{ "id": 8722964, "name": "Rhea v. State", "name_abbreviation": "Rhea v. State", "decision_date": "1956-06-18", "docket_number": "4843", "first_page": "581", "last_page": "584", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 Ark. 581" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "291 S.W.2d 505" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "13 Ark. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8728116 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/13/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 S. W. 952", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ark. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1586123 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/145/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 S. W. 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ark. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1533777 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/115/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S. W. 992", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ark. 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1497247 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/78/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ark. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1869284 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/20/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 U. S. 46", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 365087 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/332/0046-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 473, "char_count": 6531, "ocr_confidence": 0.511, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0795184901484893e-07, "percentile": 0.7588625823358813 }, "sha256": "f6ad8fb2451f1cff77d0236f60a518d6f65dc890dd0c655a45ec6fc6d88840c4", "simhash": "1:03e4e448d32a0d5f", "word_count": 1120 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:58:54.393419+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Rhea v. State." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Geoege Rose Smith, J.\nThis is a petition filed by Sewell Rhea, a sixteen-year-old boy, for a writ of cer-tiorari to quash a circuit court order by which Sewell was found to be' in contempt of court and was sentenced to serve 100 days in the county jail. The question is whether the petitioner, as a witness in the court below, was entitled to refuse to testify on the ground of self-incrimination. Ark. Const., Art. 2, \u00a7 8. Petitioner also relies on the similar clause in the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution, but that clause does not apply to proceedings in the state courts. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903.\nThe petitioner\u2019s brother, Keith Dale Rhea, was charged with having burglarized a service station owned by Mick Richards. During the trial of that case, which resulted in an acquittal, Sewell Rhea was called as a witness by the prosecuting attorney and was asked this question: \u201cDid you, in the company of your brother, Keith Dale Rhea, break into Mick Richards\u2019 service station in May of this year?\u201d The witness refused to answer the question and was thereupon held to be in contempt of court.\nInasmuch as an affirmative answer to the prosecuting attorney\u2019s question would undoubtedly have been incriminating, the witness was clearly entitled to remain silent unless there is some circumstance in the case that deprives the petitioner of his constitutional privilege. The State suggests two reasons for withdrawing the protection of the Bill of Rights, but neither suggestion is sound.\nFirst, the State relies upon the provisions of Ark. Stats. 1947, \u00a7 43-915, which reads: \u201cIn all cases where two or more persons are jointly or otherwise concerned in the commission of any crime or misdemeanor, either of such persons may be sworn as a witness in relation to such crime or misdemeanor, but the testimony given by such witness shall in no instance be used against him in any criminal prosecution for the same offense.\u201d It is contended that this section confers immunity against subsequent prosecution and effectively destroys any possibility that the witness\u2019s forced admissions may ever prove to be incriminating.\nIt is plain, however, that this statute applies only to proceedings before a grand jury. The statute was enacted as \u00a7 67 of Chapter 45 of the Bevised Statutes of 1838. This chapter relates to criminal procedure and, as may he readily seen from the table of contents which follows its title, is subdivided to conform to the various steps involved in a criminal proceeding. Sections 59 through 77 define the procedure to be observed by grand juries. When \u00a7 67 is read together with the sections that immediately precede and follow it there can be no doubt that it pertains only to testimony taken in the course of a grand jury investigation. And, with a single exception, the statute has been so applied in the reported cases. Buzzard v. State, 20 Ark. 106; Ex parte Butt, 78 Ark. 262, 93 S. W. 992; Claborn v. State, 115 Ark. 387, 171 S. W. 862; Lockett v. State, 145 Ark. 415, 224 S. W. 952.\nIt is true that in State v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307, the statute was inadvertently applied to testimony adduced at a trial before a petit jury. The court\u2019s discussion, however, was directed to an entirely different issue, and there is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the court consciously meant to extend the statute beyond the scope clearly intended by the legislature. We do not regard the Quarles opinion as a controlling precedent on the issue now presented.\nSecond, the State contends that Sewell Bhea has already been convicted for the burglary of Bichards\u2019 filling station and therefore can be compelled to testify about a crime for which he cannot again be put in jeopardy. Wigmore on Evidence (3d Ed.), \u00a7 2279. The defect in this argument lies in the State\u2019s inability to prove the asserted prior conviction. It would hardly be contended that every witness who claims his constitutional privilege must first prove the negative by demonstrating that he has not been convicted. Bather, when the claim of privilege is apparently well founded the burden logically and fairly rests on the State to refute the claim by showing that a prior conviction has robbed the testimony of its incriminating effect.\nHere the proof falls a good deal short of establishing a prior conviction. There is admittedly no written record of such a conviction by any court. The State attempted to prove by the county judge, C. 0. Smithers, that Sewell Rhea had been found guilty by the juvenile court and had been sent to the Boys\u2019 Industrial School, but Judge Smithers\u2019 candid testimony does not satisfy the State\u2019s burden of proof. He recalled that Sewell had been brought before the juvenile court by the prosecuting attorney, but he is not certain that charges were preferred in writing. No copy of any such charges was produced by the State. Judge Smithers concluded that Sewell should be in the reform school, but he is unwilling to say that the boy was sent to that institution for the particular offense of breaking into the service station. \u201cIt seemed that it was that plus some other things. We didn\u2019t think maybe he was telling all the truth about them.\u201d There is no written record of the juvenile court decision; Judge Smithers simply turned the boy over to the sheriff with an oral order that he be taken to the Industrial School.\nThe legislature declared by Act 398 of 1955 that the Boys\u2019 Industrial School shall be deemed an accredited educational institution and \u201cis not, and shall not be a part of the penal system of this State, nor shall it be construed as a penal institution.\u201d Ark. Stats., \u00a7 46-302.1. We need not, and do not, decide whether the sending of a boy to the Industrial School can amount to a conviction within the prohibition against double jeopardy. We merely hold that the State\u2019s burden of proving a conviction for the burglary of the service station was not discharged by the inconclusive oral evidence that was produced in the trial court. For all this record shows the petitioner may have been committed not for any specific offense but only because the juvenile court made a general finding of delinquency. Ark. Stats. \u00a7 46-302.2. Proof more clear-cut than this is needed to deprive a citizen of the protection afforded by the constitution.\nWrit granted.", "type": "majority", "author": "Geoege Rose Smith, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kenneth Coffelt, for appellant.", "Tom Gentry, Attorney G-eneral and Thorp Thomas, Asst. Atty. General, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Rhea v. State.\n4843\n291 S. W. 2d 505\nOpinion delivered June 18, 1956.\nKenneth Coffelt, for appellant.\nTom Gentry, Attorney G-eneral and Thorp Thomas, Asst. Atty. General, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0581-01", "first_page_order": 605, "last_page_order": 608 }