{
  "id": 1614253,
  "name": "Nail v. Combs",
  "name_abbreviation": "Nail v. Combs",
  "decision_date": "1950-02-27",
  "docket_number": "4-9099",
  "first_page": "730",
  "last_page": "732",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "216 Ark. 730"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "227 S.W.2d 173"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 270,
    "char_count": 3342,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.507,
    "sha256": "b59204d5ed72cb4db34fd3a08c760a9c5204ef075a6cfb1068d33c5892fa6f4d",
    "simhash": "1:49a988a20f823a6c",
    "word_count": 571
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:41:58.287119+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Nail v. Combs."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Griffin Smith, Chief Justice.\nAppellee is a licensed realtor doing business as West Walnut Street Land Company. Appellant owned and occupied a residence in Rogers, Arkansas. As a professional trader lie buys and sells extensively.\nAppellant listed Ms borne with appellee, to be sold for $16,000 and appellee produced a buyer ready, willing, and able to perform; but appellant, when appellee sued for the stipulated commission of $800, contended the contract was procured by fraud. The misleading act [says appellant] was appellee\u2019s statement that he had seen Mrs. Nail \u2014 appellant\u2019s wife \u2014 and that she had unconditionally agreed that the sale be made, whereas in truth Mrs. Nail had acquiesced only on condition that a suitable place be found for her to move into, or that a desirable building lot be found.\nAt trial there was substantial testimony that the contract whs not qualified. This presented a question for the jury, resulting in a verdict for the full amount claimed.\nAppellant\u2019s plea for reversal rests on the Court\u2019s refusal to submit his Requested Instructions 3 and 4, through which the jury would have been told that if in procuring the contract appellee made false representations of a material character, there could have been no meeting of the minds; hence, in these circumstances, a recovery would not lie.\nThe motion for a new trial asserts that the Court erred in giving Plaintiff\u2019s Requested Instructions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. In his brief appellant says: \u201cThe only instructions we will copy are those to which exceptions were taken at the time\u201d. These were Nos. 2, 3, 6, and 8. But in the motion for a new trial' it was asserted that Nos. 4, 5, 7 and 9 were given, and there is the claim that \u201cthe defendant at the time excepted\u201d.\nIt will be observed that in his brief appellant is still treating Instructions 4, 5, 7, and 9 as having been given, and that they were not objected to, although the record shows they were refused and that' in his motion for a new trial there is an attempt to preserve the alleged objections \u2014 none of which was specific. Other instructions were given by the Court, but have not been abstracted.\nSince the motion for a new trial is at variance with the record, and because it also contradicts the abstract, we are not able to say that error was committed in giving or refusing instructions. The situation would be different if an abstracted instruction inherently wrong had been brought forward by a specific or general objection.\nAffirmed.\nThe exact language of Requested Instruction No. 4 is: \u201c. . . It is the duty of a real estate broker or agent to make disclosures of the terms of pending negotiations, so that the seller may act advisedly in determining whether or not a proposal is satisfactory\u201d; otherwise the commission would not be earned. Requested Instruction No. 4 would have told the jury that in determining liability consideration should be given all facts and circumstances leading up to the contract.\nIn fairness to appellant it should be stated that these do not have a bearing on the controverted issue, although to ascertain this fact it was necessary to turn to the transcript as distinguished from an abstract of the record.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Griffin Smith, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Claude Duty, for appellant.",
      "Vol T. Lindsey, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Nail v. Combs.\n4-9099\n227 S. W. 2d 173\nOpinion delivered February 27, 1950.\nClaude Duty, for appellant.\nVol T. Lindsey, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0730-01",
  "first_page_order": 754,
  "last_page_order": 756
}