{
  "id": 1705413,
  "name": "Lynch v. Cypert",
  "name_abbreviation": "Lynch v. Cypert",
  "decision_date": "1957-05-27",
  "docket_number": "5-1284",
  "first_page": "907",
  "last_page": "909",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "227 Ark. 907"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "302 S.W.2d 284"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
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    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "251 S. W. 2d 677",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "129 P. 794",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "P.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "225 Ark. 700",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "71 S. W. 2d 867",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        10254456,
        2302405
      ],
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      "case_paths": [
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        "/tex/123/0383-01"
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    {
      "cite": "123 Tex. 383",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Tex.",
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        2302405
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "221 Ark. 101",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1656598
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:33:25.767944+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Lynch v. Cypert."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George Rose Smith, J.\nAn abandoned railroad right of way, 200 feet in width, lies between the appellant\u2019s land on the north and the appellee\u2019s land on the south. The appellant brought this action in ejectment to recover possession of the south half of the 200-foot strip. The complaint alleges that the entire strip was conveyed to the railroad company by one of the plaintiff\u2019s predecessors in title, Mike Mathis, and that the entire strip therefore reverted to the plaintiff \u2022 when the railroad company removed its trackage in 1949. It is asserted that the defendant, whose land lies on the south side of the right of way, has wrongfully constructed a fence along the center line of the strip and taken possession of the south half thereof. The circuit court, sitting without a jury, rejected the plaintiff\u2019s contention that the entire strip had reverted to him, and judgment was accordingly entered for the defendant.\nIn conveying the 200-foot strip to the railroad company Mathis executed two separate instruments. Th\u00e9re is no controversy about the first instrument, which was executed in 1902. That deed conveyed a 100-foot easement across a forty-acre tract \u201cfor the actual construction, use, maintenance and operation of said railroad.\u201d\nThe case turns upon the correct interpretation of the second instrument, which Mathis executed in 1903. This conveyance is in form a warranty deed, with the usual granting clause, habendum, and covenant of warranty. It conveys \u201cthe following land lying in Searcy County, Arkansas, to-wit: 50 feet on either side of the 100 feet of right of way heretofore deed[ed] to said St. Louis & N. Ark. Ey. Co. for depot grounds between stations 5074 and 5095,\u201d etc. It is stipulated that Mathis owned no land south of the 200-foot right of way, the southern boundary of that strip being also the southern boundary of his forty-acre tract. The trial court held that the second deed conveyed the fee simple title to the fifty feet lying on each side of the original easement and that therefore there had been no reversion to the appellant, since his land borders on a strip that the railroad company owned in fee. The court concluded that the appellant had not proved his own title and so could not prevail in ejectment.\nWe agree with the trial court\u2019s view. If the words \u201cfor depot grounds\u201d had not been inserted in Mathis\u2019 second deed the instrument would undoubtedly have conveyed the fee simple, and there would be no plausible basis for the contention that some lesser estate was intended. Hence the appellant\u2019s argument boils down to the assertion that the grantor\u2019s reference to depot grounds (together with the fact that a nominal consideration of one dollar was recited) overrides all the rest of the instrument and keeps it from being an absolute conveyance.\nAt the outset it will be observed that the pivotal words, \u201cfor depot grounds,\u201d seem by their position in the deed to refer to the 100-foot easement already granted and not to the additional land being conveyed by the second instrument. No attempt was made to clarify this ambiguity by proof of the use that has actually been made of the 200-foot strip. On this record we are left in doubt about what land the parties expected the railroad company to use for depot grounds.\nIf it be assumed, however, that the reference was to the outer areas along the original easement, there is still no persuasive reason for saying that the words \u201cfor depot grounds\u201d change the legal effect of the instrumeat. The appellant, citing Daugherty v. Helena & Northwestern Ry., 221 Ark. 101, 252 S. W. 2d 546, intimates that a mere easement for depot purposes was meant. The instrument construed in the Daugherty case did not purport to be a warranty deed and differed in many, respects from that now before us. That deed was ' expressly \u201cfor a right of way,\u201d which brings to mind the thought of an easement, while a depot site suggests a more extensive use of the land. In the only case that seems to be directly in point, Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 123 Tex. 383, 71 S. W. 2d 867, a warranty deed to a railway company contained two recitals that the land was to be used for depot purposes. The court held that the deed was nevertheless a fee-simple conveyance.\nNor can it well be said that Mathis\u2019s second deed created a defeasible fee in the grantee. The language of the instrument is not that ordinarily employed to describe such an estate. Davis v. St. Joe School Dist., 225 Ark. 700, 284 S. W. 2d 635. And as a general rule a bare recital of- the purpose for which the land is conveyed is not enough to justify a finding -that a determinable fee or fee on condition subsequent was intended. Powell on Real Property, \u00a7 187; Fitzgerald v. Modoc County, 164 Calif. 493, 129 P. 794; Fuchs v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 2, (Mo.) 251 S. W. 2d 677.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George Rose Smith, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John B. Driver and Virgil D. Willis, for appellant.",
      "N. J. Henley, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Lynch v. Cypert.\n5-1284\n302 S. W. 2d 284\nOpinion delivered May 27, 1957.\nJohn B. Driver and Virgil D. Willis, for appellant.\nN. J. Henley, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0907-01",
  "first_page_order": 931,
  "last_page_order": 933
}