{ "id": 1609118, "name": "Maurice v. Chaffin", "name_abbreviation": "Maurice v. Chaffin", "decision_date": "1951-07-02", "docket_number": "4-9554", "first_page": "273", "last_page": "278", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "219 Ark. 273" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "241 S.W.2d 257" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "133 S. W. 2d 739", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 Ky. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ky.", "case_ids": [ 2669554 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ky/280/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 N. E. 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Mass. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 3829712 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/275/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 A. L. R. 441", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 S. W. 2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ky. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ky.", "case_ids": [ 2787877 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ky/296/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ark. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1467126 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/213/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ark. 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1612064 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/218/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ark. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718251 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/217/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 S. W. 1023", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ark. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1318779 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/97/0265-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 505, "char_count": 8508, "ocr_confidence": 0.501, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5232424313551256e-07, "percentile": 0.6696608566754277 }, "sha256": "ea2df1660fe6ffb8ec6f405316566bc4e36a6cd3630b15c57e5f6a0d5f64170b", "simhash": "1:fd6d8f87b61d5943", "word_count": 1490 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:52:55.172495+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Maurice v. Chaffin." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Hour, J.\nThe present suit was filed August 15,1950, by appellee, M. N. Chaffin. He alleged in his complaint, in effect, that L. T. Maurice sold him a heavy duty truck (GrMC-302-1941 model); the consideration was an International 1939 truck and $900 additional, evidenced by note of even date and mortgage as security. Appellee further alleged that appellant represented that the GMC truck was in first class condition, in good running order, that all parts had just been completely overhauled, and that the truck was in good usable condition; that said representations were falsely and knowingly made with the intent to defraud appellee, that in fact, the motor, transmission and rear end assembly were completely worn out, rendering the truck worthless and unusable and that he had expended $358 in repairs.\nHe asked \u201cto have said contract rescinded and tender said CMC truck to the defendant (appellant) and is entitled to have returned to him his International truck and to have said note and mortgage cancelled,\u201d and also for recovery of the amount of the repairs.\nAppellant answered with a general denial.\nA trial resulted in a decree for appellee, rescinding the sale, cancelling the note and mortgage and appellee \u201cis ordered to deliver to the defendant and transfer title to the CMC-302-1941 model truck upon his payment to the C. & W. Auto Carage of Fort Smith, Arkansas, the sum of $178 and upon the payment into the court subject to the orders of the court the sum of $188 for the use and benefit of Williams Motor Company, and the defendant is ordered to deliver and transfer title to the plaintiff to the IC-35-1939 model truck and to pay the costs of this action,\u201d etc.\nThis appeal followed.\nAppellee testified that while he was having some repairs done on his 1939 model International truck, appellant came up, and after looking over it, said: \u201cBoy, I got a truck out here that is just exactly what you need. This is too light for what you are going to use it for. I have just what vou need, a large truck at the foot of the hill.\u201d\nFollowing this conversation, they immediately went to a shop where appellant\u2019s truck (GMC, 1941 model) was stored and appellant told appellee that he (appellant) had (quoting from appellee\u2019s testimony): \u201cA. Overhauled it from one end to the other, and it was in A-l shape. He told me whose truck it used to be and all that stuff. Everything was supposed to have been in A-l shape from one end to the other. Of course, I could see it was a new frame and a new cab and everything like that, and I went and talked to the head mechanic, and he said, \u2018Yeah, we overhauled it,\u2019 but I still didn\u2019t know it had been in there four years, or five, working on it.\u201d\nThat relying on the truthfulness of appellant\u2019s statement, he traded for the truck, in consideration of his (appellee\u2019s) 1939 International truck and $900 additional, evidenced by note and mortgage. Appellee further testified that the truck was worn out and useless and that he offered to return it within a few weeks after \u00a1'he sale and rescind the sale but appellant refused. Appellee also tendered the truck to appellant the date the present suit was filed.\nA competent mechanic, apparently disinterested, testified, in effect, tending to corroborate appellee\u2019s testimony.\nIt appears to be undisputed that appellee spent approximately $366 in attempting to repair the truck following the sale.\nWhile the testimony offered by appellant, which we do not detail, tended to contradict that of appellee, after considering all of the evidence, we are unable to say that the trial court\u2019s findings were against the preponderance thereof.\nUnder our \u201cUniform Sales Act,\u201d Ark. Stats. 1947, \u00a7 68-1412 (vol. 6, p. 613), an express warranty is defined as: \u201cAny affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller\u2019s opinion only shall be construed as a warranty,\u201d and \u00a7 68-1469 provides the remedies for the breach of a warranty in a contract for the sale of goods. Subsection (cl) provides: \u201cRescind the contract to sell or the sale and refuse to receive the goods, or if the goods have already been received, return them or offer to return them to the seller and recover the price or any part thereof which has been paid,\u201d and subparagraph (3) provides: \u201cWhere the goods have been delivered to the buyer, he cannot rescind the sale if he knew of the breach of warranty when he accepted the goods, or if he fails to notify the seller within a reasonable time of the election to rescind, or if he fails to return or to offer to return the goods to the seller in substantially as good condition as they were in at the time the property was transferred to the buyer. But if deterioration or injury of the goods is due to the breach of warranty, such deterioration or injury shall not prevent the buyer from returning or offering to return the goods to the seller and rescinding the sale. \u2019 \u2019 *\nAs indicated, we hold that the preponderance of the evidence shows that appellant knowingly misrepresented to appellee that the GMC truck was in A-l condition and suitable for appellee\u2019s purposes, that appellee relied on these representations which amounted, in the circumstances, to warranties (more than opinions) and was thus induced to buy. The truck was practically worn out or useless and these representations, upon which appellee had the right to rely, amounted to a breach of warranty in the sale of the truck to appellee, and therefore, appellee had the right to rescind as the trial court found.\n\u201cWhen the representation is made of a fact that has nothing to do with opinion, and is peculiarly within the knowledge of the person making it, the one receiving it has the absolute right to rely upon its truthfulness, though the means of ascertaining its falsity were fully open to him,\u201d Evatt v. Hudson, 97 Ark. 265, 133 S. W. 1023, and the very recent ease of Fausett & Company, Inc. v. Bullard, 217 Ark. 176, 229 S. W. 2d 490: \u201cRepresentations are considered to be fraudulent if made by one who \u2018either knows them to be false, or else, not knowing, asserts them to be true.\u2019 \u201d (Citing cases.) See, also, Logue v. Hill, 218 Ark. 797, 238 S. W. 2d 753.\nThe evidence also shows that appellee, within a reasonable time (a few weeks) after appellee sold him the truck, notified appellant (seller) of his election to rescind, and further offered to return the truck, in substantially as good condition as when the sale was made. This, appellee had the right to do under the above sections, (d) and (3) of the statute, that is \u201crescind * * * the sale * * * return or offer to return them (the goods) to the seller and recover the price * * * which has been paid. \u2019 \u2019\nThe trial court correctly allowed for the repairs made at appellee\u2019s expense after the sale of the truck to him. In the recent case of Williams v. Maier, 213 Ark. 359, 210 S. W. 2d 499, the purchaser of a pump attempted to rescind the contract of sale for an alleged breach of warranty. In an attempt to make the pump function and serve the purpose for which it was bought, the purchaser made certain repairs. Recovery for these repairs was allowed on the ground that such repairs were the proximate result of the seller\u2019s misrepresentations and breach of warranty. We there said: \u201cIn addition she would be entitled to the cost of installation of the pump, and the cost of the repairs, and the parts which she bought.\n\u201cThe annotation to the Uniform Sales Act, p. 338, cites cases which hold that such expenses are recoverable. Among others the ease of Moss v. Yount, 296 Ky. 415, 177 S. W. 2d 372, 151 A. L. R. 441, in which case it was held that where a tractor sold was worthless except as junk, buyer\u2019s reasonable efforts to restore tractor to condition where it would serve purpose for which it was bought, and expenses while making such efforts were proximate result of seller\u2019s breach of warranty. Other cases cited to the same effect are Stevens v. William S. Howe Co., 275 Mass. 398, 176 N. E. 208, and Plumbers Supply Co. v. Lanter, 280 Ky. 523, 133 S. W. 2d 739.\u201d\nThe decree is correct.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Hour, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "David L. Ford, for appellant.", "Bland, Kincannon & Bethell, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Maurice v. Chaffin.\n4-9554\n241 S. W. 2d 257\nOpinion delivered July 2, 1951.\nDavid L. Ford, for appellant.\nBland, Kincannon & Bethell, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0273-01", "first_page_order": 297, "last_page_order": 302 }