{
  "id": 1697028,
  "name": "Riverside Insurance Co. of America v. McGlothin",
  "name_abbreviation": "Riverside Insurance Co. of America v. McGlothin",
  "decision_date": "1960-02-29",
  "docket_number": "5-2093",
  "first_page": "764",
  "last_page": "767",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "231 Ark. 764"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "332 S.W.2d 486"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "61 S. W. 2d 698",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "187 Ark. 676",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1432124
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/187/0676-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "205 Ark. 115",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1488241
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/205/0115-01"
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:12:37.296536+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Riverside Insurance Co. of America v. McGlothin."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Ed. F. McFaddin, Associate Justice.\nThe question presented is, whether the insurance company, pleading an exception clause, has proved facts, in support of the exception, with such sufficiency as to entitle the insurance company to an \u2022 instructed verdict. The Lower Court answered the question in the negative and rendered judgment in favor of the insured, McGlothin (plaintiff below), against the insurer, Riverside Insurance Company (defendant below), for .$300.00 plus interest, penalty* and attorneys\u2019 fees. Such judgment is challenged by this appeal.\nRiverside issued to McGlothin an insurance policy which insured the automobile and welding\u2019 unit of McGlothin against loss or damage by fire. In the exclusion clause the policy provided: \u201cThis policy does not apply . . . (under fire coverage) ... to any damage to the automobile which is due and confined to . . . mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure, . . . unless such damage is the result of other loss covered by this policy.\u201d The automobile was equipped with a welding unit, which had a gasoline driven machine and generator. While the policy was in force, the insured discovered flames coming from the welding unit. Prompt action extinguished the fire; but there was damage, which occasioned this litigation. The insured testified that he did not know what caused the fire. The welding unit and generator was taken to an electrical company for purposes of repair, and the owner of the electrical company testified for the plaintiff that the inner poles of. the generator were burned. On cross examination this occurred:\n\u201cQ. Mr. Brown, you say the \u25a0 poles \u2022 were burned. Actually in this motor, constituting the motor are four magnetic fields setting around the generator proper?\nA. Right . . .\nQ. What was the cause of this fire?\nA. Well, the only cause I could find would be a short in the winding.\nQ. Electrical short in the wiring and setting of the fire. If the electrical short had occurred in the generator proper you know where the short was?\nA. Not exactly because I never tore it down to check it . . .\nQ. Now you don\u2019t know whether the short might have been in the armature or in the fields?\nA. I wouldn\u2019t know until I tore into it and find out . . .\nQ. The electrical short caused the main part of the damage ?\nA. Right. \u2019 \u2019\nRiverside called no witnesses; and the Court rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, Riverside urges one point: \u2018 \u2018 The judgment is contrary to the law and the facts\u201d. The case was tried before the Court, sitting as a jury, so the point urged by Riverside is equivalent to saying that an instructed verdict should have been declared for the defendant.\nThe rule is well established in this jurisdiction that when an insurance company claims that it is not liable on its policy because of some exception or exclusion against coverage, then the burden is on the insurance company, not only to plead the exception, but also to prove facts that bring it within the exception. In U. S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Universal Broadcasting Corp., 205 Ark. 115, 168 S. W. 2d 191, we quoted from Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Barefield, 187 Ark. 676, 61 S. W. 2d 698:\n\u201c \u2018The rule appears to be that, when proof is made of damage apparently within a policy of insurance, the burden is on the insurer to shoiv that the injury or damage was caused by an event from the occurrence of which the insurer had exempted itself from liability.\u2019 \u201d\nIn the case at bar, Riverside pleaded the exception as previously copied; and enough testimony was introduced to make a fact question as to .whether the fire loss was within the exception. But the insurance company, in claiming that it was entitled to a directed verdict \u2014 as it here does \u2014 had the additional burden of establishing facts within the exception with such complete definiteness that there was no fact question for decision. The insured proved the fire and testified that he did not know what caused it. The witness Brown stated that he did not dismantle the generator to check for the cause of the fire; and no testimony was offered to show that a fire did not cause the generator to develop a short.\nTo summarize, the exception was not proved by the insurance company with sufficient certainty to require a fact finding in its favor. Therefore, the Circuit Judge, sitting as a jury, had the right to find that the insurance company had failed to sufficiently, prove the pleaded exception.\nAffirmed.\nThere was a floating policy issued by another insurance company, but that policy was only for damages in excess of the Riverside coverage and the liability of the other insurance company passed out of the case.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Ed. F. McFaddin, Associate Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Pope, Pratt & Shamb\u00farger, By: Richard L. Pratt, for appellant.",
      "Griffin Smith, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Riverside Insurance Co. of America v. McGlothin.\n5-2093\n332 S. W. 2d 486\nOpinion delivered February 29, 1960.\nPope, Pratt & Shamb\u00farger, By: Richard L. Pratt, for appellant.\nGriffin Smith, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0764-01",
  "first_page_order": 788,
  "last_page_order": 791
}