{
  "id": 1684816,
  "name": "Simmons v. Murphy",
  "name_abbreviation": "Simmons v. Murphy",
  "decision_date": "1962-10-08",
  "docket_number": "5-2744",
  "first_page": "519",
  "last_page": "523",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "235 Ark. 519"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "360 S.W.2d 765"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "199 Ark. 1051",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1456623
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/199/1051-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.52,
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    "simhash": "1:8f994713278b09d3",
    "word_count": 910
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:12:51.729415+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Simmons v. Murphy."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Jim Johnson, Associate Justice.\nThis is an action by appellant, J. A. Simmons, against appellee, Marie Murphy, seeking to set aside and cancel a warranty deed which was executed and delivered by appellant to appellee on August 18, 1958, and recorded on February 2, 1959, purporting to convey certain lands in Union County. The complaint admitted that appellant executed the deed here in question, but alleged inter alia that appellant was ill and afraid he was going to die, and made the deed intending only to convey title to appellee in event of his death. Appellee answered, pleading inter alia that the deed was made and delivered with no reservations or conditions, either express or implied. The trial court held that appellant failed to sustain the burden of proof and dismissed the cause for want of equity and quieted and confirmed title to the land in the appellee as against all claims of appellant. This appeal followed.\nFor reversal, appellant contends the trial court\u2019s finding that the deed was delivered within the meaning of the law is not sustained by the evidence.\nAppellee is the niece of appellant\u2019s first wife. Following the death of appellee\u2019s mother, when appellee was about one year old, she and her three sisters were taken into appellant\u2019s home and raised as his own children. The record is replete with testimony of appellant\u2019s goodness to appellee and her sisters over a long period of time. His kindness is not in issue. The question in issue is whether appellant proved there was no delivery of the deed.\nFrom appellant\u2019s own testimony, he had drawn many deeds over a period of 45 years for himself and his employers. He had purchased some 40,000 to 50,000 acres of land, 250 million feet of timber, 2,000 acres of mineral rights, 15,000 acres of oil and gas leases, and he had also prepared leases and deeds for friends and neighbors \u201cnumbers and numbers of times.\u201d He testified that he had drawn \u201cnumbers\u201d of deeds containing conditions, exceptions and reservations, and that the deed to appellee contained none. From a reading of the testimony, appellant obviously has a thorough understanding of deeds and property transactions.\nThere is evidence that shortly after the death of appellant\u2019s first wife, he told appellee and her sisters that he wanted to deed the \u201chome property\u201d to them or to some of them. The deed was prepared at appellant\u2019s direction. He executed it, had it acknowledged, and manually delivered the deed to appellee, without any words or acts indicating any reservations or restrictions. Some months after the conveyance appellee had the deed recorded.\nThere is evidence that appellant was a sick man about the time he made this deed, but there is also evidence of mineral deeds negotiated, prepared and recorded at this same time, in the furtherance of appellant\u2019s usual business.\nSubsequent to the execution and recordation, appellant leased the property from appellee at a time when apparently he was no longer sick nor afraid he was going to die but in fact was preparing to remarry. He drafted and signed a rental contract in which appellee is named as owner of the property, and actually paid rent for seven months. Both appellant\u2019s and appellee\u2019s acts arc consistent with a completed delivery \u2014 appellee paid taxes and insurance on the property, and lived there until appellant\u2019s remarriage. Now, some two years after the conveyance, appellant claims there was no delivery.\nIn the Chancellor\u2019s detailed and cogent opinion, he stated:\n\u201cIn the case at bar, plaintiff (appellant) alleged and so testified that he was in \u2018very bad health\u2019 and was afraid he was going to die when he made and delivered the deed to her, \u2018intending for title to pass to her in the event that death ensued such illness.\u2019\n\u201cIt must be noted, however, that plaintiff (appellant), did not allege nor did he testify that defendant (appellee) was aware of any mental reservations, nor did he testify that he told her of such intention or that there was any reservation on his part.\u201d\nAs stated in 26 C. J. S. at page 681:\n\u201cA mental reservation contrary to the grantor\u2019s expressed intention to convey title, or a subsequent change of intention, does not destroy the effect of a completed delivery. \u2019 \u2019\nThis court has consistently held that in a proceeding to cancel a solemn deed, on the theory of nondelivery or otherwise, the quantum of proof required must rise above a preponderance of the testimony: it must be clear, cogent and convincing. Stephens v. Keener, 199 Ark. 1051, 137 S. W. 253.\nWhile there was testimony elicited from appellee on cross-examination tending to show that she was somewhat confused as to when she thought legal title passed, and that she had knowledge of appellant\u2019s intention to remarry prior to the recordation of the deed, and further evidence that in the course of appellant\u2019s vast real estate transactions title to various properties was, from time to time, placed in her name as a \u201cstraw\u201d title-holder for the convenience of appellant, we cannot, from the record before us on trial de novo, in the instant case, say that the learned Chancellor was wrong in concluding that appellant failed to produce the quantum of proof required to set aside the deed.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Jim Johnson, Associate Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Bruce Bennett and Mahony & Yocum, for appellant.",
      "J. 8. Brooks and Spencer & Spencer, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Simmons v. Murphy.\n5-2744\n360 S. W. 2d 765\nOpinion delivered October 8, 1962.\nBruce Bennett and Mahony & Yocum, for appellant.\nJ. 8. Brooks and Spencer & Spencer, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0519-01",
  "first_page_order": 545,
  "last_page_order": 549
}