{
  "id": 1650223,
  "name": "Bartlett v. Standard Life and Accident Insurance Company",
  "name_abbreviation": "Bartlett v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance",
  "decision_date": "1954-02-01",
  "docket_number": "5-286",
  "first_page": "37",
  "last_page": "38",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "223 Ark. 37"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "264 S.W.2d 46"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "197 Ark. 1118",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8725759
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/197/1118-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "57 S. W. 2d 399",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "186 Ark. 960",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8726579
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/186/0960-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 3070,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.544,
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    "sha256": "b157a900eb1c98c845e33b0247980624fc3e257999ee9597d57b0bcef7e27391",
    "simhash": "1:2b9aa22dcf0f9672",
    "word_count": 536
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:02:33.600099+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Bartlett v. Standard Life and Accident Insurance Company."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George Rose Smith, J.\nThis is an appeal from the trial court\u2019s action in setting aside, after the lapse of the term, a default judgment against the appellees. The circuit court found in effect that the defendants\u2019 failure to appear on the day of trial resulted from unavoidable casualty or from the clerk\u2019s misprision. Ark. Stats. 1947, \u00a7 29-506. It is the appellant\u2019s contention that the entry of judgment by default was due solely to the negligence of the defendants\u2019 counsel.\nBartlett brought suit for $507.30 upon a policy of casualty insurance, joining as defendants the insurer and its local agent. Summons was served on the corporate defendant on December 6, 1952. The company\u2019s general counsel, a firm of Oklahoma attorneys, filed an answer for both defendants on December 29, which was within the time allowed. Thereafter, without notice to the defendants, the case was set to be tried on January 21,1953.' On that day the defendants failed to appear, and the plaintiff took judgment by default.\nAt the ensuing April term of court the judgment was set aside for the reasons mentioned above. In vacating the judgment the court found that its clerk had neglected in two respects to comply with the court\u2019s rules: First, when the answer was filed the clerk should have mailed to the defendants\u2019 attorneys a copy of the court\u2019s rules and of the court calendar. This was not done. Second, when the case was set for trial the clerk should have immediately notified counsel, but this also was not done. It was on the basis of these two omissions that the trial court granted the defendants \u2019 motion to vacate the judgment.\nThe circuit court is clothed with a sound discretion in a matter of this kind. United Order of Good Samaritans v. Bryant, 186 Ark. 960, 57 S. W. 2d 399. In this case we find no abuse of that discretion. It is true, as argued by the appellant, that the insurer\u2019s Oklahoma attorneys were at fault in merely filing an answer, without attempting to find out when the case would be tried. But this oversight was not the sole cause for the defendants \u2019 failure to appear on the day of trial. Had the circuit clerk performed the duties imposed upon him by the court\u2019s rules the defendants would have received notice of the impending trial. It is familiar law that a litigant should not be prejudiced by an act of the court. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Duty, 197 Ark. 1118, 126 S. W. 2d 921. Here the defendants\u2019 misfortune would have been prevented either by diligence on the part of their lawyers or by the clerk\u2019s discharge of his duty. Neither factor can fairly be said to outweigh the other. When it is remembered that the vacation of the judgment simply leads to a trial on the merits, which is all the plaintiff was entitled to in the first place, we are not willing to say that the trial court was in error.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George Rose Smith, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "F. G. Grow, for appellant.",
      "Savage, Gibson & Benefield, McMillen & Teague and Graves <& Graves, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Bartlett v. Standard Life and Accident Insurance Company.\n5-286\n264 S. W. 2d 46\nOpinion delivered February 1, 1954.\nF. G. Grow, for appellant.\nSavage, Gibson & Benefield, McMillen & Teague and Graves <& Graves, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0037-01",
  "first_page_order": 59,
  "last_page_order": 60
}