{ "id": 1702671, "name": "Rebsamen Motors, Inc. v. Morris", "name_abbreviation": "Rebsamen Motors, Inc. v. Morris", "decision_date": "1958-10-13", "docket_number": "5-1612", "first_page": "483", "last_page": "485", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "229 Ark. 483" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "317 S.W.2d 141" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "225 Ark. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1642455 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/225/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ark. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1652937 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/222/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 S. W. 2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1652880, 1653113 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/222/0200-01", "/ark/222/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ark. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1652880 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/222/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ark. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1653068 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/222/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 Ark. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1660015 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/220/0601-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 273, "char_count": 3251, "ocr_confidence": 0.527, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.06428038854774931 }, "sha256": "8aaa8d7e0d812f0038304451dc22610170e52d841d2d429f5596a4e2c1b6bd0c", "simhash": "1:d74ed9de0109e374", "word_count": 564 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:19:04.434209+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Rebsamen Motors, Inc. v. Morris." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Ed. F. McFaddin, Associate Justice.\nThe question in this case is whether usury tainted the sale of the automobile involved.\nOn July 20, 1951 Tony Morris contracted to purchase a 1949 Ford automobile from Rebsamen Motors, Inc. Here are the figures as reflected in the Conditional Sales Contract:\nTotal Cash Price $1,345.00\nTotal Time Price 1,608.25\nLess Trade-in of Old Car 535.00\nUnpaid Balance of Time Price 1,073.25\nMorris signed a note for $1,073.25, payable in fifteen monthly installments of $71.55 each. He paid some of these monthly installments and then sued to cancel the contract because of usury (\u00a7 68-602 et seq. Ark. Stats.).\nMorris claimed that the difference between the $1,608.25 (total time price) and $1,345.00 (total cash price) was $263.25; that $101.50 of this was for insurance; and that the balance of $161.75 was for \u201cfinance charges\u201d, which amount was in excess of 10 per cent per annum, the interest on the amount actually due if calculated on the total cash price instead of the total time price. In other words, Morris claimed that the \u201cfinance charge\u201d was a cloak for usury. The Trial Court agreed with Morris and entered a decree cancelling any balance claimed by Rebsamen. This appeal ensued.\nWe call particular attention to the fact that this transaction was on July 20,-1951. We also mention that the date of finality of our holding in the case of Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S. W. 2d 973, was June 30, 1952. If the transaction here involved had been after the final date of the Hare case, then the decree herein would be affirmed. In the Hare case we pointed out that the \u201ctime price differential\u201d which had allowed finance charges and other charges in excess of 10 per cent had been approved in a long line of cases and we would not upset those holdings retrospectively; and then we said:\n\u201cBut the time has come when we must re-examine these holdings, so we now give the public a caveat that the effect of transactions, such as in the case at bar, may impinge on the constitutional mandate against usury, and transactions entered into after this appeal becomes final, may be subjected to the taint of usury with the aforementioned decisions affording no protection. \u2019 \u2019\nIn numerous cases since the Hare case we have upheld, as against the claim of usury, contracts like the one here involved tvhich were entered into before the date the Hare opinion became final. Some of these cases are: Crisco v. Murdock, 222 Ark. 127, 258 S. W. 2d 551; Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Crossley, 222 Ark. 200, 258 S. W. 2d 562; Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. Clift, 222 Ark. 313, 259 S. W. 2d 517; and Universal C.l.T. Credit Corp. v. Hall, 225 Ark. 78, 279 S. W. 2d 281. The case at bar cannot be distinguished from the cases last cited.\nTherefore, the decree is reversed and the cause is remanded, with directions to enter a decree for appellant for the unpaid balance of principal and interest due on said contract involved, together with costs.", "type": "majority", "author": "Ed. F. McFaddin, Associate Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Talley & Owen, by William L. Blair and James R. Howard, for appellant.", "Martin K. Fulh and Gentry