{ "id": 8725078, "name": "Dixon v. Hall, Secretary of State", "name_abbreviation": "Dixon v. Hall", "decision_date": "1946-09-30", "docket_number": "4-8024", "first_page": "891", "last_page": "895", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "210 Ark. 891" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "198 S.W.2d 1002" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "97 S. W. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ark. 1155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1415104 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/192/1155-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 S. W. 2d 1067", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ark. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1462396 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/196/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 S. W. 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ark. 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1350599 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/104/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S. W. 2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ark. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1462267 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/196/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S. W. 2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ark. 848", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1414960 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/192/0848-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 S. W. 2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ark. 945", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725585 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/194/0945-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S. W.' 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "167 Ark. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1377028 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/167/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ark. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1462267 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/196/0508-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 467, "char_count": 7461, "ocr_confidence": 0.503, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.715101384801191e-07, "percentile": 0.9629719724972382 }, "sha256": "7ed7028afdc3e5863be6a0209685ef7b86a8aaa85b1737d2efbf5860f21fd518", "simhash": "1:14501d21c24d820c", "word_count": 1241 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T23:00:55.346799+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Mr. Justice McFaddiN dissents." ], "parties": [ "Dixon v. Hall, Secretary of State." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GeiefiN Smith, Chief Justice.\nA proposed initiated amendment to the Constitution has tentatively been designated No. 40. It bears the popular title, \u201cIncreasing Purposes and Millage for Municipal Improvement Bonds \u2019 \u2019.\nOn July 20th plaintiff filed an original action in this Court, asking that the Secretary of State be enjoined from accepting additional signatures, it is not disputed that when the initative petition was filed July 3 it contained but 3,664 names, while the requisite number was 21,685' \u2014 a deficiency of 18,021. But, say proponents of the measure, Act 195 of 1943 commands the Secretary of State to receive additional names within a period of thirty days; and these, it is insisted, must be considered a part of the petition.\nAmendment No. 7 to the Constitution, under which the proposed measure and the method of initiating it are sought to be justified, provides that if sufficiency of any petition is challenged and the Secretary of State shall hold it to be deficient, \u201che shall, without delay notify the sponsors . . . and permit at least thirty days from the date of such notification . . . for correction or amendment\u201d.\nAttention is called to Phillips v. Rothrock, 194 Ark. 945, 110 S. W. 2d 26; Beene v. Hutton, 192 Ark. 848, 96 S. W. 2d 485; Wait v. Hall, Secretary of State, 196 Ark. 508, 118 S. W. 2d 585; Hammett v. Hodges, 104 Ark. 510, 149 S. W. 667; Stewart v. Hulett, 196 Ark. 403, 117 S. W. 2d 1067; Walton v. McDonald, 192 Ark. 1155, 97 S. W. 2d 81, and other decisions of our own. There are also citations to holdings'in other jurisdictions.\nThe point at issue does not appear to have been directly determined by us. 1\nAny attempt by the General Assembly to add something to or take substance from the constitutional provision would be a nullity.\n\u25a0 An elastic construction would be the result if we should say that the right to correct and amend means that proponents may file an obviously deficient petition \u2014 containing, for example, one name from each of fifteen counties \u2014 and upon notification by the Secretary of State that twenty thousand or more additional names were needed it would become mandatory that time be extended thirty days from the so-called \u201cdead line\u201d.\nOur view is that, under any rational construction, it was intended that a petition be filed within the time fixed by Amendment No. 7. To be a petition it must, prima facie, contain at the time of filing the required number of signatures. Correction and amendment go to form and error, rather than to complete failure.\nThe Secretary of State is directed to treat the proposed amendment as having failed for want of initiation. He is enjoined from certifying the measure to election commissioners.\nMr. Justice McFaddiN dissents.\nTwo other measures, one known as \u201cThe Four Year Term Amendment,\u201d the other as \u201cCommunity Property Law,\u201d were involved in the original pleadings, but inasmuch as sufficient signatures to complete the petitions were not secured within the extension of thirty days corresponding with the period here involved, it is not necessary to discuss them.", "type": "majority", "author": "GeiefiN Smith, Chief Justice." }, { "text": "Ed. F. MoFaddiN\n(dissenting). Constitutional Amendment No. 7 is generally called the \u201cInitiative and Referendum Amendment.\u201d It was submitted at the general election in 1920, but not until the Special Supreme Court rendered the decision in Brickhouse v. Hill, 167 Ark. 513, 268 S. W.' 865, on February 16, 1925, did the amendment become adopted officially.\nThe various paragraphs in the amendment are not numbered; so it is difficult to refer to any particular provision. But in the constitutional amendment as published in Pope\u2019s Digest, certain paragraphs begin with capitalized catchwords; and, by considering these as sections, it will be seen that the amendment has 22 sections which I list and number by the capitalized catchwords, as follows:\nSection 1 Section 1\nSection 2 Initiative\nSection 3 Referendum\nSection 4 Emergency\nSection 5 Local for Municipalities and Counties\nSection 6 Definition\nSection 7 No veto\nSection 8 Amendment and Repeal\nSection 9 Election\nSection 10 Majority\nSection 11 Canvass and Declaration of Results\nSection 12 Conflicting Measures\nSection 13 Title\nSection 14 Limitation\nSection 15 Verification\nSection 16 Sufficiency\nSection 17 Court Decisions\nSection 18 Amendment of Petition ,\nSection .19 Unwarranted Restrictions Prohibited\nSection 20 Publication\nSection 21 Enacting Clause -\nSection 22 Self-executing\nThrough this method of identification, I proceed to refer to certain sections of the amendment.\nThe purpose of Amendment 7 was to facilitate the submission of measures to the people, either by initiative or by referendum. Section 16 of the amendment deals .with the sufficiency of the petition. Sufficiency in what regard? The number of signers; because \u00a7 18 says, in part: \u201cIf the Secretary of State, . . ,. shall decide an3>- petition to be insufficient, he shall without delay notify the sponsors of such petition, and permit at least thirty days from the date of such notification, in the instance of a state-wide petition, . . . for correction or amendment.\u201d\nThis language, to me, clearly means that the sponsors of the measure are to have thirty days (for a state measure such as is here involved) to secure additional signatures if the original petition does not contain sufficient signatures. That being true, the Secretary of State was acting within the letter and the spirit of the law when lie gave tlie sponsors of the measure here involved thirty days from July 20th in which to obtain additional signatures.\nThe majority opinion in this present case holds that the petition, when originally presented to the. Secretary of State, must be \u201cPRIMA FACIE\u201d sufficient when filed, or there is no filing. My answer to that holding is, that the majority is writing the words \u201cPRIMA FACIE\u201d into the amendment, and thereby not only rewriting the amendment, but doing violence to its intent and its language. The words \u201cPRIMA FACIE\u201d are not in the amendment, and the adding of the words restricts and makes more difficult the right of the people to initiate laws.\nIt is very significant that this \u201cPRIMA FACIE\u201d requirement was not mentioned in the opinion in Wait v. Hall, 196 Ark. 508, 118 S. \"W. 2d 585. In that case this court recited that the original petition (for referendum) needed an additional 1,242 valid signatures to be sufficient; yet the court made no issue of the fact that the Secretary of State gave the sponsors of the petition the additional thirty days in which to obtain enough signar tures to make the petition sufficient. Did this court mean to hold in that ease that invalid names on a petition can make it \u201cPRIMA FACIE\u201d sufficient?\nI think Act 195' of 1943 is valid as within the authority and scope of \u00a7 22 of this amendment No. 7, which says : \u201c. . . laws may be enacted to facilitate its operation. \u201d\nSection 5 of Act 195 of 1943 clearly permits \u2014 in fact, requires \u2014 the Secretary of State to do what he did in the case at bar. The majority, without saying so in words, has in effect held \u00a7 5 of Act 195 of 1943 to be void. Yet no authority is furnished for such holding.\nWithout prolonging this dissent, it is sufficient to say that I respectfully, but most seriously, dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Ed. F. MoFaddiN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Tilghman E. Dixon, for petitioner.", "Guy E. Williams, Attorney General, and Ike Murry, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Dixon v. Hall, Secretary of State.\n4-8024\n198 S. W. 2d 1002\nOpinion delivered September 30, 1946.\nTilghman E. Dixon, for petitioner.\nGuy E. Williams, Attorney General, and Ike Murry, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent." }, "file_name": "0891-01", "first_page_order": 907, "last_page_order": 911 }