Helen McLean, the wife of Holland McLean, was driving the truck in question at the time of the injury to the sign.\nThe facts are that Holland McLean, at the time of the injury to appellee\u2019s sign, was in appellant\u2019s employ as truck driver. Appellant maintained a warehouse in Hot Springs and another in Glenwood, where it kept feed and groceries. McLean lived out on highway No. 70, across the river, and haul\u00e9d feed and groceries for appellant between Hot Springs and Glenwood. For appellant\u2019s interest, and the convenience of the truck driver and appellant, appellant permitted McLean to take the truck home with him at night, and says appellant, C. J. Horner, \u201cYes, it is customary where you have a run like that, for 1he driver to keep the truck in the vicinity rvhere he lives and travel in it. Keeping the truck out there at Mr. McLean\u2019s house was for your convenience, too, to save time, wasn\u2019t it'? Oh yes, it was a matter of convenience.\u201d On the afternoon when the damage to the sign occurred, the truck driver, McLean, started home with the truck along state concrete highway No. 70 at about 3 o\u2019clock, after having sparkplugs installed, in the motor, at a repair shop.\nVelma Oonine, an eyewitness, testified that the truck hit appellee\u2019s sign between 3:30 and 4 o\u2019clock, that the truck belonged to appellant, and that a man was driving the truck at the time. Against this testimony, appellant\u2019s witness, Helen McLean, testified that she, dressed in overalls and wearing a driver\u2019s cap, was driving the truck between 2 and 3 o\u2019clock of that same afternoon, that she drove by appellee\u2019s sign and that she does not know whether she hit it or not. The truck driver, McLean, denied hitting the sign.\nThe law applicable to facts such as we have here is well settled. We held in Carter Truck Line v. Gibson, 195 Ark. 994, 315 S. W. 2d 270, (Headnote 3), \u201cThe test of the master\u2019s liability for the negligence of his servant is not whether the act complained of was committed while the servant was in his employ, but whether it pertains to something incident to the employment and which it was the servant\u2019s duty to perform, or was for the master\u2019s benefit. \u2019 \u2019 See, also, Lindley v. McKay, 201 Ark. 675, 146 S. W. 2d 545.\nIn Helena Wholesale Grocery Company v. Bell, 195 Ark. 435, 112 S. W. 2d 416, (Headnote 1), it was held: \u201cWhere appellant employed a person to drive his truck in delivering groceries some 40 miles from the store, and the driver who lived some miles from the store was permitted to go home at night in the truck and return the next morning to his work in the truck, he was on business for appellant when, on returning to Ms home in the evening, he negligently ran into the wagon of appellee injuring him, since it was for the benefit of appellant that the driver go to his home in the evening and return to work the next morning in the truck, \u2019 \u2019 and in the opinion, it is said: \u201c\"We think the jury were warranted, and reasonably so, in drawing the inference from the evidence that appellant\u2019s permission to take the truck to the driver\u2019s home every night was for the convenience-and benefit of said appellant, and that on account of this convenience and benefit the driver was engaged in the prosecution of the business of appellant while driving said truck to his home. \u2019 \u2019\nGuided by these rules of law, we think there was substantial evidence here upon which the trial court based its decision, and we do not disturb that finding.\nAppellant also contends that there can be no recovery because, as he says, \u201cthe sign in front of appellee\u2019s place of business was a sign suspended over a public highway. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the owner of said sign to place same at a sufficient height that it would not be damaged by the use of this paved area by the general public, by the use of standard vehicles thereon,'\u201d and that appellee failed to comply with the provisions of \u00a7 6802 (a) of Pope\u2019s Digest, which required the sign to be not less than 12 feet, 6 inches above the highway unless a notice was posted indicating a lesser height and therefore that appellee could not recover under \u00a7 6809 which provides-, \u201c(b) Any person driving any vehicle, object or contrivance upon any highway shall be liable for all damages to structures spanning the highway or a part of the highway by reason of load heights in excess of that which such structure will permit, when the clearance height of such structure is posted, and in any event where the height of the vehicle and load is in excess of 12 feet, 6 inches. . .\u2022 (d) Such damage may be recovered in a civil action brought by the authorities in control of such highway or highway structure.\u201d We think, however, that these sections of the highway statute have no application here, for the reason that the sign in question was the personal property of appellee, erected in front of his building, 15 feet from the edge of highway No. 70. The purpose of the above sections of the highway statute is to give to the state \u201cauthorities in control of such highway or highway structure\u201d a right to recover damages in a civil action against any person who, while driving any vehicle upon any highway, damages \u201cstructures spanning the highway or a part of the highway by reason.of load heights, etc.\u201d As indicated, the sign involved here was the property of appellee and was 15 feet away from the highway\u2019s edge, and the statute does not apply.\nFinding no error, the judgment is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Holt, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Martin, Wootton & Martin, for appellant.",
      "Jay M. Rowland, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "C. J. Horner Company v. Holland.\n4-7373\n180 S. W. 2d 524\nOpinion delivered May 29, 1944.\nMartin, Wootton & Martin, for appellant.\nJay M. Rowland, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0345-01",
  "first_page_order": 383,
  "last_page_order": 387
}