{
  "id": 1473271,
  "name": "Tipton v. State",
  "name_abbreviation": "Tipton v. State",
  "decision_date": "1947-09-29",
  "docket_number": "4463",
  "first_page": "1042",
  "last_page": "1045",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "211 Ark. 1042"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "204 S.W.2d 552"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 447,
    "char_count": 6681,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.495,
    "sha256": "82f602b4ca13a07d28aedf5035dff8780d97587c826d911c021914d96cb9105b",
    "simhash": "1:6be65bb767da6cab",
    "word_count": 1111
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:35:40.925427+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Tipton v. State."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Griffin Smith, Chief Justice.\nLeo Tipton was convicted of arson and sentenced to serve a year in the penitentiary. In appealing he contends that the judgment should be reversed because (a) the Prosecuting Attorney was erroneously permitted to ask leading questions of State witnesses, (b) testimony of Leamon Dollar should have been rejected because he did not understand the nature of an oath, (c) it was improper for the State to impeach the testimony of Mrs. Clyde Tipton, and (d) the defendant\u2019s requested Instruction No. 2 should have been given.\nHerman Stump, 33 years of age, owned a home in Russellville, with outbuildings, including a barn. A $2,000 policy of insurance was issued July 13, 1946, on the residence, but the contract provided that a sum not in excess of temper cent, of the principal would extend as coverage to -secondary structures, provided value equaled that amount. The barn was destroyed by fire December 18th and the following day appellant was arrested.\nLeamon Dollar, whose use as a State witness is questioned, was 22 years of age and lived with his father, William Morgan Dollar. Tipton, according to Leamon, called at the Dollar home about seven o \u2019clock the night of December 18th. The two drove for a short time in a truck and Tipton told Leamon he \u201chad a barn to burn.\u201d Leamon was invited to join the enterprise, but declined. However, he admitted going with Tipton to a point near the Stump home, where the truck was parked. Tipton went into the barn, used a match to ignite some hay, then withdrew. Leamon had remained outside.\nWe do not think the questions complained of as leading are open to that objection. When asked by the Prosecuting Attorney \u201cWhere were you the first time you saw [Tipton] that night\u201d the witness seemingly did not understand, and said, \u2018 \u2018 That night he came up there ? \u2019 \u2019 The defendant\u2019s attorney interposed the remark, \u201cI object to putting the answer into his mouth. \u2019 \u2019 Context of the examination does not show there was any prompting here.\nLater, when Leamon was asked what time Tipton reached the Dollar home the night of December 18th and replied that it was about seven o\u2019clock, appellant objected to the clarifying inquiry, \u201c Was it after dark ? \u2019 \u2019 The next question was, \u201cWhat did Leo [Tipton] want?.\u201d, and again it was complained that the witness was being led. ffihere were other questions and objections of a somewhat similar nature. Nope shows an intent to improperly develop the case.\nLeamon was asked if he knew the meaning of an oath and replied, \u201cYes, I know some of it.\u201d This occurred on cross-examination conducted by the defendant\u2019s attorney, who continued-to ask questions, some of which related to matters not touched by the Prosecuting Attorney. It was not until additional testimony had been given on redirect examination that appellant\u2019s attorney moved to have the jury directed to disregard all of Leamon\u2019s testimony because of the so-called infirmity of understanding. The Court properly ruled otherwise. Even if the defendant had not used the witness as his own by bringing in new matter on cross-examination, there was not sufficient showing of statutory disqualification in the answer by Leamon that, as to an oath, he knew the meaning of part of it. He might have understood all of the requisites. We cannot tell what the witness meant by his answer, and therefore must hold that the objection was waived.\nMrs. Clyde Tipton, the defendant\u2019s step-mother, testified'that she was at home the night of December 18th and the accused did not leave the house. After the State had rested its case and the defendant\u2019s witnesses had been examined, Mrs. Tipton was recalled and was asked whether, shortly after the fire, certain officers came to her home to ask about it. When she replied in the affirmative the questions were asked, \u201cDid you tell them that on the night of the fire Leo had borrowed Herman Stump\u2019s pickup truck and had gone to town? \u2019 \u2019 And again, \u201cDid you tell either of the officers that the only time Herman Stump left your home was when he went to look for Leo ? \u201d A negative answer was given to each question. Two witnesses were permitted to impeach Mrs. Tipton by testifying that she had made contradictory statements\u2014 that is, statements at variance with her testimony given on recall.\nAppellant thinks the jury may have believed that the impeaching testimony was direct evidence, hence inadmissible for. that purpose and prejudicial. The only purpose in recalling Mrs. Tipton-and then having witnesses testify she had made contradictory statements was so obviously a test of verity or veracity that it is difficult to see how the jury could have been misled.\nIt was within the Court\u2019s discretion to refuse the defendant\u2019s requested Instruction No. 2. By Instruction No. 7 the jury was told that \u201cThe defendant starts out at the commencement of the trial with the presumption of innocence in his favor, and this presumption follows him throughout the trial, or until the evidence convinces you of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d This was sufficient.\nEvidence was ample to warrant conviction. The defendant, in the presence of officers (including a deputy fire marshal) confessed he had burned the structure and said ten dollars was to have been paid him by Stump. There was testimony Stump was seen handing the defendant five dollars. He was overheard to say it was \u201cto apply on that job.\u201d A nightwatchman saw Tipton and Dollar the night of December 18th. Tipton was running, and when questioned merely said, \u201cI am just running.\u201d The time was 9:15, The watchman saw another boy, later identified as Dollar. He, also, was running and would not explain his hurry. Other witnesses testified to statements or admissions sustaining the State\u2019s case.\nAppellant undertook to repudiate his confession, asserting . he had been promised a suspended sentence. He also insisted that veiled threats had been made by the officers. The confession was submitted to the jury under proper instructions and it had a right to believe or disbelieve what the defendant was alleged to have said, and to reject his alibi.\nAffirmed.\nThe instruction would have told the jury that \u201cThe information filed [against Tipton] is of itself a mere formal accusation . . . and is not of itself any evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt, and no juror should permit himself to be, to any extent, influenced against the defendant because ... of the information.\u201d",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Griffin Smith, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Reuben Chenowith, for appellant.",
      "Guy E. Williams, Attorney General, and Oscar E. Ellis, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Tipton v. State.\n4463\n204 S. W. 2d 552\nOpinion delivered September 29, 1947.\nRehearing denied October 27, 1947.\nReuben Chenowith, for appellant.\nGuy E. Williams, Attorney General, and Oscar E. Ellis, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "1042-01",
  "first_page_order": 1058,
  "last_page_order": 1061
}