{ "id": 1646514, "name": "Public Loan Corporation of Little Rock v. Terrell", "name_abbreviation": "Public Loan Corp. v. Terrell", "decision_date": "1955-02-14", "docket_number": "5-589", "first_page": "616", "last_page": "618", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "224 Ark. 616" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "275 S.W.2d 435" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "207 Ark. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1481720 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/207/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.W. 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ark. 846", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724735 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/173/0846-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 264, "char_count": 3975, "ocr_confidence": 0.509, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.212262085584386e-08, "percentile": 0.2681554021103161 }, "sha256": "461244675cbff777640803a04025c6130db515603622c9b3b3de0e3acc6410e1", "simhash": "1:9541943281e66cd2", "word_count": 678 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:52.725032+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Public Loan Corporation of Little Rock v. Terrell." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Ward, J.\nThe only issue on this appeal is whether appellant is a holder in due course of the promissory note sued on.\nAppellee, John Terrell, purchased a window fan from Easy Appliance Company for the purpose of ventilating and cooling his cafe. He made a down payment and executed a note and conditional sales contract for the balance of $181.62, which amount included the cost of installation. The note was dated May 22, 1952 and was payable in monthly installments of $10.09 each, the first installment being- due June 22, 1952.\nOn the same day the note was executed it was assigned by Easy Appliance Company to appellant without recourse. The conditional sales contract was also assigned to appellant at the same time.\nAppellant sued Terrell on the note after he failed to make payments. Terrell had Easy Appliance Company made a party, and answered (a) that there was a failure of consideration in that the fan was wholly ineffective for the purpose intended and (b) that he was entitled to assert against appellant all the defenses he had against Easy Appliance Company for the reason that appellant was \u201cto all intents and purposes a party to the original transaction\u201d set forth above. The prayer was that appellant\u2019s complaint be dismissed, or, in the alternative, that he be given judgment against the Easy Appliance Company.\nThe trial court, sitting as a jury by agreement, heard testimony by all the parties, dismissed appellant\u2019s complaint and found for the cross-defendant, Easy Appliance Company, rendering judgments accordingly.\nAppellant has appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its complaint, but appellee has not appealed from the judgment in favor of the Easy Appliance Company.\nIn view of the status of the record there is no need to discuss the evidence tending to show a failure of consideration. It relates to issues not before us, because; (a) Appellee, as stated, has not appealed from the judgment in favor of the Easy Appliance Company, and (b) it is no defense to a holder in due course. In Jones v. Green, 173 Ark. 846, 293 S.W. 749, the court, in considering the same issue on page 851 of the Arkansas Reports, said: \u201cThe fact that appellee is seeking to recover, although he knows that the appellant never got any value, is immaterial.\u201d\nThe judgment of the trial court can be sustained only on the basis that appellant was to all intents and purposes a party to the original transaction between Terrell and the Easy Appliance Company, as alleged by appellee, or [in the words of Ark. Stats. \u00a7 68-156] on the basis that appellant \u201chad knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith.\u201d\nIn our opinion there is no substantial evidence to support a finding of any knowledge or bad faith on the part of appellant such as mentioned above, or that appellant was to all intents and purposes a party to the transaction between appellee and the Easy Appliance Company. The only evidence we find which remotely tends to support the necessary findings is that Easy Appliance Company had some blank notes and sales contracts which were prepared by appellant but which did not bear its name, and that the note was endorsed by the Easy Appliance Company to appellant on the day it was executed. There is no evidence tending to show appellant knew of any defects in the fan or its operation prior to the assignment. It is not questioned that the note was assigned before maturity and for a valuable consideration. The case under consideration is similar to and controlled by Leonard v. Aviation Credit Corporation, 207 Ark. 465, 181 S.W. 2d 27.\nReversed with directions to enter judgment in favor of appellant and to affirm the judgment in favor of Easy Appliance Company.", "type": "majority", "author": "Ward, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lasley, Spitzberg, Mitchell do Hays, for appellant.", "No brief, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Public Loan Corporation of Little Rock v. Terrell.\n5-589\n275 S. W. 2d 435\nOpinion delivered February 14, 1955.\nLasley, Spitzberg, Mitchell do Hays, for appellant.\nNo brief, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0616-01", "first_page_order": 638, "last_page_order": 640 }