{
  "id": 1650405,
  "name": "Hagan v. Knowles",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hagan v. Knowles",
  "decision_date": "1954-05-03",
  "docket_number": "5-383",
  "first_page": "590",
  "last_page": "593",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "223 Ark. 590"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "267 S.W.2d 514"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
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    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "196 Ark. 785",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    {
      "cite": "43 S. W. 2d 729",
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      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
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    {
      "cite": "184 Ark. 542",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:02:33.600099+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Hagan v. Knowles."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Griffin Smith, Chief Justice.\nA truck owned- by-Paul Hagan and driven by Ewell Gray was struck by an automobile owned and operated by Grady A. Knowles, who sued for $496.93' to compensate property loss. Hagan\u2019s denial that his driver was negligent was coupled with a cross-complaint for $490.76 covering loss sustained by reason of the damage to his truck. From a judgment in favor of Knowles for the full amount of his claim Hagan has appealed.\nAppellant\u2019s contention is that the undisputed evidence shows contributory negligence when Knowles undertook to pass the truck.\nHighway 270 passes through Malvern and intersects some of its streets. Gray, as TTacan\u2019s servant, was driving westward on the highway and undertook to enter Railroad street by turning to the left. Knowles, traveling in the same direction, attempted to pass the truck at a point where the highway is intersected by railroad lines and where Railroad street enters the highway. Appellant concedes that Gray did not give a manual signal of his intention to turn, hut thinks it is not seriously disputed that stop lights on the truck were activated when the driver maneuvered control mechanism preparatory to the actual turn. If, as appellant contends, Knowles was guilty of contributory negligence, recovery is barred. It is not insisted that the jury\u2019s failure to return a verdict for Hagan on his cros --complaint should work a reversal and remand of the cause.\nKnowles testified that while driving on the highway he first observed appellant\u2019s trnclc when it was slightly less than half a block from him. He estimated the truck\u2019s speed (which was not diminished) at from 15 to 20 miles an hour and his own at 30 or perhaps 35 miles. The fact that G-ray was traveling slowly did not suggest to Knowles that a turn was to be made, \u201cbecause he was making the same speed when I first saw him\u201d.\nThere was no other visible traffic on the highway; and, said Knowles, the truck was virtually overtaken between the tracks and the street intersection. Gray testified that before or at the time of making the turn he did not lower the window; nor did he put out his hand \u201cor do anything of that sort\u201d. The collision occurred on the left side of the center line of the highway in respect of driver direction. Knowles\u2019 reconstruction of essentials is that he attempted to pass the truck \u201cjust beyond the railroad tracks \u2019 \u2019; that the street intersection was approximately 75 feet from the tracks, and that he applied his brakes and sounded his horn in an attempt to inform the truck driver of an intention to pass.\nAppellant\u2019s contentions, as summarized, are: (1) Appellee failed to give an audible signal of his purpose to pass the truck; (2) he was attempting to pass where the highway is intersected by railroad tracks, and (3) the attempt was made at the intersection of the highway with a street.\nThe collision occurred in November, shortly after dark. It had been raining and a slight mist was still falling. Darkness and weather conditions, it is urged, required that appropriate precautions be observed. We are cited to the provisions of Acts embraced within \u00a7\u00a7 75-609 and 75-611, Ark. Stat\u2019s, prescribing a driver\u2019s duty in passing a vehicle when the two are going in the same direction. Primarily, however, appellant relies upon our decisions in Madison Cadillac Company v. Lloyd, 184 Ark. 542, 43 S. W. 2d 729, and Ward v. Haralson, 196 Ark. 785, 120 S. W. 2d 322.\nIn the Cadillac Company case the opinion states that when the appellees (who there stood in Knowles\u2019 position here in most respects) were within 100 yards of the Cadillac Company\u2019s automobile (a Hudson) it was discovered by those in the rear car that the Hudson was slowing to a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour. Following a summation of facts the opinion, in regard to the law, said that the automobile in front has a superior right to use of the highway for the purpose of leaving it to enter an intersecting road, and the traveler who is following must handle his car \u201cin recognition of the superior right of the traveler in front\u201d. This broad statement does not, of course, mean that the so-called front car may be driven without regard to trailing traffic. We have often said that the violation of a traffic safety measure is not negligence per se, but only evidence of such.\nThe Ward-Haralson case can hardly be said to have factual application here. There the truck driver was on his right side of the highway. He was driving slowly in circumstances indicating the exercise of unusual care, and the car in the rear was being driven rapidly as it topped a hill, in disregard of obvious danger.\nIn view of the testimony of appellant\u2019s driver that he did not manually signal an intention to turn, and in the absence of conduct from which appellee, as a reasonably prudent person, should have inferred that Gray\u2019s purpose was to leave the highway, we are not able to say that appellee\u2019s act in undertaking to pass the truck was of a character imputing negligence as a matter of law and that an instructed verdict should have been given. The jury could have made a finding that appellee was negligent, and the evidence would have sustained that finding.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Griffin Smith, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John M. Lofton, Jr., and Owens, Ehrman S McHaney, for appellant.",
      "H. B. Means, Jr., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Hagan v. Knowles.\n5-383\n267 S. W. 2d 514\nOpinion delivered May 3, 1954.\nJohn M. Lofton, Jr., and Owens, Ehrman S McHaney, for appellant.\nH. B. Means, Jr., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0590-01",
  "first_page_order": 612,
  "last_page_order": 615
}