{ "id": 1660144, "name": "T. J. Moss Tie & Timber Company v. Martin", "name_abbreviation": "T. J. Moss Tie & Timber Co. v. Martin", "decision_date": "1952-03-24", "docket_number": "4-9696", "first_page": "265", "last_page": "269", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "220 Ark. 265" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "247 S.W.2d 198" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "74 R. I. 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "R.I.", "case_ids": [ 4452155 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ri/74/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S. W. 2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Tenn. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 8531303 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/185/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ark. 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723029 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/217/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ark. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721853 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/214/0416-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 465, "char_count": 7854, "ocr_confidence": 0.505, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5253066280030904e-07, "percentile": 0.811960851771667 }, "sha256": "415e5378d20023f4cdcd57d9773ef9ba08fed51141d5558874cc60c52a8bb378", "simhash": "1:d559a567874ed05a", "word_count": 1319 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:18:21.188385+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice Ward dissents." ], "parties": [ "T. J. Moss Tie & Timber Company v. Martin." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Minor W. Millwee, Justice.\nTlie sole question presented on this appeal is whether appellee is barred from prosecuting a compensation claim for permanent partial disability under \u00a7 18- (a) of the 1939 Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law (Ark. Stats., \u00a7 81-1318[a]). The facts are undisputed.\nAppellee suffered a compound fracture of his right forearm on May 2, 1947, in the course of his employment by appellant, T. J. Moss Tie & Timber Co., at a sawmill in Boone County. Iiis compensation claim for temporary total disability was controverted bj^ the employer and the appellant insurance carrier, but was allowed by the Compensation Commission on October 16, 1947. The Commission ordered payment of compensation for temporary total disability through the maximum healing period with the further direction that it should then be determined whether permanent disability existed for which further compensation should be paid.\nAppellee was treated by physicians at Harrison, Arkansas, but the injury failed to heal and he reported to Dr. Joe F. Shuffield of Little Rock, a prominent orthopedic surgeon, selected by appellants. Dr. Shuffield performed an operation on the arm prior to the original hearing in September, 1947. Appellee subsequently returned to Little Rock several times for examination and treatment by Dr. Shuffield and the compensation payments for temporary total disability were continued. At the last examination on April 14, 1948, Dr. Shuffield advised appellee that he felt sure his arm would be all right, but that it would take some time for the arm to regain its strength. Appellee was also advised to make light use of the arm in his work; that such use would cause considerable pain; and that a small knot on the arm would eventually disappear.\nIn his report to the Commission on June 12, 1948, Dr. Shuffield stated that the temporary disability had terminated and that appellee was able to resume work on May 3. The report concludes: \u201cWhen I last saw him [April 14, 1948] I did not think there would be any permanent disability.\u201d On April 28, 1948, the insurance carrier\u2019s representative wrote counsel for appellee: \u201cLast week I was in Dr. office and was advised that he felt reasonably sure Mr. Martin would have no' permanent partial.\u201d Appellee signed and accepted a final settlement receipt and payment for temporary disability through April 15,1948, which were enclosed in the letter.\nAppellee testified that he then resumed the work of driving his truck on short trips, but did no.lifting and noticed no change in the condition of his arm until about six months later when the knot began to get larger; that in June, 1949, he, accompanied by his father, was driving a truckload of peaches on a trip between Harrison and Clarksville which required more gear shifting than usual and his arm completely gave way and commenced to pain him severely. Three days later he consulted his doctor at Harrison who referred appellee to another orthopedic surgeon in Little Bock. The latter found that appellee then had a permanent partial disability of from thirty-five to forty per cent, involving the forearm and hand. Appellee further stated that after returning to work he followed the instructions and advice of Dr. Shuffield to the best of his ability and, in reliance thereon, kept thinking his arm would eventually be all right, until the occasion in June, 1949, when his arm completely gave way. Appellee\u2019s testimony was corroborated by that of his father.\nOn August 6,1949, appellee filed a claim for compensation for permanent partial\u2019 disability. Appellants \u2019 plea that the claim was barred under \u00a7 81-1318 (a), supra, because it was not filed within one year of the date of the last payment of compensation was sustained by the referee and later by the full Commission. On appeal to circuit court the cause was reversed and remanded to the Commission with directions to determine whether appel-lee has a permanent partial disability and if so, the extent thereof.\nSection 81-1318 (a) provides: '\u2018The right of compensation for disability under this act . . . shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one [1] year after the time of injury, and the right to compensation for death shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after the death, except that if payment of compensation has been made in any case on account of such injury or death a claim may be filed within one year after the date of the last payment. Every claim shall be filed with the Commission, and may be included in the notice of injury. \u2019 \u2019 This court has construed this subsection of the statute in at least two cases: Sanderson & Porter v. Crow, 214 Ark. 416, 216 S. W. 2d 796, and Donaldson v. Calvert-McBride Printing Co., 217 Ark. 625, 232 S. W. 2d 651.\nIn the Sanderson & Porter case the claimant was injured in May, 1942, and signed a final settlement receipt in August, 1942. Claim for additional compensation filed.in December, 1946, was held barred because not filed within one year after the date of the last compensation payment. In reaching this conclusion this court held that claimant\u2019s injuries were \u201crecurrent\u201d and not \u201clatent,\u201d saying: \u201cEven under the \u2018latent injury\u2019 cases, when the substantial character of the injury becomes known, then the claimant must file his claim within a specified period of time, or be barred thereafter by the statute of limitations.\u201d It was further held that even if the injuries were latent there was substantial evidence showing that they became patent two years before the filing of the claim so as to then commence the running of the one year statute of limitations.\nIn the Donaldson case we held that \u201cthe time of injury\u201d from which the statute commences to run means the time when the disabling consequences of the accident or injury become apparent or discoverable, rather than the time of the happening of the accident from which the injury results. In short, we held that the time of injury meant the time when the injury becomes compensable. In applying this rule to the undisputed facts in the case at bar the circuit court held that appellee had filed his claim well within one year from the time he discovered, or could reasonably have discovered, that he suffered a permanent injury from the accident. We concur in this view.\nIt is clear from the undisputed facts that at the time appellee accepted the last payment for temporary disability he, acting in good faith, had every reason to believe that his arm would heal without permanent injury. This belief was based on the advice and opinion of a highly competent and reputable surgeon whose prognosis was given in the same good faith. The medical advice which appellee relied upon did not permit him, in good conscience, to file a claim until such time as- the permanently disabling consequences of his injury became apparent or reasonably discoverable. A narrow and technical construction of the statute would require a claimant to file a claim for a disability which did not in fact exist and one that was not reasonably apparent or discoverable to the claimant. Ogle v. Tennessee Eastman Corp., 185 Tenn. 527, 206 S. W. 2d 909; Rosa v. George A. Fuller Co., 74 R. I. 215, 60 At. 2d 150. Under the undisputed facts, the permanent nature of appellee\u2019s disability and injury did not become apparent or discoverable until at least four months after the date of the last payment for temporary disability on April 28,1948. claim was filed within one year from that date, and the judgment is affirmed.\nJustice Ward dissents.\nThis section was amended by \u00a7 18 of the 1948 Act which appears as \u00a7 81-1318 in the 1951 Cumulative Pocket Supplement to Ark. Stats.", "type": "majority", "author": "Minor W. Millwee, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Leffel Gentry, for appellant.", "Willis & Walicer, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "T. J. Moss Tie & Timber Company v. Martin.\n4-9696\n247 S. W. 2d 198\nOpinion delivered March 24, 1952.\nLeffel Gentry, for appellant.\nWillis & Walicer, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0265-01", "first_page_order": 289, "last_page_order": 293 }