{
  "id": 1464549,
  "name": "St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v. Travis Insulation Company",
  "name_abbreviation": "St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Travis Insulation Co.",
  "decision_date": "1949-10-24",
  "docket_number": "4-8912",
  "first_page": "868",
  "last_page": "873",
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      "cite": "215 Ark. 868"
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      "cite": "223 S.W.2d 765"
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      "cite": "123 S.W. 384",
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    {
      "cite": "92 Ark. 378",
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      "cite": "32 N.Y. 399",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:42:13.131733+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "G-rippin Smith, C. J., and Frank G. Smith and Holt, JJ., dissent.",
      "Frank G. Smith, J., concurs."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v. Travis Insulation Company."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George Rose Smith, J.\nThis suit was brought by Travis Insulating Company, L. W. Hamilton, and Federal Insurance Company, for property damage resulting from a fire caused by the appellant railroad. At the close of the testimony the only instructions offered were requests for directed verdicts. In accordance with our practice in that situation the trial judge decided all questions of fact, directing a verdict against the railroad upon the Travis and Hamilton claims and in its favor upon the insurance company\u2019s claim. Only the railroad has perfected an appeal.\nArkansas Sales Company had leased from the railroad certain property on its right of way for the purpose of maintaining a warehouse owned by the sales company. After the fire the insurance company paid to its insured, the lessee, the amount of its loss and by subrogation asserted its claim against the railroad. Travis and Hamilton had stored personal property in the warehouse and joined in the suit to recover their damages.\nAppellant relies upon two paragraphs in,its lease to the sales company to exempt it from liability for these claims. The first is paragraph ten, by which the lessee assumed liability for \u201call damages resulting from fire ... to property of any kind or character . . . that may now or hereafter be upon said leased premises . . . and to whomsoever the same may belong, whether any such damages shall be caused by negligence of lessor . . . or otherwise. Lessee covenants and agrees to release . . . and to protect, save harmless and indemnify lessor from and against any and all damages in this paragraph referred to . . .\u201d\nProvisions of this kind, exempting the railroad from liability to its tenant, are almost universally upheld when inserted in a lease covering property situated on the railroad right of way. Elliott on Railroads (3rd Ed.), \u00a7 1760. The placing of property on the right of way is not required by any public duty of the carrier and increases the danger of fire; so the policy that ordinarily prevents a railroad from contracting against the consequences of its own negligence is inapplicable. Without discussion of the principles involved we sustained a similar provision in Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Barnes, 197 Ark. 199, 121 S. W. 2d 896.\nThis provision in the lease, however, does not affect the rights of Travis or Hamilton. The lease does not purport to extinguish the railroad\u2019s possible liability to third persons, as was the case in some of the decisions cited by appellant. Here the lessee merely agreed to indemnify the lessor against such claims and to release any claims of its own. No doubt the trial court ruled against the insurance company for the reason that as subrogee it occupied no better position than its insured, which had already agreed to ,make no claim for damage by fire.\nBut the same considerations obviously do not apply to Travis and Hamilton. Their causes of action are not affected by the lessee\u2019s agreement to indemnify the lessor. The Barnes case, supra, seems to lend support to the opposite conclusion only because the facts were not fully stated. The opinion indicates that J. K. Barnes was the lessee, while the court relied upon the lease to defeat the claim of Maggie Barnes \u2014 apparently a stranger to the lease. But the transcript and briefs reveal that Maggie Barnes was undeniably a party to the lease. She owned the improvements on the leased premises and was in reality the lessee. J. K. Barnes, her son, had managed her property for years and signed the lease in his own name merely as a matter of convenience. The Barnes case is not authority for the position that a clause like the one now in question relieves the railroad from the claims of third persons.\nThe other provision in the lease relied on by appellant is paragraph sixteen: \u201cLessee shall have no right to, and will not, assign this agreement or sublet said leased premises, or any part thereof, or permit the same to be used or occupied by any person, firm or corporation other than lessee, without first obtaining the written consent of lessor thereto.\u201d The railroad\u2019s consent had not been obtained when the Travis and Hamilton property was stored. Appellant, contending that this paragraph of the lease was violated, characterizes Travis and Hamilton as trespassers and cites Elliott on Railroads, supra, % 1759, as authority for the statement that a trespasser on the railroad right of way cannot recover for loss caused by fire.\nWe do not decide whether an entry in violation of the lease would be a trespass; for we do not think that the lease prohibited the action taken by the lessee in this instance. We pass over the prohibitions against assignment or subletting, as the meager testimony in this case does not establish either one. The real question is whether the lessee permitted the'premises to be \u201cused or occupied\u201d by Hamilton or Travis without the railroad\u2019s consent. We think not. The burden was upon the appellant to prove this affirmative defense. The trial court was justified in believing that the lessee merely allowed Travis and Hamilton to store personal property upon its premises, without relinquishing its own dominion and control. It was not shown that any specified part of the warehouse was turned over to the exclusive possession of these appellees. All that can be said is that the lessee accepted property for. safekeeping under its own supervision.\nThis conduct does not show use or occupancy of the premises by Travis and Hamilton. On the contrary, it was the lessee who was using and occupying the property, for the purpose of storing chattels as a bailee. This conclusion is inescapable when we observe that this is a printed lease, prepared by the railroad and to be construed favorably to the lessee. If the lessor intended to forbid the storage of property belonging to. others, it could have put a clause to that effect in the lease. Instead, it merely prohibited use and occupancy by third persons. These two words are often used interchangeably. Smith v. Mechanics\u2019 & Traders\u2019 Fire Ins. Co., 32 N.Y. 399, and Jackson v. Sewell, 284 S.W. 197 (Mo.App.). A definition of \u201cuse\u201d in Webster\u2019s New International Dictionary is: \u201cThat enjoyment of property which consists in its employment, occupation, exercise or practice. \u2019 \u2019\nIn the view we take, the lessee did not violate the terms of its lease in accepting property for storage. This answers the argument that Hamilton at least should be bound by the contract, he being the secretary of the lessee corporation and having attested the lease in its behalf. Hamilton\u2019s knowledge of terms of the lease is of course immaterial if, as we hold, the lease permitted what was done.\nIn closing its argument the railroad complains of the allowance of an attorney\u2019s fee. to the appellees. Hamilton recovered only half the amount he sued for, and appellant insists that this fact precludes the award of the fee. That is the rule under our statute allowing attorney\u2019s fees in insurance cases, but the reason is that the statute applies only when the insurer fails to pay the loss \u201cafter demand made therefor.\u201d Ark. Stats. (1947), \u00a7 66-514; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 92 Ark. 378, 123 S.W. 384, 124 S.W. 764. The statute applicable to the present case requires only that the plaintiff recover in the action. Ibid., \u00a7 73-1014. We have twice upheld the allowance when the plaintiff recovered less than the amount of damages alleged in his complaint. Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Cecil, 171 Ark. 34, 283 S.W. 1; Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Campbell, 206 Ark. 657, 177 S.W. 2d 174.\nAffirmed.\nG-rippin Smith, C. J., and Frank G. Smith and Holt, JJ., dissent.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George Rose Smith, J."
      },
      {
        "text": "Holt, J.\nI respectfully dissent for the reason that I think the present case is controlled by the decision of this court in Missouri Pacific Rd. Company v. Barnes, 197 Ark. 199, 121 S. W. 2d 896. The situation in that case was similar in effect to that presented here. Here, the lease was between the Arkansas Sales Company and appellant, and it appears that Hamilton and Travis stored property in the building which was on appellant\u2019s right-of-way.\nThe lease provided against subleasing any part without written notice to appellant. Sections 10 and 16 in the present lease contain the following provisions: \u201c(Lessee) ... 10. To assume all damages resulting from want or failure at any time of title on,the part of Lessor to said leased premises, or any part thereof, and all damages resulting from fire communicated from the right-of-way, premises, locomotives, trains, cars or other instrumentalities of Lessor, or otherwise, to property of any kind or character (including, among other things, buildings, structures, improvements, and the contents thereof) that may now or hereafter be upon said leased premises, or any part thereof, and to whomsoever the same may belong, whether any such damages shall be caused by negligence of Lessor or any of its agents, servants or employees, or otherwise. Lessee covenants and agrees to release and does hereby release, and to protect any and all demands, causes of action, suits, judgments, attorney\u2019s fees, costs and expenses on account thereof.\n\u201c16. Lessee shall have no right to, and will not, assign this agreement or sublet said leased premises, or any part thereof, or permit the same to be used or occupied by any person, firm or corporation other than Lessee, without first obtaining the written consent of Lessor thereto.\u201d\nIt seems to me that the language used is so simple, plain and crystal clear as to require no construction.\nAppellees, Hamilton and Travis, were not on appellant\u2019s property with permission or consent of appellant, railroad company. \u25a0 The undisputed testimony shows that they had not obtained the written consent of the Lessor, railroad company.\nIn the Barnes case, supra, we held: \u201cRAILROADS \u2014LEASE OF RIGHT-OF-WAY \u2014 Fire.\u2014In appellee\u2019s action for damages for the destruction of a warehouse by fire owned by her and located on appellant\u2019s right-of-way which she had leased for warehouse purposes under a lease providing for written notice of termination thereof and also exempting appellant from liability for loss whether the damage was the result of fire, flood or other agency, held that a verbal notice was insufficient to terminate the lease, and the lease being in force when the loss by fire occurred, appellant was not, under the terms of the lease, liable therefor. \u2019 \u2019\nUnless the Barnes case, which, as I see it, is squarely in point here, is overruled, which we refuse to do, the judgment here should be reversed.\nFrank G. Smith, J., concurs.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Holt, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "E. C. Nahler and E. L. Westbroohe, Jr., for appellant.",
      "Ivie C. Spencer, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v. Travis Insulation Company.\n4-8912\n223 S. W. 2d 765\nOpinion delivered October 24, 1949.\nE. C. Nahler and E. L. Westbroohe, Jr., for appellant.\nIvie C. Spencer, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0868-01",
  "first_page_order": 890,
  "last_page_order": 895
}
