{ "id": 8719282, "name": "Jackson v. State", "name_abbreviation": "Jackson v. State", "decision_date": "1948-11-22", "docket_number": "4533", "first_page": "194", "last_page": "198", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "214 Ark. 194" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "215 S.W.2d 148" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "243 S. W. 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ark. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1361174 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/154/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ark. 1100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1488129 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/205/1100-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ark. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1485047 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/206/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 S. W. 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ark. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1545458 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/94/0069-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 586, "char_count": 8539, "ocr_confidence": 0.51, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4841626702639954e-07, "percentile": 0.8078758645774329 }, "sha256": "4866d9a75b4a0fdea052f87eedd17139d51262c5b5023068706a9a8c72d76b4f", "simhash": "1:a30a05841e2fa52d", "word_count": 1446 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:29:26.096089+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Jackson v. State." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GriffiN Smith, Chief Justice.\nThe information under which John Jackson was convicted and given a five-year prison sentence charged use of a deadly weapon in an assault upon Shelton Moore, with intent to kill.\nAppellant\u2019s motion for a new trial contains twelve assignments. These have appropriately been condensed under two classifications in a very competent presentation by counsel: (a) The State\u2019s testimony did not warrant a verdict of guilty as charged; (b) the jury was improperly addressed by the Prosecuting Attorney, and the inflammatory nature of that official\u2019s argument served to prejudice the defendant.\nJackson and Moore had been friends for fifteen years, and in May of this year were neighbors. Each was addicted to the use of strong drink, and at times became intoxicated. Moore was a sawmill employe. Friday afternoon, May 14, he received a wage check, and the following morning concluded to work at home. Emphasizing the cordial relations then prevailing, Moore testified that when he saw Jackson there was no thought of hard feelings, because \u201cI got him out of jail [last] Christmas.\u201d Whether Moore invited Jackson to his house, or whether Jackson went without invitation, is of no importance. It is not disputed that preliminary to the difficulty resulting in appellant\u2019s arrest the two consumed an appreciable quantity of whiskey. Jackson went away, (presumably to procure additional liquor) but returned empty-handed; whereupon a small quantity remaining in Moore\u2019s home was made available to Jackson, \u201cwho took a few more drinks.\u201d In the meantime, according to Moore\u2019s testimony, he as host went to the kitchen and made coffee:\u2014 \u201cI said coffee, Gentlemen [of the jury], and we drank coffee together. \u2019 \u2019\nApprehending that Jackson \u2014 who was known to be quarrelsome and dangerous when drunk \u2014 was imbibing too freely, Moore \u201cmade as if \u201d he intended to go to town, but only went to a half-way house \u201cwhere loafers always hang out, \u2019 \u2019 and remained until about six o \u2019clock in order to give Jackson (who had left Moore\u2019s home) a sobering-up period; or, if Jackson returned, the latter would not be there. On his way home Moore met Jackson in the street, and together they returned to Moore\u2019s home and again began drinking. Supper was postponed because, as Moore testified, \u201cI knew that if we ate we would drink some more, so I laid down \u2018angling\u2019 across the bed.\u201d Jackson, he said, wanted to divide the whiskey, but there wasn\u2019t enough to go around, \u201cnot two drinks for me when I get thirsty for whiskey \u2014 only a little half pint bottle half full, or maybe a little more.\u201d Jackson said something about another bottle being on the dresser, but Moore replied, \u201cJohn, there ain\u2019t no bottle there.\u201d\nWhen Moore, who was then lying oh the bed, disputed Jackson\u2019s assertion regarding the bottle on the dresser, Jackson made an assault; and for several seconds Mdore \u201cdidn\u2019t know anything: was too busy dodging and batting my eyes.\u201d He then heard Mrs. Moore calling, and at the same time saw a flashlight fall \u201cfrom her and him\u201d and strike the floor. Jackson then asked where the whiskey was, and Moore pointed to it \u2014 on the floor. In the meantime Moore was bleeding profusely from the nose. Mrs. Moore had intervened, and Jackson\u2019s brother appeared on the scene with a \u201cchunk of wood\u201d or a two by four, or \u201csomething like that\u201d in his hands.\nIt was stipulated that Dr. Davis, if called, would testify that Moore sustained \u201ca broken jaw bone on one side and a fractured jaw on the other side.\u201d\nMoore\u2019s wife, who did not see all of the fight, testified that the commotion attracted her attention while she was sitting on a porch. When she reached the bed where her husband had been reclining, appellant had just picked up a flashlight. Mrs. Moore was slightly deaf and did not hear all that was said, nor did she see Jackson use the flashlight. She slapped Jackson \u201ca couple of times,\u201d and he dropped the light on the floor.\nWhen arrested some time later Jackson told officers he had \u201cjust beaten up Shelton Moore,\u201d and he added that if they would bring Moore to him he would do it again, or finish the job.\nFrom testimony given by the Moores there is only an inference that use of the flashlight caused the serious injuries. Jackson insisted that he fought with fists, and he undertook to justify with the explanation that Moore made an assault with the flashlight, \u201cand I undertook to dispossess him of. it because I was afraid he would kill me with it.\u201d On cross-examination the defendant admitted he and Moore had consumed nearly five half pints of whiskey that day. He thought half of the unused liquor was his, and the fight followed Moore\u2019s refusal to tell where the remnant was. The exact question asked by appellant\u2019s counsel was, \u201cWhen [Moore] refused'to let you have [half that was left] or tell you where it was,\u2014 that was what caused the trouble, is that right?\u201d Answer, \u201cYes, sir.\u201d\nFrom Jackson\u2019s testimony, as reflected by what has been quoted, the jury could have believed that Moore was assaulted for his refusal to comply with a peremptory demand for surrender of the whiskey. As to Jackson\u2019s general attitude respecting behavior, there was the admission on cross-examination that convictions for fighting and being drunk were \u201cmore than he could count\u2014 about twenty-five, I would say.\u201d On a comparatively recent occasion, while being tried for beating a man with a barbed wire \u201cswitch,\u201d Jackson\u2019s defense was that he was too drunk to remember what occurred. The participants in that transaction had consumed \u201capproximately\u201d five pints of whiskey.\n(1) \u2014 Evidence of Intent. \u2014 Where the State alleges an assault, and that the defendant\u2019s intent was to kill, it is not necessary to prove that the crime was committed \u201cafter or with-deliberation.\u201d Roberson v. State, 94 Ark. 69, 126 S. W. 88. But in determining the intent, the jury may give consideration to the character of the weapon employed, the manner of the assault, the nature, extent, and location of injury, and all other facts and circumstances tending to reveal the assailant\u2019s state of mind. Davis v. State, 206 Ark. 726, 177 S. W. 2d 190; Craig v. State, 205 Ark. 1100, 172 S. W. 2d 256.\nTo support a conviction in the case at bar it was only necessary to show that the instrument employed, when used as a weapon, was likely to produce death or great bodily harm. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that a heavy flashlight when viciously used by a sturdy man, was not an agency of sufficient weight, balance, and rigidity, to inflict wounds from which death might result. Indeed, the admitted consequences \u2014 a jawbone broken on one side and fractured on the other \u2014 would give substance for a factual finding that the assault was made in blind and reckless fury with a momentary purpose to use the weapon to the full extent of its potentiality as such. That Jackson considered the flashlight deadly is shown by his assertion that he took it away from Moore because of fear that he would be killed.\n(2) \u2014 Improper Argument by the Prosecitting Attorney. \u2014 The impassioned appeal to the jury is not to be condoned, and had a mistrial been declared, and had the proceedings and order been brought up by the Attorney General to determine whether the Court abused its discretion, the Court\u2019s act would have been sustained on the ground that the manner of expression, the emphasis given to particular accusations, and possible effect upon the jury, were considerations the trial Judge was peculiarly qualified to determine. But, by the same process of reasoning, we have concluded that the Court did not think prejudicial consequences attended the address.\nThe facts here are different from those involved in Hughes v. State, 154 Ark. 621, 243 S. W. 70, where the Montgomery County prosecutor assured the jury the defendant was guilty \u201cbecause . . . I know things that never got to anybody else.\u201d\nIn the case at bar the Prosecuting Attorney did not tell the jury he had information concerning the accused\u2019s guilt not brought out at the trial. When objections were interposed by defense counsel to particular remarks, coupled with a request that the jury be admonished to disregard them, the fact-finders were told to consider only the evidence and to base their verdict upon it.\nThe judgment is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "GriffiN Smith, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Johnson & Johnson, for appellant.", "Guy E. Williams, Attorney General, and Oscar E. \u25a0 Ellis, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jackson v. State.\n4533\n215 S. W. 2d 148\nOpinion delivered November 22, 1948.\nRehearing denied December 20, 1948.\nJohnson & Johnson, for appellant.\nGuy E. Williams, Attorney General, and Oscar E. \u25a0 Ellis, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0194-01", "first_page_order": 232, "last_page_order": 236 }