{
  "id": 8721478,
  "name": "Tate v. Paul Revere Fire Insurance Company",
  "name_abbreviation": "Tate v. Paul Revere Fire Insurance",
  "decision_date": "1949-01-10",
  "docket_number": "4-8677",
  "first_page": "397",
  "last_page": "398",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "214 Ark. 397"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "216 S.W.2d 385"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 226,
    "char_count": 2503,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.505,
    "sha256": "fd3bd9417efe6c70f7e88a737f76cfcbb1f349d33952c1c5c16cec4c7a050a4d",
    "simhash": "1:db555cf8884c780d",
    "word_count": 408
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:29:26.096089+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Tate v. Paul Revere Fire Insurance Company."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "G-rifein Smith, Chief Justice.\nA combination automobile policy was issued severally by The Paul Revere Fire Insurance Company and The Home Indemnity Company. The Home agreed with B. E. Tate that it would pay on his behalf all sums the assured became obligated for by reason of liability imposed upon him by law \u201c . . . for damages . . . because of bodily injury . . . sustained by any person . . . caused by accident and arising out of the . . . use of the [identified] automobile.\u201d\nIt is stipulated that the car was accidentally upset while being driven by Tate, and that his wife, as guest within the meaning of Act 61 of 1935, was injured. Medical bills amounting to $409.05 were incurred and paid by Tate. Mrs. Tate\u2019s enforced absence from the husband\u2019s mercantile establishment necessitated employment of a clerk, who was paid $192 for services the wife would have rendered. Judgment for $601.50 with penalty and an attorney\u2019s fee was asked by Tate on the theory that his common law liability for the items in question and payment to avoid a multiplicity of suits disclosed pecuniary damage distinct from coverage excluded by Act 61.\nWe do not discuss the effect of appellee\u2019s plea that by policy provisions recovery does not lie \u201c . . . until the amount of the insured\u2019s obligation to pay shall have been finally established, either by judgment against the assured after actual trial or by written agreement of the assured,, claimant and the Company.\u201d The stipulation is that all services in the demand for $601.50 were necessary, and that Tate had paid them.\nAct 61 denies a cause of action to any person transported as a guest in any automotive vehicle upon the public highways unless the vehicle is willfully and wantonly operated. \u2022 Since the person admitted here to have been a guest is not suing, appellant thinks his demand rests upon a contractual obligation not expressly or by necessary implication excluded by the statute.\nWe think the trial Court correctly held, in effect, that appellant\u2019s claim to reimbursement was dependent upon Mrs. Tate\u2019s right to maintain a claim against her husband. It is true appellant was pecuniarily damaged, but Act 61 must be read into indemnifying policies. A clear purpose of the legislation was to protect the insurer against claims arising in the circumstances here shown.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "G-rifein Smith, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Troy W. Lewis, for appellant.",
      "McMillen & Teague, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Tate v. Paul Revere Fire Insurance Company.\n4-8677\n216 S. W. 2d 385\nOpinion delivered January 10, 1949.\nTroy W. Lewis, for appellant.\nMcMillen & Teague, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0397-01",
  "first_page_order": 435,
  "last_page_order": 436
}