{
  "id": 1614126,
  "name": "Robbins v. Page",
  "name_abbreviation": "Robbins v. Page",
  "decision_date": "1950-02-13",
  "docket_number": "4-9085",
  "first_page": "627",
  "last_page": "632",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "216 Ark. 627"
    },
    {
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      "cite": "227 S.W.2d 145"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    "name": "Ark."
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      "cite": "207 Ark. 987",
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      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
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    {
      "cite": "195 Ark. 773",
      "category": "reporters:state",
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      "cite": "124 S. W. 1037",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
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    {
      "cite": "93 Ark. 421",
      "category": "reporters:state",
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    {
      "cite": "152 S. W. 288",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
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      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "105 Ark. 630",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    {
      "cite": "247 S. W. 77",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
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      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "157 Ark. 11",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1357152
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:41:58.287119+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Robbins v. Page."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Ed. F. McFaddin, Justice.\nAppellee, Page, filed this action against appellant, H. E. Robbins, under tbe Forcible Entry Statute. (\u00a7 34\u20141501 et seq. Ark. Stats. 1947.) Upon issue joined, tbe case was tried to a'jury and a verdict returned for Page. Robbins bas appealed; and presents questions wbicb relate to (1) sufficiency of the evidence, and (2) correctness of instructions.\nI. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Page was in possession of certain lands lying east of Big Piney Creek, and for more, than fifteen years bad considered tbe creek as bis boundary line. Robbins purchased lands west of the creek and claimed that bis deed called for approximately nineteen acres east of tbe creek. When Robbins bad a surveyor locate tbe supposed boundary line east of the creek, Page notified Robbins by registered mail:\n\u201cI am advised that you recently made a survey to determine tbe east line of\u201d . . . (a 40 acre tract) . . . \u201cand are contemplating erecting a fence along this line.\n\u2018 \u2018 This letter is to advise you that I am tbe owner of all that part of tbe\u201d . . . (40 acre tract) . . . \u201clying east of the middle of Big Piney Creek, and have been the owner and in possession thereof for many years. I cannot permit such a fence, nor can I recognize any claim of title you may make to that property. Will you please in the future refrain from going upon the lands lying east of the Creek for any purposes. \u2019 \u2019\nNotwithstanding this letter, Robbins erected a fence along the supposed line being on the lands in Page\u2019s possession east of the creek; and at that time Robbins told the witness, Riggs, that he would give Page no trouble if Page gave him no trouble. When Page removed the fence that Robbins had erected, Robbins, armed with a shotgun, went to the place where the fence had been and held a conversation with the witness, McMinn. The latter testified that Robbins said, he had heard in Clarksville about his fence being taken down and he came to see about it, and that Page \u201c. . . ought to have known what he was doing before he took this fence down.\u201d A few days after, the foregoing conversation with McMinn, Robbins and his son erected another fence along the line claimed by him, and Robbins continued to hold possession of the disputed lands. While these matters were happening, the wire on a cross fence, that Page had on the land, was cut into small bits and the fence destroyed.\nThereupon Page filed this action, claiming that Robbins was guilty of Forcible Entry in erecting the second fence and holding possession thereafter. Page testified:\n\u201cA. Well, I heard that Mr. Robbins was going to erect his fence and he said it wasn\u2019t going to be torn down any more.\nQ. Then what happened?\nA. Well, he built another fence up through the field and was seen down there with a gun \u2014 I didn\u2019t want to have any trouble with the man, so I brought this suit.\nQ. Why didn\u2019t you tea]' down the second fence?\nA. I didn\u2019t want to have any trouble with the man,\nQ. Did you expect trouble if you did?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Now you say you didn\u2019t remove that fence because of your fear of trouble with him?\nA. Yes, sir. He had cut my fence down and part of the wire was gone.\u201d\nAppellant insists that his entry on the land, at the time of the building of the second fence, was \u201cwithout force\u201d; and that the entry was peaceable and he was entitled to retain possession. But from the evidence, as heretofore detailed, we reach the conclusion that a jury question was made as to the extent of force used bjr Robbins in making his entry. When a man, armed with a shotgun, enters on lands and makes the remarks that Robbins made, and then proceeds to rebuild his fence and hold possession against the previous possessor, a jury may reasonably find that all such conduct is not that of peace and friendship, but rather of force and aggression.\nIn Douglas v. Lamb, 157 Ark. 11, 247 S. W. 77, Mr. Justice Wood, speaking for this Court, discussed the extent of force required to make a case under our statutes:\n\u201cAppellant next contends that there was no testimony tending to prove that the appellant took possession of the land in controversy by force. The appellees brought this action under \u00a7 4837 of Crawford & Moses\u2019 Digest, and under that section force is the gist of the action. Miller v. Plumber, 105 Ark. 630, 152 S. W. 288, and cases there cited. Actual physical violence upon the person in possession by the one who takes possession is not a prerequisite to the maintenance of the action, but \u2018if the demonstration of force is such as to create a reasonable apprehension that the party in possession must 3deld to avoid a breach of the peace, it is sufficient. It is not necessary that the party be actually put in fear. There need only be such a number of persons or show of force as is calculated to deter the person in possession from undertaking to send them away or to retain his possession.\u2019 11 R. C. L., \u00a7 23, pp. 1160-1161. To determine whether or not force was used, the personnel and situation of the parties and the circumstances surrounding them at the time must all be taken into consideration.\u201d\nWe conclude that the evidence in the case at bar was legally sufficient to take the case to the jury and to support the verdict that was rendered.\nII. Instructions. Appellant complains of the wording of Instructions 11 and 12, against each of which there was only.a general objection. The Court instructed the jury as to the nature of the action, the issues, the burden of proof, the statutory definition of Forcible Entry, the amount of force required, and other appropriate matters. Then, in Instruction 11, the Court told the jury that, in the light of the foregoing instructions, if it found from the predominance of the evidence that\n\u201c. . . the plaintiff was in peaceable possession of the lands involved in this action, and that the defendants without legal right, forcibly, as defined by the court, entered upon the lands and took possession of the same and illegally and without legal right continued in the wrongful\u2019 possession of such lands and refused to deliver the possession of such lands to plaintiff, then if you so find, your verdict should be for the plaintiff for the recovery of the lands in question. \u2019 \u2019\nIn Instruction 12, the Court told the jury that if it found\n\u201c. . . that the defendants entered into possession of the controverted lands on or about May 1, 1948, peacefully and under a claim of right, and not as a result of a forcible or hostile entry, and that the entry was not hostile and as alleged by the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff at the time of the alleged entry was not in possession of the lands involved, then your verdict should be for the defendants.\u201d\nWhen we consider these two instructions in the light of the entire fourteen that were given, we reach the conclusion that the appellant\u2019s point is not well taken. It is clear, from reading the instructions, that the learned Circuit Judge was thoroughly conversant with, and instructed the jury in the language of, our cases on Forcible Entry, some of which are: Grammer v. Blansett, 93 Ark. 421, 124 S. W. 1037; Miller v. Plummer, 105 Ark. 630, 152 S. W. 288; Douglas v. Lamb, 157 Ark. 11, 247 S. W. 77; Holzman v. Gattis, 195 Ark. 773, 114 S. W. 2d 3; Wall v. Robling, 207 Ark. 987, 183 S. W. 2d 605.\nWe find the instructions in this case to be clear and comprehensive and covering every phase of the case.\nAffirmed.\nRobbins\u2019 son was also named as a party hut H. E. Robbins is the real defendant and appellant.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Ed. F. McFaddin, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "H. B. Covington and E. L. Hollaway, for appellant.",
      "Robb. J. White, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Robbins v. Page.\n4-9085\n227 S. W. 2d 145\nOpinion delivered February 13, 1950.\nRehearing denied March 20, 1950.\nH. B. Covington and E. L. Hollaway, for appellant.\nRobb. J. White, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0627-01",
  "first_page_order": 651,
  "last_page_order": 656
}
