{ "id": 1473234, "name": "Reynolds v. State", "name_abbreviation": "Reynolds v. State", "decision_date": "1947-03-31", "docket_number": "4441", "first_page": "383", "last_page": "388", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 Ark. 383" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "200 S.W.2d 806" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "166 S. W. 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ark. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 S. W. 1009", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ark. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1501126 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/76/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ark. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723052 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/210/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 S. W. 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ark. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1556149 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/123/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ark. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8720711 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/210/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ark. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1444145 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/204/0233-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 538, "char_count": 8857, "ocr_confidence": 0.481, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.460712694991844e-07, "percentile": 0.657251832056618 }, "sha256": "b5ba78ebeb872224382424f76c804a7cb6f3e80aee7afcbc9f359efb5680c4f2", "simhash": "1:7bb2cfb1eb0c9ce5", "word_count": 1563 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:35:40.925427+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Reynolds v. State." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Holt, J.\nAppellant, Tommy Reynolds, by information, was charged with the crime of murder in the first degree, for the unlawful-killing of \u201cOthel Lee Ashley by striking and beating the said Othel Lee Ashley over the. head and body with his fists,\u201d on August 31, 1946. A jury found .him guilty of involuntary manslaughter and assessed the maximum punishment of twelve months in the State penitentiary (\u00a7 2994, Pope\u2019s Digest). From the judgment comes this appeal.\nFor reversal, appellant argues (1) insufficiency of the evidence, (2) error in instructions, and (3) improper argument by the prosecuting attorney.\n1.-'\nThe deceased, Othel Ashley, was killed while engaged in a fight with appellant from blows inflicted from appellant\u2019s fist, on the night of August 31, 1946. The record discloses that-Roy Cossey and Jim Dempsey, both intoxicated, were evicted from -a picture show in Redfield, Arkansas, by the owner, Joe Smith, who was mayor of the town and also justice of the peace. Shortly thereafter, the difficulty was renewed by Cossey with Joe Smith in front of Smith\u2019s home, a short distance from the theater. Smith called a deputy sheriff to assist him in subduing Cossey and also deputized Othel Ashley, the deceased, to assist. It appears that Ashley had his arms around Cossey\u2019s neck and upon Cossey\u2019s complaining of being choked, Cossey\u2019s wife came up and managed to separate them. At this point, Mrs. Cossey testified that Ashley said: \u201cGertrude, I will slap hell out of you,\u201d and that appellant stepped between her and Ashley and told him not to hit her. Mr. Cossey was finally subdued and taken to the.rear of Smith\u2019s home. Vernon Oates, a witness for tlie State, gave his version of what thereafter transpired, in substance, as follows: \u201cTommy (meaning appellant) was there, yes. . . . A. He wanted to know if they were going to take Mr. Oossey and Mr. Dempsey to jail and Othel spoke up and said, \u2018anybody that got drunk ought to go to jail,\u2019 and Albert Beynolds made the remark, \u2018you don\u2019t have to break a man\u2019s neck taking him to jail,\u2019 and Othel said, \u2018I still say that anybody that gets drunk ought to go to jail,\u2019 and when Othel said that Tommy hit him. The first time he knocked him down then he got up, I guess half straightened up, and Tommy hit him again. Q. Then what happened! A. Then Othel fell and he never moved. Q. Was Othel Ashley doing anything to Tommy Beynolds? A. No. Q. Just prior to striking him? A. No, sir, not that I know of. . . . A. He never spoke to Tommy, no, sir. He was talking to Albert.\u201d\nAnother State\u2019s witness, Eugene H. Tucker, testified, (quoting from appellant\u2019s brief): \u201cTommy (appellant) and Albert came walking up the path, and Albert went to my left and Tommy went to my right, and he walked around there and hit him. Mr. Ashley was at the time standing by the fence. No one said anything or spoke a word. Mr. Ashley got up about straight and he hit him again and said, \u2018Stay there.\u2019 He wasn\u2019t hardly straight when Tommy hit him the second time. The first time he struck him on the chin and the second time on the neck.\u201d\nS. E. South, an undertaker, testified that he examined the body of Othel Ashley and that his neck was broken.\nAppellant testified that he struck Ashley in self-defense after Ashley had called him a vile name and was advancing toward him, and in appellant\u2019s own words: \u201cA. Because when he walked over there I had seen him in fights before and I knew how he fought, and when he. walked over there with doubled-up fists he was just fixing to hit me and he was a much bigger man than I was, and I didn\u2019t want him a holt of me so I hit him and I knocked him down, and he got back upon his feet in a crouching position and come at me again and I hit him again. \u2019 \u2019\nAppellant denied that he said \u201cstay down\u201d after striking Ashley the second time.\nWhether the death of Ashley resulted from the unlawful acts of appellant as charged in the information, or whether it was justified, as appellant insists, on the grounds of self-defense, was clearly a question for the jury to determine.\nIt is our duty here to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and the jury\u2019s verdict, and when so considered, if we find it substantial, we must affirm. Higgins v. State, 204 Ark. 233, 161 S. W. 2d 400.\nThe weight to be given the testimony and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom were questions for the jury to determine. Griffin v. State, 210 Ark. 388, 196 S. W. 2d 484.\nHere, the jury evidently found that appellant did not kill Othel Ashley in self-defense, as claimed, and we think there was substantial testimony to. support their verdict.\n2.\nAppellant next objected to the following instructions given by the court: \u201cNo. 11 \u2014 The defendant in this case pleads self-defense in justification of his act in killing the deceased. .Self-defense is a legal defense, and one which would entitle the defendant to an acquittal if you find from the evidence that he acted in self-defense at the time of the killing,- and it need not appear, in order that he may plead self-defense, that the defendant was actually in danger of losing his life or of receiving great bodily harm at the hands of the deceased, but if you believe from the evidence in the case that the defendant, acting in good faith, and without fault or carelessness on his part, honestly believed, at the time he struck the deceased, that he was in danger of losing his life or of receiving some great bodily harm at the hands of the deceased, then he would be entitled to an acquittal, even though you should further find that he was in no actual danger of losing his life or of receiving some great bodily harm at the hands of the deceased at the time he struck the deceased.\u201d\n\u201cNo. 12 \u2014 If you believe from the evidence in the case that the defendant ,by accident, or misadventure, not intentionally, struck and killed Ashley, and that he had no evil design against him, he would not be guilty of unlawful homicide and you will acquit him unless you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he killed the deceased either in the commission of an unlawful act, or in the commission of a lawful act without due caution and circumspection.\u201d\nAnd he argues that the following instruction, No. A, which appellant requested, should have been given by the court: \u201cIf you believe from the evidence in this case that the defendant, acting without carelessness on his part, honestly believed that the deceased, Ashley, against whom defendant had no evil d\u00e9sign, was about to make an unlawful assault on him, and that defendant, acting under such belief, struck the said Ashley with his fist, he would not be guilty of unlawful homicide, and you will acquit him.\u201d\nWe cannot agree that any error appears when instructions No. 11 and No. 12 are read together. They fairly and clearly declared the law applicable to the facts disclosed by this record. Slim and Shorty v. State, 123 Ark. 583, 186 S. W. 308.\nWhile Instruction A requested by the appellant was, we think, not incorrect, it was fully covered by the two instructions, supra, and there was no error in the court\u2019s refusal to give it since the court was not required to multiplv instructions on anv particular issue. Wallin v. State, 210 Ark. 616, 197 S. W. 2d 26.\n3.\nFinally, appellant says: \u201cThe following argument by counsel for the State was prejudicial, to-wit: \u2018The defendant just wanted to impose his mean disposition on the man he killed.\u2019 \u201d The record discloses that upon appellant\u2019s prompt objection to this argument, the trial court said: \u201cThe court can\u2019t pass on that, Mr. Brock-man, \u2019 \u2019 whereupon appellant\u2019s exceptions were noted. .\nAfter considering all the testimony in this record, we cannot say that this statement of the prosecuting attorney was not a fair and reasonable deduction therefrom. It was but an expression of an opinion from the facts, and as was said by this court in Maxey v. State, 76 Ark. 276, 88 S. W. 1009: \u201cStill, the facts upon which-he predicated his opinion were before the jury, and, as sensible men, we must assume that they gave the opinion of the attorney as to these facts no more or greater consideration than the facts themselves justified.\u201d We are unable to see how these remarks could have prejudiced appellant\u2019s rights in the minds of sensible and fair-minded jurors.\nAs said in Lemuels v. State, 113 Ark. 598, 166 S. W. 741: \u201cThe control of the argument was within the discretion of the court, and the judgment ought not to be reversed unless there was a manifest abuse of the court\u2019s discretion in that regard.\u201d We find no abuse of discretion here.\nThe judgment is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Holt, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "II. K. Toney and E. W. Brockman, for appellant.", "Guy E. Williams, Attorney General, and Arnold Adams, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Reynolds v. State.\n4441\n200 S. W. 2d 806\nOpinion delivered March 31, 1947.\nII. K. Toney and E. W. Brockman, for appellant.\nGuy E. Williams, Attorney General, and Arnold Adams, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0383-01", "first_page_order": 399, "last_page_order": 404 }