{ "id": 1646616, "name": "Cannon v. Owens", "name_abbreviation": "Cannon v. Owens", "decision_date": "1955-02-14", "docket_number": "5-599", "first_page": "614", "last_page": "615", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "224 Ark. 614" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "275 S.W.2d 445" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "198 Ark. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1459823 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/198/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.W. 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717955 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/173/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 S.W. 2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ark. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1389696 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/182/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 S.W. 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ark. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1352018 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/103/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 A.L.R. 1234", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ark. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718023 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/201/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S. W. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1646545 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/224/0342-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 261, "char_count": 3017, "ocr_confidence": 0.517, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.518663207679568e-07, "percentile": 0.8836816354930346 }, "sha256": "3748aaa64f0d49781337c9953bc82fd920e1c9d0175a88453a9ab9f4fdf1b5d0", "simhash": "1:5b6f46b7888d3cfd", "word_count": 520 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:52.725032+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Cannon v. Owens." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "George Eose Smith, J.\nIn 1948 Mary Vannatter paid $4,000 for fifteen acres of land and had the deed made to herself for life with remainder to the appellants, who are Mrs. Vannatter\u2019s daughter and son-in-law. After the life tenant\u2019s death the appellants brought this suit to quiet their title as against the appellees, Mrs. Vannatter\u2019s other heirs. As defenses to the complaint the appellees asserted (a) that the appellants furnished none of the consideration paid to Mrs. Vannatter\u2019s grant- or, (b) that the appellants were named as remaindermen in return for their promise to support Mrs. Vannatter for the rest of her life, an obligation that was not fulfilled, and (c) that the appellants obtained their interest by duress and undue influence. The chancellor sustained the first of these defenses and therefore declined the appellees \u2019 offer of proof on the other issues.\nThe court was in error in holding the remainder void on the ground that the appellants supplied none of the money paid to Mrs. Vannatter\u2019s grantor. There is no requirement that each grantee share in the payment of the consideration, or, for that matter, that any consideration at all be paid to the grantor. Ferguson v. Haynes, 224 Art. 342, 273 S. W. 2d 23. Not infrequently the remaindermen cannot even be identified when the deed is executed, as in the case of a remainder to unborn children, heirs of the body, etc.; but such conveyances are valid in spite of the fact that the remaindermen pay none Of the purchase price.\nThe appellees also argue that the deed was ineffective as to the appellants because they were named in the granting clause but not in the habendum. Even under the strict rules of construction that were formerly observed, the granting clause was controlling when it conflicted with the habendum. Now, however, we construe a deed in its entirety, Beasley v. Shinn, 201 Ark. 31, 144 S. W. 2d 710, 131 A.L.R. 1234, and when the present instrument is so considered there can be no doubt about the parties\u2019 intention.\nThe cause must be remanded to afford the appellees an opportunity to make proof of their other defenses. It is true that when a promise of future support is made in good faith, the cause of-action for its breach is personal to the promisee and cannot be asserted by his heirs. Priest v. Murphy, 103 Ark. 464, 149 S.W. 98; Jeffery v. Patton, 182 Ark. 449, 31 S.W. 2d 738. But nonperformance of the promise may also be evidence of fraud in the original procurement of the deed, giving rise to a cause of action that does survive the promisee\u2019s death. Phillips v. Phillips, 173 Ark. 1, 291 S.W. 802; Richey v. Crabtree, 198 Ark. 25, 127 S.W. 2d 269. Furthermore, the appellees are entitled to be heard upon their assertions of duress and undue influence. Thus the incompleteness of the proof requires a remand.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "George Eose Smith, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Chas. F. Cole, for appellant.", "Ben Williamson, W. G. Wiley and Ivan Williamson, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Cannon v. Owens.\n5-599\n275 S. W. 2d 445\nOpinion delivered February 14, 1955.\nChas. F. Cole, for appellant.\nBen Williamson, W. G. Wiley and Ivan Williamson, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0614-01", "first_page_order": 636, "last_page_order": 637 }