{ "id": 1473282, "name": "Garst v. General Contract Purchase Corporation", "name_abbreviation": "Garst v. General Contract Purchase Corp.", "decision_date": "1947-04-21", "docket_number": "4-8163", "first_page": "526", "last_page": "531", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 Ark. 526" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "201 S.W.2d 757" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "143 A. L. R. 235", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ark. 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1444095 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/204/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S. W. 2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ark. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1462376 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/196/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 S. W. 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ark. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1527126 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/83/0031-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 516, "char_count": 7981, "ocr_confidence": 0.504, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9143761825657908e-07, "percentile": 0.7321349623086134 }, "sha256": "10cb65ce98776e2b30ed171b2c018cc4995ef30a021434487e847064cbc17ea0", "simhash": "1:f866d4bfd6c2d3fb", "word_count": 1327 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:35:40.925427+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Garst v. General Contract Purchase Corporation." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Grieein Smith, Chief Justice.\nMarch 3, 1946, Garst signed Consolidated Motor & Aviation 'Company\u2019s conditional sales contract covering a Studebaker automobile. The \u201cbona ficle cash delivered price, including sales tax and extra equipment, \u2019 \u2019 was $843, w:ith a cash payment of $300. At the same time Garst signed a retail buyer\u2019s order. It shows \u201ccash delivered price in Little Rock, $843; cash on delivery, $300; net balance due, $543.\u201d Supplementing these entries the following appears: \u201cSpecial notes, $45.99; balance, 15 monthly notes of $45.99 -each; balance due, $543; rec. fee, etc., $146.85; grand total, $689.85.\u201d The purchaser signed a buyer\u2019s statement in which it was noted that the obligation would be carried by Commercial Credit Corporation.\nAttached to the conditional sales contract, perforated for easy detachment, was Garst\u2019s negotiable note for $689.85 payable to Consolidated, providing for payment in fifteen monthly installments of $45.99, beginning April 6, 1946. This not\u00e9 was sold to General Contract Purchase Corporation.\n\u25a0 March 26 following execution of the note and contract, Garst replied to a letter from Purchase Corporation. He acknowledged receipt of the Corporation\u2019s \u201coutline of time payment contract,\u201d saying, \u201cI am paying a usurious and unlawful rate of interest upon the balance of $543.\u201d\nPurchase Corporation responded April 2d, stating \u25a0 that the note was for $689.85. The \u201crates charged,\u201d it said, \u201cwere certainly within reason for a fifteen-months contract, for, as you know, this covers a considerable amount of insurance. . . . You may be quite certain that these charges are in no way unlawful.\u201d\nGrarst refused to pay the note maturing April 6th. In a letter dated April 10th Purchase Corporation told Grarst it was not required to define the term \u2018 \u2018 time price differential; [for], as we stated previously, this figure represents insurance, investigation charges, bookkeeping and legal cost of setting up your account.\u201d \"When the May note was not paid it was explained that the insurance premium was $36.25, finance company service ' charge $43.44, aiid that $67.16 was set up as a dealer\u2019s reserve fund \u201cwhich is authorized as a protection against any loss due to repossession or damages to this collateral. \u2019 \u2019\nMay 14 Purchase Corporation, invoking an acceleration clause contained in the note, declared all installments due; and on May 18 it brought an action of replevin, executed bond, and procured possession of the automobile, value of which was alleged to be $700.\nIn an answer and cross-complaint Grarst alleged that his agreement was to pay $843 for the car; that interest charged exceeded the legal rate; that he had offered to pay the balance of $543; that the contract and note he signed were in blank, and that he relied upon the seller to fill in the agreed amount, but that instead of doing so an item of $146.85 was fraudulently inserted. He alleged that Consolidated had damaged him in the sum of $1,000; that Purchase Corporation\u2019s action in repossessing the car had injured him to the extent of $5,000, and he prayed judgment against U. S. F. & Gr. for $1,400, amount of the bond it had executed.\nAppeal is from directed verdicts (1) for the plaintiff, Purchase Corporation, and (2) for the defendants named in the cross-complaint, Consolidated, and H. S. F. & Gr.\nFirst. \u2014 The Court correctly directed the jury to find for Purchase Corporation. The-note was negotiable, and there is no evidence that the assignee had knowledge of any infirmities. Garst admitted signing it, bnt insists that the monthly installment items of $45.99 were not on the, document when he subscribed. He also signed the buyer\u2019s statement, in which it was said that the obligation would be carried by Purchase Corporation; hence he had actual notice that it would be transferred. This, however, was not controlling, since the note was negotiable.\nBefore usury can be sustained it-must be shown that there was an agreement upon the part of the lender to receive, and on the part of the borrower to give, a greater rate of interest than ten percent for the use of money. Citizens Bank v. Murphy, 83 Ark. 31, 102 S. W. 697. In Perry v. Shelby. 196 Ark. 541, 118 S. W. 2d 849, it was held that while it is not necessary that both parties be informed as to the facts constituting usury, it is necessary that the lender have an intention to charge an illegal rate of interest, or that he be cognizant of the facts constituting usury. It was said in Harper v. Futrell, 204 Ark. 822, 164 S. W. 2d 995, 143 A. L. R. 235, that a conditional sales contract wap not void because computations on an interest basis showed a greater charge than ten percent per annum. The carrying cost was not based on a loan of money, but was \u201ca part of the purchase price which the purchaser agreed to pay.\u201d\nThe rule would be different if in fact the finance company actually advanced money to the purchaser and by subterfuge added items t.o disguise the transaction in \u25a0 order to realize more than the maximum permissible contract rate.\nThere is nothing in the testimony here sustaining appellant\u2019s position that Purchase Corporation knew there had been an unauthorized addition.to the contract; hence as to it the judgment must be affirmed, notwithstanding a contention that form of the verdict and judgment was improper. It was, \u201cWe, the jury, find for the plaintiff for possession of the automobile ... or its value.\u201d It is argued thdt under this verdict, Purchase Corporation has a judgment for possession of the car and for the value. No objection to form was made when the jury was directed to return the verdict October 3d. Nothing was said in protest until October 14 when motion ior a new trial was filed. The objection came too late, but judgment must be construed as one for possession; and not, in addition, for the value. Appellant has not been injured by failure of the jury to ascertain the value. Purchase Corporation alleged it was $700, and this was not denied.\nSecond. \u2014 It is urged in the brief that the entire transaction was void because, under OPA appraisement, $843 was the top price. Violation of the so-called \u201cceiling\u201d was not alleged in the answer and cross-complaint. However, there was evidence that the maximum cash price was $843. It was not shown other than by appellant\u2019s unsupported assertion that no more could be charged if installment payments were allowed; nor is appellant in position to take advantage of this alleged overcharge. The point was not raised in the motion for a new trial.\nThird. \u2014 Appellant\u2019s testimony, and that of his wife, present a question of fact in respect of the assertion that the price, whether cash or .credit, was $843. While we know that in general practice time contracts with installment payments are higher than cash sales, yet in a particular case we do not have judicial notice that cash and credit price were not the same.\nIt is possible, but highty improbable, that Consolidated told Garst the sale price, whether for cash or on time, would be $843. Garst admits having discussed payments \u2014 whether the contract would run for twelve or fifteen months. He was told what the monthly payments would be \u2014 \u201cforty, or perhaps forty-one dollars.\u201d This was for fifteen-months. If we should accept the maximum figures authorized by appellant, the balance would be $615 \u2014 not $543, as he contends. It is therefore self-evident that some authorization was given for completion of the contract through insertion of a definite amount.\nStill, it cannot be said that a factual question was not presented. It follows that the judgment in favor of Consolidated must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to permit this part of the controversy to be submitted to a jury.", "type": "majority", "author": "Grieein Smith, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "T. J. Gentry, for appellant.", "Guy B. Beeves and Barber, Henry & Thurman, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Garst v. General Contract Purchase Corporation.\n4-8163\n201 S. W. 2d 757\nOpinion delivered April 21, 1947.\nRehearing denied May 26, 1947.\nT. J. Gentry, for appellant.\nGuy B. Beeves and Barber, Henry & Thurman, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0526-01", "first_page_order": 542, "last_page_order": 547 }