{
  "id": 1478722,
  "name": "Crossett Lumber Company v. Johnson",
  "name_abbreviation": "Crossett Lumber Co. v. Johnson",
  "decision_date": "1945-04-23",
  "docket_number": "4-7654",
  "first_page": "572",
  "last_page": "577",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "208 Ark. 572"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "187 S.W.2d 161"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "62 A. L. R. 173",
      "category": "reporters:specialty",
      "reporter": "A.L.R.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "204 Ark. 407",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1444135
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/204/0407-01"
      ]
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:02:19.909104+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Crossett Lumber Company v. Johnson."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "McFaddin, J.\nThis appeal challenges a finding and an award made by the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Commission in favor of appellees.\nRaymond E. Johnson received instantly fatal injuries while in the course of his employment for Crossett Lumber Company. He was single and twenty-two years of age, and made his home with the appellees, being his father, mother and minor brother. These appellees filed claim for compensation (under Act 319 of 1939); and same was awarded by the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Commission after an extensive hearing in which the principal\u2014if not only\u2014question was whether the appellees were dependent on Raymond Johnson at the time of his death.\nThe Commission made the following finding of fact; \u201cThat C. M. Johnson, Mrs. C. M. Johnson and James Marvin Johnson were dependents of Raymond E. Johnson, deceased, at the time of his death, \u2019 \u2019\nThe Commission also made the following conclusions of law:\n\u201cA reading of the record and argument of counsel for the respondent indicate that the respondent relies upon a contention that it is necessary to show that one is wholly dependent upon a deceased employee in order to qualify for compensation\u2014such is' not the law. It is well settled that partial dependency is sufficient to justify an award for compensation.\n\u201cIn Mach Coal Co. v. Hill, (9 cases consolidated) 204 Ark. 407, 162 S. W. 2d 906, it was said: \u2018We do not think that the Commission improperly determined that the. father and stepmother were dependents of Ralph Walker, . . In that case the respondent argued that contributions of $25 to $30 a month made by Ralph Walker were not sufficient to establish dependency.\n\u201cThe Commission has consistently held that one is a dependent within the meaning of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law if one relies for support in whole or in part upon the aid of another. Under the provisions of \u00a7 16 of the law partial dependency is sufficient to support an .award for compensation for alien non-resident parents and surely it was not the legislative intent to be more liberal with alien non-residents than with our own citizens.\n\u2018 \u2018 The decedent was living at home with the claimants and was making regular contributions to the family group of which he was a party. We do not believe the fact that the claimants were able to save a part of the contributions and a part of the father\u2019s earning would affect their status as dependents. Support does not mean the bare necessaries of life, and' even though the claimants could have existed without the contributions received from the decedent, it is quite apparent that the contributions did affect their standard of living and were properly a part of their support.\n\u201cThe fact that much the larger part of the money used in the support of the family was supplied by the' father was not inconsistent with the father and stepmother being partial dependents of the deceased if the contributions the latter was in the habit of making were required to enable them to meet the reasonable necessary expenses of living in the way to which they were accustomed, and they looked forward to and relied on the continuance of such contributions for their support. Texas Employers\u2019 Ins. Ass\u2019n v. Sheppeard, (C.C.A. 5) 62 Fed. 2d 122.\n\u201cSee, also, 62 A. L. R. 173; 28 R. C. L. 77; 71 C. J. \u00a7 272, 273; Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law, Schneider, Yol. II, Second Edition, <\u00a7\u00a7 370, 371.\u201d\nI. The Issue of Dependency in This Case was a Fact Question; and the Commission\u2019s Finding on This Fact is Amply Supported by the Evidence. Where dependency is not conclusively presumed by reason of relationship (as in the case of a child below a certain age), then dependency is a question of fact. In the case of Texas Employers\u2019 Ins. Ass\u2019n v. Bheppeard, 62 Fed. 2d 122, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit said: \u2018 \u2018 The question of dependency is one of fact in the determination of which all the circumstances of the particular case are to be considered.\u201d\nIn Honnold on Workmen\u2019s Compensation, Yol. I, p. 256, the rule is stated: \u201cActual dependency is a question of fact, to be determined, in the absence of any applicable and conclusive statutory presumption, from the circumstances of the particular case, . . . \u201d\nAnd in Schneider on \u201cWorkmen\u2019s Compensation Law,\u201d Second Ed., Yol. II, p. 1230, the rule is stated: \u201cDependency, its extent, and persons entitled to compensation, are questions of fact. . . .\u201d\nC. M. Johnson, father of deceased, testified that Raymond Johnson made about $100 per month; that Raymond contributed to the household expenses in addition to giving $6 per week to his mother; that whenever witness did not have enough money to pay the grocery bill, Raymond would pay whatever was the balance; that in addition Raymond bought other groceries for the family; and that when witness\u2019 wife (Raymond\u2019s mother) had to go to Monroe, Louisiana, to see a doctor, Raymond paid all of the expenses of the trip, and also the doctor\u2019s bill. He said:\n\u2018 \u2018 It took all I made and about half of what Raymond made to meet expenses. ...\n\u201cI wasn\u2019t wholly dependent on him, but I depended on him to help bear the expenses of the family.\u201d\nMrs. C. M. Johnson's testimony was even more detailed, but it may be summed up in the statement that Raymond gave the family \u201cas much as one-half of his income.\u201d Without prolonging this opinion by reviewing all of the evidence, we have concluded that the evidence \u2022 is amply sufficient to sustain the Commission\u2019s finding of fact.\nII. The Commission\u2019s Conclusions of Law are Correct. Our Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law (Act 319 of 1939) in \u00a7 II (j) in speaking of unmarried children uses the word \u201cdependent on deceased\u201d; but when speaking of married children uses the words \u201cwholly dependent on deceased\u201d; likewise, in speaking of married sisters, uses the term \u201cwholly dependent upon the deceased. \u201d Then in \u00a7 II (k). in speaking of parents, the act uses the term \u201cdependent upon the deceased.\u201d Thus, the act makes a distinction between \u201cwholly dependent\u201d and \u201cdependent.\u201d This shows that the evident intent of the lawmakers was to make \u201cdependent\u201d mean something different from \u201cwholly dependent\u201d; and the only difference that could exist is that \u201cdependency\u201d means partial dependency, unless it is stated to mean total dependency.\nIn Honnold\u2019s two-volume treatise on \u201cWorkmen\u2019s Compensation,\u201d Yol. I, page 232, in discussing partial dependency, it is said:\n\u201cThe phrase \u2018actual dependents\u2019 means dependents in fact whether wholly or partially dependent. Hence it was no defense, in proceedings under an act using this term, that petitioner and his family were not entirely dependent on deceased. Partial dependency, giving a right to compensation, may exist, though the contributions be at irregular intervals and of irregular amounts, and though the dependent have other means of support, and be not reduced to absolute want. \u2019 \u2019\nWe affirm the judgment of the circuit court which affirmed the award of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Commission.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "McFaddin, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Paul Johnson, for appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Crossett Lumber Company v. Johnson.\n4-7654\n187 S. W. 2d 161\nOpinion delivered April 23, 1945.\nPaul Johnson, for appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0572-01",
  "first_page_order": 590,
  "last_page_order": 595
}