{ "id": 1475722, "name": "Ray, Ex Parte", "name_abbreviation": "Ex parte Ray", "decision_date": "1946-02-11", "docket_number": "4-7815", "first_page": "739", "last_page": "742", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 Ark. 739" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "192 S.W.2d 225" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "143 S. W. 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ark. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1353997 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/102/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 S. W. 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ark. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724085 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/160/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ark. 765", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1488295 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/205/0765-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S. W. 2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ark. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1415116 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/192/0660-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 379, "char_count": 5401, "ocr_confidence": 0.483, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.476986920846159e-08, "percentile": 0.34343044710328674 }, "sha256": "aa53b93769840a49de2ae50e5e48fe1cc71b583669e2e41918b7ab93115fdb3b", "simhash": "1:1e2f48592c2c07f2", "word_count": 930 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:58:59.179776+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Ray, Ex Parte." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Grieein Smith, Chief Justice.\nO. H. and Minnie Ray were divorced on testimony supporting the husband\u2019s cross-complaint. An appeal from the decree reached this Court in 1936 and was disposed of April 27th. Ray v. Ray, 192 Ark. 660, 93 S. W. 2d 665. Result was that an award of $30 per month as alimony was reduced to $15, but each of two minor children was given $7.50 monthly maintenance. After the children became of age and were no longer living with their mother, the latter petitioned for an increased allowance. In October, 1942, she was decreed $25 per month. The former husband prosecuted an unsuccessful appeal. Ray v. Ray, 205 Ark. 765, 170 S. W. 2d 681.\nPayments under the new order were made until 1945, but were omitted for May and June of that year. Information to this effect having come to the Chancellor\u2019s attention (no formal complaint appearing to have been filed by Mrs. Ray), the Clerk was directed to issue a citatiou commanding Ray to appear and show cause why he should not be dealt with as for contempt. Through error the Clerk issued an ordinary summons, effect of which was to inform the defendant that he had been sued and that unless defense should be made within the time prescribed by law allegations of \u25a0 the complaint would be taken for confessed. The Sheriff\u2019s return shows the summons was served June 25, 1945.\n-When Ray called at the Clerk\u2019s office to procure a copy of the complaint, he was informed by the Clerk that no pleading's had been filed, but that he (the Clerk) had been directed by the Chancellor, who called by telephone, to issue the summons. In appellant\u2019s brief, testimony of the Clerk is quoted to the effect that Ray was told no pleadings had been filbd, \u201c. . . and that he was directed orally by the Chancellor to issue the summons.\u201d The Clerk, however, testified that he inadvertently, violated the Court\u2019s instruction; so a fair inference arises that the nature of the proceeding was made known to Ray. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that Ray went directly from the Clerk\u2019s office to see his attorney.\nOn July 10th Mrs. Ray petitioned the Court for further modification of the decree. This transaction is not involved in the instant controversy because Ray\u2019s conversations with the Clerk and with his attorney occurred before the petition was filed.\nWhen Court convened at 10 o\u2019clock the morning of July 16th, Ray appeared with his attorney and was informed by the Chancellor regarding the charges. His defense was that no citation had been served. This amounted to a challenge to jurisdiction. Ray was directed to appear at 1 o\u2019clock the same day, and did so, but again protested for the same reason. Witnesses were heard, in consequence of which the respondent was ordered to pay the two twenty-five-dollar delinquencies on or before August 1, under penalty of contempt. The Sheriff was instructed, in the event of default, that Ray be taken into custody and confined in jail \u201cuntil such time as he makes the payments. \u2019 \u2019\nDid the Court have jurisdiction? In Ex Parte Coulter, 160 Ark. 550, 255 S. W. 15, it was held (quoting from CarlLee v. State, 102 Ark. 122, 143 S. W. 909) that the accused was entitled to be informed with reasonable certainty \u201cof the facts constituting the offense, . . . and [be given an opportunity] to make defense thereto\u2014 his day in court . . . The statute [as to contempt] says only that [the accused] shall be notified . . . and have a reasonable opportunity to make his defense. There must be an accusation before the accused can be notified of it, and there is no reason why the Court in session cannot recite that the matter offending has come to its knowledge, setting it out in an order, and directing a citation thereon to show cause. \u2019 \u2019\nIn another paragraph of the same opinion it is said (repeating) that there must first be an accusation in some form, made either by the judge himself or by someone in possession of the facts, sufficient to constitute a prima facie case. \u2019 \u2019\nIt is definitely settled by our decisions and elsewhere that the Court wherein a contemnor is in default may initiate the process for adjudication. That is exactly Avhat was . done in the case at bar. The Chancellor had information that the payments had not been made. He directed the Clerk to issue citation and deliver it to the Sheriff for service. The Clerk apparently understood what the objective was, but erroneously assumed that a summons would suffice. If Ray had not appeared July 16th to dispute the 'Court\u2019s jurisdiction the result would be different. But he did respond, with his attorney, and the Chancellor told, him what the complaint was. If at that time he had made reasonable representations that a tenable defense could'not be established unless witnesses then not available should be procured, or if under his own testimony doubt had been cast upon deliberate contempt* the penalty now complained of would not be before us. Certainly, when told at 10 o\u2019clock in the morning that the hearing would proceed three hours later, Ray had ample time within which to state that he had a defense and to tell the Court what witnesses were needed. Having elected to rely upon the defense that there was no jurisdiction, and being wrong in that respect, it follows that the order must be affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Grieein Smith, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "if. J. Denton, for petitioner." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Ray, Ex Parte.\n4-7815\n192 S. W. 2d 225\nOpinion delivered February 11, 1946.\nif. J. Denton, for petitioner." }, "file_name": "0739-01", "first_page_order": 755, "last_page_order": 758 }