{
  "id": 8726166,
  "name": "Obennoskey v. Pennington",
  "name_abbreviation": "Obennoskey v. Pennington",
  "decision_date": "1949-03-21",
  "docket_number": "4-8818",
  "first_page": "892",
  "last_page": "895",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "214 Ark. 892"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "218 S.W.2d 711"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "210 S. W. 150",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "138 Ark. 162",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1566981
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/138/0162-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "155 S. W. 122",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "107 Ark. 415",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1343998
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/107/0415-01"
      ]
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:29:26.096089+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Obennoskey v. Pennington."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Holt, J.\nMay 11, 1948, appellant, a resident of Hot Spring county, sued appellees in that county for damages for allegedly alienating the affections of appellant\u2019s wife, who is the daughter of appellees. At the time the present action was filed, and at all times thereafter, appellees were residents of Prescott, Nevada county, where they had lived for several years and are now residing. Summons was served on them May 27, 1948, in Nevada county. On July 22, 1948, a day of the regular term of the Hot Spring Circuit Court, appellees, not having answered or filed any pleading, appellant was awarded a judgment by default against appellees and thereafter on September 14th, caused a writ of garnishment to he issued out of the Hot Spring Circuit Court against the wages of J. C. Pennington, who is employed by the Ozan Lumber Company at Prescott. Thereafter, and at the same term of the court, appellees appeared specially, and without entering their general appearance, filed a motion asking that said default judgment be set aside, voided, and that appellant\u2019s suit be dismissed on the ground \u201cthat no judgment could be rendered against defendants, appellees, except in the county where they, or one of them, was served with summons, and no service was had on them in Hot Spring county. \u2019 \u2019\nThe trial court sustained appellees\u2019 motion, giving as a reason therefor that \u2018\u2018the Hot Spring County Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction of the persons of either of the said defendants and said verdict and judgment rendered in the Hot Spring County Circuit Court are void and of no effect and should be set aside and said action dismissed,\u201d and accordingly set aside said default judgment and dismissed appellant\u2019s complaint, as well as the garnishment against the Ozan Lumber Company.\nThis appeal followed.\nWe find no error in the action of the trial court. The court had control over its judgments at all times during the term at which they were rendered.\nWe said in Wells Fargo & Co. v. Baker Lumber Company, 107 Ark. 415, 155 S. W. 122: \u201c \u2018During the whole of the term, at which a judgment or order is rendered, it remains subject to the plenary control of the court, and may be vacated, set aside, modified or annulled . . . This is a power inherent in all courts of general jurisdiction and is not dependent upon nor derived from the statutes.\u2019 23 Cyc. 901.\n\u201cIn Ashley v. Hyde, 6 Ark. [92] 100, this court said: \u2018During the term at which judgment is rendered, the power of every court of record to set aside, vacate and annul its judgments and orders, is undoubted. This is a power of daily exercise by the courts, in the granting of new trials, arrests of judgment and in other proceedings of like character. Its exercise and propriety can not be questioned; it is based upon the substantial principles of right and wrong, and for the furtherance of justice.\u2019\n\u201cIn Underwood v. Sledge, 27 Ark. [295] 296, this court said: \u2018 It is well settled in this State, that a court has control over its orders and judgments during the term at which they are made, and, for sufficient cause, may modify or set them aside.\u2019 \u201d\nIt is undisputed that appellees were residents of Nevada county and were served with summons in that county in the present action brought in Hot Spring county, and that they had at no time entered their appearance in the suit, or waived jurisdiction, but appeared specially, as indicated, to question the court\u2019s jurisdiction over them in person. Under our Venue Statutes (Ark. Stat., \u00a7\u00a7 27-601 to 27-618) which localized certain actions according to the nature of the subject-matter and relative situation of the parties, not including or localizing actions for alienation of affections, which is transitory, \u00a7 27-613 of said Venue Statutes' provides that \u201cevery other action may he brought in any county in which the defendant, or one of several defendants resides, or is summoned.\u201d\nIn the circumstances here, this latter provision controls the venue and appellees, not having waived jurisdiction or entered their appearance, could be sued only in the county of their residence, or where proper service of summons was had.\nAccordingly, as indicated, the court did not err in setting the default judgment and the garnishment aside, and in dismissing appellant\u2019s complaint. (Arkansas-Louisiana Highway Improvement District v. Douglas-Gould and Star City Road Improvement District, 138 Ark. 162, 210 S. W. 150.)\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Holt, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Oscar Barnett, for appellant.",
      "R. D. Rouse, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Obennoskey v. Pennington.\n4-8818\n218 S. W. 2d 711\nOpinion delivered March 21, 1949.\nOscar Barnett, for appellant.\nR. D. Rouse, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0892-01",
  "first_page_order": 930,
  "last_page_order": 933
}
