{
  "id": 1614123,
  "name": "American Republic Life Insurance Co. v. Presson",
  "name_abbreviation": "American Republic Life Insurance v. Presson",
  "decision_date": "1950-03-06",
  "docket_number": "4-9101",
  "first_page": "771",
  "last_page": "777",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "216 Ark. 771"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "227 S.W.2d 969"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "219 S. W. 2d 763",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        1464465
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/215/0174-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 686,
    "char_count": 12466,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.506,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.0365465571789687e-07,
      "percentile": 0.5495021138298024
    },
    "sha256": "b11eca5a1d4780f892b6e9d606e10f3f3bc06e180948cc1619a59abcbd76b644",
    "simhash": "1:70b5f086a8fff1f7",
    "word_count": 2065
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:41:58.287119+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "American Republic Life Insurance Co. v. Presson."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Griffin Smith, Chief Justice.\nSeptember 1, 1945, American Republic insured Clyde E. Presson, naming Dovie Presson as beneficiary. The principal sum of $1,250 was payable if death occurred through accidental means. In addition, monthly benefits were due upon proof of disability because of sickness or as a result of accidental injury. Quarterly premiums of $15 were payable in advance. There was no period of grace.\nThe insured was accidentally shot October 30, 1948, and died from the wound the day it was inflicted. The Company denied liability7- under the plea that the policy lapsed March 10, 1948, when the period for which a payment made the preceding December expired. Appellee prevailed on her proof that unpaid disability claims in respect of which the Company had notice were sufficient to carry the policy to the insured\u2019s death. Under appellee\u2019s theory the funds wrongfully withheld should have been applied to the quarterly premiums due the 10th of March, June, and September. If the illness alleged existed and the Company had notice in a manner substantially complying with policy requirements, the benefits were sufficient to pay the premiums.\nAppellant\u2019s summation of the appeal is stated as follows: (a) The Company\u2019s check or draft, for $81.48, dated December 30, 1947, and cashed a month later, compensated disability from October 6 to November 1 ; (b) competent proof did not show that Presson filed a claim after November 1, and the Court erred in permitting Mrs. Presson to testify regarding correspondence; (e) indorsement of the check created an estoppel, and the plaintiff could not go behind the decedent\u2019s signature acknowledging payment; (d) the draft constituted full payment; (e) even if the plaintiff be permitted to question complete payment, there was failure to comply with a policy provision that notice of disability must be given within ten days.\nAppellee says there is substantial testimony to show that the compensable illness began July 1, 1947, and continued until the first of November. From October 6th to the 14th Presson was in a hospital. He returned home on the 14th and was ill until November 11. According to at least one of the witnesses, the insured went to his place of business and possibly did some light work the first week in November, but got wet, suffered a relapse, and was bedridden until the third week in December.\nOn defendant\u2019s motion proof of disability between July 1 and October 6th was rejected because the plaintiff, prior to trial, had not demanded production of the claimant\u2019s original letters or notices of disability; nor, said the Court, could the plaintiff prevail on a claim covering the period in question without showing compliance with the policy provision excluding payment for any period greater than ten days before notice. These rulings were not appealed from.\nThe certificate executed by Dr. E. J. Brown gave July 1 as the beginning of Presson\u2019s illness and November 1 as the termination. Dr. Geo. Holitik, who also treated Presson, certified to substantially the facts covered by Dr. Brown.\nMrs. Elizabeth Pittard, claims auditor for the Insurance Company, testified that under this proof Presson would have been entitled to compensation from July 1 to November 1 at the rate of $3.33 per day \u201cif he had notified us\u201d. She explained that failure of the insured to give the contractual notice \u201cdeprived us of the right of finding out [what his actual condition was\u201d].\nWhen the Court ruled that the claim covering illness prior to November 1 could not be considered, plaintiff\u2019s counsel argued that notice of illness subsequent to November 1 had been given and that the amount due under this claim was sufficient to keep the policy in force.\nThe discrepancies and inconsistencies affecting notice, proof, and the period covered by payment cannot be harmonized. Dr. Brown\u2019s certificate was dated November 4th. It was \u201cnotarized\u201d December 5. \u2022 Presson\u2019s disability, it stated, began July 1. Dr. Holitik died before the trial began.\nA Company letter of October 10 acknowledged receipt of Presson\u2019s request for claim blanks, but explained that they were not being sent because the insured did not say whether his disability was caused by illness or accident. The letter did not mention the date of Presson\u2019s communication. Pour days later the Company wrote that \u201cin accordance with [your] request\u201d claim forms wore being enclosed. Nothing was said respecting the Company\u2019s objection of October 10, but on November 17 the Company wrote its acknowledgment of Presson\u2019s \u201ccompleted claim blanks\u201d. There was the observation that \u201cimproper blanks were mailed to you\u201d. Another set of forms was enclosed, together with an additional physician\u2019s blank; for [wrote the Company] \u201cWe note that you had two attending physicians\u201d.\nAppellee\u2019s testimony was that \u201cprior to this the Company sent back some more forms\u201d. These were for use in certifying the time claimant had spent in a hospital. Drs. Holitik and Brown \u201cfilled out forms, too, and just a few days after this, . . . notice of the relapse the insured had suffered was sent; asked for blanks [for that purpose], but didn\u2019t receive any\u201d. Appellee was quite certain that the letter of November 17 dealt with the claim her husband had made for the initial phase of the relapse period.\nOn the fifteenth of December the Company wrote again, stating that it had received claim forms \u201crelative to your illness\u201d. There was the assurance that the matter would receive attention \u201cas soon as routine investigations are completed\u201d.\nOn cross-examination Mrs. Presson again mentioned that the claim referred to in the Company\u2019s letter of the 17th was for November. A letter requesting forms for use in December was likewise written and posted, but the Company ignored it.\nThe trial judge, in an attempt to clarify Mrs. Pres-son\u2019s testimony, said: \u201cWhen [your husband] wrote for the claims in November, they sent those to him and he filled them out \u2014 is that true?\u201d The answer was, \u201cYes, sir\u201d. Immediately preceding this question Judge Wood had said: \u201cThis is what Dr. Holitik says here, but I understand you to say that Mr. Presson filed a request for blanks for November, and also for December, and did not get them \u2014 did he do that?\u201d Answer: \u201cHe did not get any answer.\u201d\nMrs. Pittard, as auditor for the Company, was handed an undated letter from the insured in which he wrote, \u201cPlease send me blanks to make my claim\u201d. She testified that the insurance files disclosed an envelope postmarked at Waldron October 9th, 1947. It was her understanding that the undated letter came in the envelope and that the Company\u2019s letter of October 10 was the reply; \u201cbut,\u201d said the witness, \u201cI can\u2019t swear that the letter came out of that envelope\u201d.\nThere was nothing on the check of December 30th showing what period of illness the remittance covered.\nWith the record in this condition, the jury could have reasoned that Dr. Brown\u2019s certificate of November 1th was returned by the insurer for a formal acknowledgment (as shown by the December 5th dating); that following its second receipt by the Company nearly a month passed before the draft was written, and that perhaps it was retained in the insurance files for several weeks. Mrs. Pittard spoke of signing it, but did not mention the time of mailing. Since it was not cashed until January 31, 1948, there was an unexplained hiatus. In the meantime notices of disability continuing through November and into December had \u2014 according to Mrs. Presson \u2014 been sent the Company, with a request for blank forms that were not sent.\nThe policy does not require as a condition precedent to the validity of a claim that proof be submitted, although the claim will not be paid until that is done. Written notice, is sufficient. It then becomes the Company\u2019s duty (\u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4, General Provisions) to furnish the forms for proof purposes. Result here is that if the notices were actually sent, and there was failure to supply the forms, the claimant was excused in respect of other delays while that status continued.\nIt is true that the only evidence that notice was given came through Mrs. Presson, an interested party whose testimony will not be treated as undisputed. But the fact-finders chose to accept Mrs. Presson\u2019s statements, and the result must stand unless physical facts contradict her or unless the matters testified to are so visionary that it can be said as a matter of law that the statements would not be credited by any reasonable person. For the same reasons Mrs. Presson\u2019s testimony regarding the nature, extent, and disabling effect of her husband\u2019s sickness after November 1st supports a finding that the compensation withheld was sufficient to pay the three quarterly installments aggregating $45.\nSummation of the appeal includes a contention that \u201cAppellee would have this Court believe that [letters were written] asking for blanks, that the blanks were sent-in, and that all of these just vanished into thin air at appellant\u2019s doing\u201d.\nThat is not the point. \u201cThis Court\u201d is not permitted to project the result on what it believes or disbelieves when substantial testimony has been accepted by the jury.\nFinal argument is that Mrs. Presson ought not to have been allowed to testify that she saw her husband write the November and December letters, and that they were posted. We are cited to the opinion of April 25, 1949, and our action in reversing an insurance judgment and remanding the cause because the insured\u2019s wife was permitted to read from carbon copies of letters she allegedly had written to two Companies. Continental Casualty Company v. Speer, 219 S. W. 2d 763, 215 Ark. 174.\nThe principles are dissimilar and so are the facts. In the Speer case depositions had been taken with an opportunity to cross, and there was no intimation in any question or answer that the insured received replies to his' originals and that these Company letters had been lost when fire destroyed the insured\u2019s residence, but that the copies were preserved. The insurer was placed at a prejudicial disadvantage when, without notice, the copies were offered in circumstances where it could not be heard in denial or explanation. The defendant pleaded surprise and requested reasonable time for communication with the home office, no competent witness being present. The motion was overruled. In holding that a continuance should have been granted we said that reasonable foresight did not require the defendant to anticipate that an issue not raised by the pleadings and not hinted at in the interrogatories would be added.\nIn the case here Mrs. Presson did not read from letter copies, nor did she testify that the defendant had written letters, or communicated by writing in other form, and that the primary evidence had been lost \u2014 as did Mrs. Speer. Mrs. Presson\u2019s statements were in support of facts within her own knowledge: her husband had written letters, she read what he said, and she knew that the letters had been mailed. Under plain terms of the policy liability could not be incurred in the absence of notice.\nAffirmed.\nThe policy bore the indorsement, \u201cInitial term expires December 10, 1945.\u201d\nThe Company\u2019s audit covering the illness disclosed an allowance of $46.62 from Oct. 6 to Oct. 20, \u201cconfining\u201d disability at $3.33 per day; Oct. 20 to Nov. 1, non-confining disability at $1.66 per day, $19.92; Oct. 6 to Nov. 14, additional hospital allowance, 9 days at $1.66 per day, $14.92; total, $81.48.\nThis would have amounted to $406.26. However, the answer does not take into consideration the 60-day limitation on payments provided for in Part H of the policy, nor does it differentiate between the classes of compensable liability.\n[After Mrs. Pittard had stated that the physicians\u2019 certificates disclosed the illness that was being discussed, counsel for appellee said: \u201cIn other words, what you are telling this jury is that you knew [the insured] had a disability, but you were depriving him of those benefits because he had not notified you?\u201d The answer was, \u201cThat is right\u201d].\nMrs. Pittard, for the Company, testified that the October 10th letter was returned with the word \u201cillness\u201d written on it twice.\nMrs. Pittard\u2019s refreshing frankness as a witness is of a highly commendable character.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Griffin Smith, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Talley S Owen and Robert L. Rogers II, for appellant.",
      "Bates, Poe & Bates, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "American Republic Life Insurance Co. v. Presson.\n4-9101\n227 S. W. 2d 969\nOpinion delivered March 6, 1950.\nTalley S Owen and Robert L. Rogers II, for appellant.\nBates, Poe & Bates, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0771-01",
  "first_page_order": 795,
  "last_page_order": 801
}