{ "id": 1650423, "name": "Pate v. Fears", "name_abbreviation": "Pate v. Fears", "decision_date": "1954-03-22", "docket_number": "5-349", "first_page": "365", "last_page": "367", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 Ark. 365" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "265 S.W.2d 954" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "222 Ark. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1653105 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/222/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 S. W. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ark. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8720309 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/179/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 S. W. 2d 1052", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ark. 1024", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8726408 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/181/1024-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 S. W. 2d 1110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ark. 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1389756 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/182/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 S. W. 2d 796", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Ark. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1435327 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/185/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ark. 938", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8726371 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/214/0938-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ark. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1614233 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/216/0119-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 378, "char_count": 5102, "ocr_confidence": 0.534, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.108697801627131e-07, "percentile": 0.9099822035956536 }, "sha256": "d3d86d3893163eb03634ad69cedb8912944d6326988ec70d0c7fb9294d0f6f93", "simhash": "1:324d08e5692ae6da", "word_count": 884 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:02:33.600099+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Pate v. Fears." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Minor W. Mill wee, Justice.\nAppellee, Emma Fears, brought this action against the appellant, James Pate, seeking damages for personal injuries sustained when she was hit by appellant\u2019s car. Appellee alleged that she was walking north at the intersection of Eighth and Hays streets in Little Eock, Arkansas, at about 8:30 p.m. on November 5, 1952, when she was struck, and that appellant was negligent in operating his car in a fast and reckless manner and in failing to keep a proper look-out. Appellant denied that he was negligent and pleaded contributory negligence on the part of appellee.\nThe trial court, sitting as a jury, rendered judgment for appellee in the sum of $2,500. The only contention for reversal is that the judgment is unsupported by any substantial evidence.\nWhere a jury is waived and the case is tried before a judge sitting as a jury, his finding on a question of fact is as conclusive on appeal as a jury verdict and will not be disturbed if supported by any substantial evidence. Wallis v. Stubblefield, 216 Ark. 119, 225 S. W. 2d 322. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, it must be-considered in the light most favorable to appellee. United Van Lines v. Haley, 214 Ark. 938, 218 S. W. 2d 715.\nOn the night in question appellant was driving north on Hayes street which is paved and level for several blocks from the intersection with Eighth street. According to appellee\u2019s testimony she was walking north on the right-hand gravel shoulder of Hayes street where it intersects with Eighth street when she was struck by appellant\u2019s speeding car. Charlotte Robinson, who lives about 50 feet from the scene of the accident, testified that she heard \u201cthe brakes race\u201d or \u201cskidding\u201d of a car and reached her front door just as appellee was struck. When she asked appellant why he hit appellee, he replied, \u201cMy lights was dim and I didn\u2019t see her. I wouldn\u2019t have hit her for nothing. \u2019\u2019 She also corroborated appellee\u2019s statement that there were no other vehicles passing at or near the time that appellee was struck.\nAppellant testified that as he approached the intersection he was blinded by the headlights of two automobiles going in the opposite direction. He was driving about 25 miles per hour and as he passed the second car he saw appellee in the middle of Hayes street and immediately applied his brakes. He also turned his car to the right shoulder of the street but appellee ran in front of the car and was struck by the left front headlight and fender. It was dark and appellee was dressed in black clothing. He measured the skid marks of his car which were 41 feet long.\nThere are many decisions of this court defining the relative rights and duties of pedestrians and drivers of automobiles using the public streets and highways. Both have a right to the use of the streets and are required to exercise ordinary care for their own safety and the prevention of injury to others. In sustaining a jury finding that the driver of an automobile failed to exercise ordinary care under facts similar to those in the instant case, this court said in Northwestern Casualty and Surety Co. v. Rose, 185 Ark. 263, 46 S. W. 2d 796: \u201cIt is the well-settled rule that the duty rests upon the driver of an automobile to exercise ordinary care in its operation, and in the exercise of such care it is his duty to keep a constant lookout to avoid injury to others. This is particularly incumbent upon him when driving on the street of a city in order to avoid injury to pedestrians, as he should anticipate their presence upon such streets and their equal right to their use.\u201d In Morel v. Lee, 182 Ark. 985, 33 S. W. 2d 1110, the court said: \u201cOrdinary care, however, is a relative term, its interpretation depending upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case; and, although drivers of automobiles and pedestrians both have the right to the use of the streets, the former must anticipate the presence of the latter and exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring them, care commensurate with the danger reasonably to be anticipated. \u2019 \u2019 And in Smith Ark. Traveler Co. v. Simmons, 181 Ark. 1024, 28 S. W. 2d 1052, it is said: \u201cDanger may always be expected or anticipated at street crossings or at intersections of streets, and every driver of an automobile should keep a lookout and approach same with his machine under control, else he cannot be regarded or treated as exercising ordinary care.\u201d See, also, Murphy v. Clayton, 179 Ark. 225,15 S. W. 2d 391, and Yocum v. Holmes, 222 Ark. 251, 258 S. W. 2d 535, and cases there cited.\nWhen the conflicting evidence in the case at bar is considered in the light most favorable to appellee under the foregoing principles, it is substantial and sufficient to support the court\u2019s finding that appellee\u2019s injuries were proximately caused by appellant\u2019s failure to exercise ordinary care under all the circumstances.\nThe judgment is, therefore, affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Minor W. Mill wee, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "John M. Lofton, Jr., and Owens, Ehrmcm & McHaney, for appellant.", "M. V. Moody, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Pate v. Fears.\n5-349\n265 S. W. 2d 954\nOpinion delivered March 22, 1954.\nJohn M. Lofton, Jr., and Owens, Ehrmcm & McHaney, for appellant.\nM. V. Moody, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0365-01", "first_page_order": 387, "last_page_order": 389 }