{ "id": 8718638, "name": "Harper v. Dees", "name_abbreviation": "Harper v. Dees", "decision_date": "1948-11-15", "docket_number": "4-8641", "first_page": "111", "last_page": "114", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "214 Ark. 111" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "214 S.W.2d 788" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "154 S. W. 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ark. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1343986 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/107/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S. W. 981", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ark. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1491202 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/80/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 S. W. 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ark. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1322253 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/55/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 S. W. 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ark. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1403456 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/175/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 S. W. 1030", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ark. 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1546826 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/93/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ark. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1467108 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/213/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 S. W. 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ark. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1329187 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/58/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S. W. 1177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ark. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721928 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/130/0491-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 387, "char_count": 5974, "ocr_confidence": 0.532, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0295241643920006e-07, "percentile": 0.5477095382781004 }, "sha256": "2369c60eb5f0bf9f41590278d37146fff80ef06b7074cf5dcfe38b05de559acd", "simhash": "1:bb60433f8f2d40be", "word_count": 1043 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:29:26.096089+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Harper v. Dees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WiNE, J.\nThis action was instituted for property-damage and personal injuries alleged to have been caused by tbe negligence of appellee in leaving ber loaded lumber truck parked on East Main Street, near tbe city limits of Magnolia, wbicb street is also a part of tbe State highway. A trial of tbe case resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendant Dees, from which comes this appeal.\nThere is no substantial dispute as to the following facts:\n1. The accident occurred about 1:30 a. m., December 5, 1945, on one of the principal streets in the city of Magnolia, which street is also a part of a State highway leading from Magnolia to El Dorado, Arkansas.\n2. The truck of the appellee was parked on the street in front of appellee\u2019s home in the city of Magnolia.\n3. Appellant\u2019s automobile, driven by appellant, was virtually demolished in a collision with the parked truck of the appellee.\n4. The appellant sustained injury to his person as a result of the collision.\n5. There were corner street lights burning directly in front and to the rear of appellee\u2019s parked truck and there was a light on the porch of appellee\u2019s home.\nThe appellant urges reversal on four counts:\n1. Exclusion by the Co%irt of the Testimony of S. G. Speer. In chambers beyond the hearing of the jury, the trial court properly excluded the proffered testimony of S. C. Speer that he (Speer) had a similar collision with defendant\u2019s truck, parked at the same place, a few weeks prior to this accident. The rule of this Court is set out in the case of Pugsley v. Tyler, 130 Ark. 491, 197 S. W. 1177: \u2018 \u2018 This Court has adopted the rule, where the sole issue is one of negligence or non-negligence on the part of the person on a particular occasion, that previous acts of negligence are not admissible. Railway Co. v. Harrell, 58 Ark. 454, 25 S. W. 117, and cases therein cited on this point. \u201d This rule was reiterated in the more recent case of Schwam v. Reece, 213 Ark. 431, 210 S. W. 2d 903. 2d 903.\n2. Refusal by the Court of Appellant\u2019s Requested Instruction No. I: \u201cYou are instructed that leaving a motor vehicle parked on the highways of this State is a violation of the law, and if yon find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case, that the defendant negligently left her truck, parked on the highway and her negligence in leaving her truck parked on the highway was the proximate cause of the injury complained of, and you further find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff did not negligently contribute to the accident, then your verdict will be for the plaintiff. \u2019 \u2019\nThis requested instruction appears to have been drafted in contemplation of \u00a7 6769, Pope\u2019s Digest,, but said requested instruction is not a correct statement of the law and was properly refused by the trial court for the reason that it presumes that the mere parking of the truck, in itself, was unlawful as distinguished from the rule that it may be evidence of negligence.\n3. Plaintiff\u2019s Requested Instruction No. II: \u201cIf you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent in leaving her truck parked on Highway 82, in Columbia county, Arkansas, on or about December 5, 1945, as alleged in the complaint, and said truck was parked without light on said truck, or signal flares or lights to warn approaching traffic of the presence of said truck, and that her negligence in leaving an unlighted truck on the highway was the proximate cause of the injuries complained of, then your verdict will be for the plaintiff, in such an amount as you may find will compensate him for such injuries and damages, unless you further find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff, himself, was negligent, and that his negligence contributed to the injury complained of. \u2019 \u2019\nThe substance of this requested instruction was included and amply covered in other instructions given. It is well settled that the court\u2019s refusal to give a particular instruction is not error if the proposition of law contained therein is covered by other instructions given and the instruction complained of is not a binding instruction. Lowe v. Hart, 93 Ark. 548, 125 S. W. 1030; 53 Am. Jur., \u00a7 527. And it is equally well settled that the trial court is not required to duplicate or.repeat instructions. Robb v. Woosley, 175 Ark. 43, 295 S. W. 13. For a wealth of cases on these points see West\u2019s Arkansas Digest, Yol. 16.\n4. Insufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Verdict and Judgment. Finally, it is urged by appellant that the verdict and judgment are not supported by substantial evidence. In this, the appellant is in error. Appellant, himself, testified that he did not know what caused the accident. Upon direct examination by counsel appellant was asked: \u201cWhat were the circumstances surrounding the \u00e1ccident \u2014 tell the jury just what happened. A. I don\u2019t know what caused it. I just run into it (the truck).\u201d\nIt is abundantly clear from the testimony that the street at the scene of the accident was well illuminated and was of sufficient width to permit free passage of traffic.\nThis being a question of fact, the rule of this Court is as set out in Pugsley v. Tyler, supra: \u201c ... if there is some legal competent evidence to support the verdict, the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal. Robinson v. Swearingen, 55 Ark. 55, 17 S. W. 365; Gazola v. Savage, 80 Ark. 249, 96 S. W. 981; Harris v. Ray, 107 Ark. 281, 154 S. W. 499. Therefore, we have not examined the record with a view of ascertaining where the weight or preponderance lies, but simply for the purpose of ascertaining whether the verdict is supported by sufficient competent legal evidence.\u201d\nThe verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the evidence and the judgment is affirmed.\nIt is so ordered.", "type": "majority", "author": "WiNE, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Claude E. Love, for appellant.", "McKay, McKay & Anderson, for appellee*." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Harper v. Dees.\n4-8641\n214 S. W. 2d 788\nOpinion delivered November 15, 1948.\nClaude E. Love, for appellant.\nMcKay, McKay & Anderson, for appellee*." }, "file_name": "0111-01", "first_page_order": 149, "last_page_order": 152 }