{ "id": 1646595, "name": "Scurlock, Commissioner of Revenues v. City of Springdale", "name_abbreviation": "Scurlock v. City of Springdale", "decision_date": "1954-12-20", "docket_number": "5-551", "first_page": "408", "last_page": "413", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "224 Ark. 408" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "273 S.W.2d 551" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "207 Ark. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1481762 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/207/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ark. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1485094 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/206/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ark. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1488235 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/205/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ark. 755", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724340 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/217/0755-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ark. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1879280 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/31/0387-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 485, "char_count": 9277, "ocr_confidence": 0.486, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.921937731962346e-07, "percentile": 0.7330975666921121 }, "sha256": "f2954ff7709ab690f283813b47d65a8a71d37a7dbb4b76759b08fdc385cf88f8", "simhash": "1:bbfb7c70c3ec2b6c", "word_count": 1583 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:52.725032+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Scurlock, Commissioner of Revenues v. City of Springdale." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Ward, J.\nThe question presented on this appeal is: Does the Arkansas Compensation Tax Act, Act 487 of 1949, which imposes a two (2%) per cent tax [commonly called \u201cUse Tax\u201d] on merchandise bought from without and used within the State of Arkansas, apply to such purchases made by a municipal corporation?\nThe City of Springdale, a city of the first class, during the years 1950, 1951 and 1952 purchased from without the State certain articles such as concrete pipe, fire hose and equipment, janitor supplies, etc., amounting to $35,246.57. The Revenue Department of the State of Arkansas required the City of Springdale to pay the two (2%) per cent Use Tax on the above purchases, the tax amounting to $704.93. This payment was made under protest, as provided for in said Act, and this suit was instituted in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County by the City against the Revenue Commissioner to recover the amount of tax so paid.\nThe cause was submitted to the trial judge, sitting as a jury, upon the pleadings and admissions of facts, and judgment was rendered in favor of the City. The question presented to us on this appeal is purely one of law.\nIt is our conclusion that the 1949 Compensation Tax Act referred to above does not apply to purchases made by the City of Springdale. The pertinent language which imposed the tax is found in \u00a7 5(a) of said Act, being Ark. Stats., \u00a7 84-3105, and reads as follows:\n\u201cThere is hereby levied and there shall be collected from every person in this State a tax or excise for the privilege of storing, using or consuming, within the State, any article of tangible personal property, after the passage and approval of this Act, purchased for storage, use or consumption in this State at the rate of two (2%) per cent of the sales price of such property.\u201d (Emphasis ours.)\nSpecifically we are called on to decide if the word \u201cperson\u201d emphasized above includes municipal corporations. Section 4 of the Act defines the meaning of numerous words and phrases found in the Act, and subsection (h) thereof, being Ark. Stats., \u00a7 84-3104(h), defines the word \u201cperson\u201d in this language:\n\u201cThe term \u2018person\u2019 means and includes any individual, company, firm, partnership, co-partnership, joint adventure, joint agreement, association (mutual or otherwise), corporation, estate, trust, business trust, receiver, trustee, syndicate, agency, \u2022 subsidiary, dealer, distributor, consignor, supervisor, principal, employer, or any other group or combination acting as a unit, and the plural as well as the singular number.\u201d (Emphasis ours.)\nIt is the contention of appellant that the word \u2018 \u2018 corporation, \u201d emphasized above, means or include a municipal corporation, and that therefore the effect of Ark. Stats., \u00a7 84-3105 and \u00a7 84-3104(h) is to impose the Use Tax on municipalities.\nIt is true that if we were not here considering a tax act it could be said with reason that the words \u201cany . . . corporation\u201d used in Ark. Stats., \u00a7 84-3104(h), copied above, indicate an intention on the part of the legislature to impose the tax on municipal corporations. The word \u201ccorporation\u201d could be interpreted to include a municipal corporation. It is common knowledge that there are many different kinds of corporations such as private, public and beneficent, and a municipality may sometime be referred to as a municipal corporation. However, there are other matters, set out hereafter, which must be taken into consideration, and which lead us to disagree with appellant\u2019s contention herein.\nAct 487 of 1949, which imposes a tax on the use of personal property, was passed to complement or compensate [as the title implies] for certain limitations in Act 386 of 1941, entitled The Arkansas Gross Receipt Act and commonly referred to as the Sales Tax Act. Section 2(a) of said Act 386, being Ark. Stats., \u00a7 84-1902(a), defines the meaning of the word \u201cperson\u201d as follows:\n\u201cThe term \u2018person\u2019 includes any individual, company, partnership, joint venture, and joint agreement, association (mutual or otherwise), corporation, estate, trust, business trust, receiver, or trustee appointed by any State or Federal Court or otherwise, syndicate, this State, any county, city, municipality, school district, or any other political subdivision of the State or group or combination acting as a unit, in the plural or singular number.\u201d (Emphasis ours.)\nIt will be noted that the word \u2018 \u2018 corporation \u2019 \u2019 and the words \u201cany . . . corporation\u201d used above are the -exact words used to define \u201cperson\u201d as were used -in the 1949 Act. It will be further noted that in the 1941 Act the word \u201cperson\u201d is specifically defined to mean- or include \u201ccity\u201d and \u201cmunicipality,\u201d while the 1949 Act does not contain either of these words. The difference between the definition of \u201cperson\u201d in the two Acts has a significance which we are not at liberty to ignore, and which impels us to conclude that the omission of the words \u201ccity\u201d and \u201cmunicipality\u201d from the act under \u2022consideration evinces an intent on the part of the legislature not to impose the Use Tax on municipalities. It is obvious that the legislature, in passing said Act 487 -of 1949 .was cognizant of the 1941 Gross Receipt Act, and likewise was cognizant of the definition of the word \u201cperson\u201d as used therein. It is only reasonable to assume that the legislature had a purpose in deleting the words \u201ccity\u201d and \u201cmunicipality\u201d from the definition contained in Act 487 of 1949, and that purpose could be none other than to exempt municipalities from the provisions of the Act. In said Act 487 of 1949 the legislature defined \u201cperson\u201d to mean some twenty different things and if it had meant to include cities and. municipalities it would have been easy to have done so.\nIt is immaterial that some doubt may exist as to whether the word \u201cperson\u201d or the word \u201ccorporation\u201d was meant to include a municipality. The mere fact that this suit is pending may indicate such a doubt, even though this court, in Boone County v. Kecke, 31 Ark. 387, indicated very clearly that the word \u201ccorporation\u201d does not mean or include a municipality. The 1941 Legislature must have. thought it was necessary to mention \u2018\u00a3 cities and municipalities \u2019 \u2019 in addition to the word \u00a3 \u2018 corporation\u201d or it would not have done so.\nHowever, if such doubt does exist, though we think none does, concerning the intent of the legislature to exclude municipalities from the tax still that doubt must be resolved in favor of appellee here. This court has many times held that a tax act must be construed in favor of the purported taxpayer and that we are not at liberty to imply a meaning to a tax act which is not clearly stated. In Morley, Commissioner of Revenues v. Pitts, 217 Ark. 755, 233 S. W. 2d 539, at page 757 of the Arkansas Reports, it was said:\n\u201cTax acts are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer; and matters not appearing in a taxing Statute are not to be read into it when such result is adverse to the taxpayer through implication. Our cases recognizing and declaring this salutary interpretation of the law are legion.\u201d\nIn U-Drive-\u2019Em Service Company v. Hardin, Commissioner of Revenues, 205 Ark. 501, 169 S. W. 2d 584, at page 506 of the Arkansas Reports, the court quoted with approval:\n\u201c \u2018It is the general rule that a tax cannot be imposed except by express words indicating that purpose. The intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from a consideration of the entire act, and where there is ambiguity or doubt it must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, and against the taxing power.'\u2019 \u201d\nIn McCain, Commissioner of Labor v. Crossett Lumber Company, 206 Ark. 51, 174 S. W. 2d 114, at page 61 of the Arkansas Reports, it was said:\n\u201c. . . it\u2018might be well to observe in passing that in construing an act imposing a special tax, such' as we have here, we must construe the same strictly against the state and favorably to the taxpayer, and all ambiguities or doubts therein respecting liability for such tax must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.\u201d\n\u25a0In Moses, Executor, v. McLeod, Commissioner of Revenues, 207 Ark. 252, 180 S. W. 2d 110, it was likewise stated at page 256 of the Arkansas Reports that \u201ceven if there were any doubt' about the proper construction of the act, it would be the duty of the court to resolve such doubt in favor of the taxpayer.\u201d Many other cases could be cited which hold uniformly to the same effect.\nWe conclude, therefore; First, that the elimination of cities and municipalities from the definition of \u201cperson\u201d in Act 487 of 1949 evinces a definite intent to exclude municipalities from the operation of the Act; and, Second, that if any doubt does exist in this regard it must be resolved in favor of appellee. .\nThe argument that cities should not be allowed to make out of state purchases tax free, when they are compelled [under Act 386 of 1941] to pay a tax on purchases made within the state, is a matter which addresses itself, not to the judiciary, but to the legislative branch of our government.\nIt follows from the above that the judgment of the trial court was correct and the same is hereby affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Ward, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "TJlys A. Lovell, for appellee.", "O. T. Ward, for appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Scurlock, Commissioner of Revenues v. City of Springdale.\n5-551\n273 S. W. 2d 551\nOpinion delivered December 20, 1954.\nTJlys A. Lovell, for appellee.\nO. T. Ward, for appellant." }, "file_name": "0408-01", "first_page_order": 430, "last_page_order": 435 }