{
  "id": 1646543,
  "name": "Christy v. Pilkinton",
  "name_abbreviation": "Christy v. Pilkinton",
  "decision_date": "1954-12-20",
  "docket_number": "5-557",
  "first_page": "407",
  "last_page": "408",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "224 Ark. 407"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "273 S.W.2d 533"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.497,
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    "simhash": "1:05c40d5c4eb9afaa",
    "word_count": 379
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:52.725032+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Christy v. Pilkinton."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George Rose Smith, J.\nThis is a suit for specific performance, brought by the appellee as vendor in a contract for the sale of real property. In appealing from a decree for the plaintiff the defendants contend only that the court erred in ordering them to perform a promise which, the proof shows to be beyond their financial resources.\nIt is conceded that the parties executed a valid written contract by which the Christys agreed to buy an apartment house from Mrs. Pilkinton for $30,000. The vendor\u2019s title is admittedly good. \"When the time came for performance the purchasers, although not insolvent, were unable to raise enough money to carry out their contract. Mrs. Pilkinton, after having tendered a deed to the property, brought this suit. At the trial the defendants\u2019 evidence tended to show that, as a result of a decline in Christy\u2019s used car business, they do not possess and cannot borrow the unpaid balance of $29,900.\nProof of this kind does not establish the type of impossibility that constitutes a defense. There is a familiar distinction between objective impossibility, which amounts to saying, \u201cThe thing cannot be done,\u201d and subjective impossibility \u2014 \u201cI cannot do it.\u201d Rest., Contracts, \u00a7 455; Williston on Contracts, \u00a7 1932. The latter, which is well illustrated by a promisor\u2019s financial inability to pay, does not discharge the contractual duty and is th\u00e9refore not a bar to a decree for specific performance.\nMuch, of the appellants\u2019 brief is devoted to a discussion of the difficulty that the chancellor may have in enforcing his decree; but that problem is not now before us. By the decree the defendants were allowed a period of twenty days in which to perform their obligation. If their default continues it will, of course, be for the chancellor to say whether further relief should be granted, as by a foreclosure of the vendor\u2019s lien or by other process available to a court of equity; At present it is enough to observe that foreseeable-obstacles to the enforcement of a judgment are not a sufficient reason for denying the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George Rose Smith, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Paul E. Gutensohn, for appellant.",
      "Bethell \u00e9 Pearce, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Christy v. Pilkinton.\n5-557\n273 S. W. 2d 533\nOpinion delivered December 20, 1954.\nPaul E. Gutensohn, for appellant.\nBethell \u00e9 Pearce, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0407-01",
  "first_page_order": 429,
  "last_page_order": 430
}