{ "id": 1681304, "name": "Johnson v. State", "name_abbreviation": "Johnson v. State", "decision_date": "1963-09-23", "docket_number": "5082", "first_page": "917", "last_page": "920", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "236 Ark. 917" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "370 S.W.2d 610" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "221 Ark. 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1656599 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/221/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ark. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721897 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/226/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ark. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1688467 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/234/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 S. W. 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ark. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1571607 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/135/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S. W. 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ark. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1379874 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/165/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ark. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1467022 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/213/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S. W. 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ark. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1378523 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/166/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 S. W. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ark. 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1418488 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/191/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S. W. 2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ark. 1053", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1418597 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/191/1053-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 S. W. 939", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ark. 768", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1369450 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/171/0768-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 458, "char_count": 7296, "ocr_confidence": 0.475, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.1035903287573944e-07, "percentile": 0.8595016543435544 }, "sha256": "6c90a979ffea696ebd78cc2884493d4842a253327c27628a37658d76a9e05121", "simhash": "1:51bafd56d409f66e", "word_count": 1294 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:38:16.140393+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Johnson v. State." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Sam Robinson, Associate Justice.\nAppellant was convicted of the crime of forgery, sentenced to five years in the penitentiary, and has appealed.\nFirst, appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for a mistrial because of the method used by the prosecuting attorney in cross-examining the defendant about the commission of other offenses. When the defendant takes the stand, as in the ease at bar, he is subject to the same rules of evidence as other witnesses, and for the purpose of throwing light on his credibility, he may, in good faith, be asked about other crimes he may have committed and other convictions, but he cannot be asked if he has been charged, indicted, or accused of other crimes. Sullivan v. State, 171 Ark. 768, 286 S. W. 939; Mathis v. State, 191 Ark. 1053, 89 S. W. 2d 599; Morrison v. State, 191 Ark. 720, 87 S. W. 2d 50; Kennedy v. Quinn, 166 Ark. 509, 266 S. W. 462.\nIf the defendant denies that he has committed other crimes he cannot be impeached by showing that he has given false answers. Montague v. State, 213 Ark. 575, 211 S. W. 2d 879. Here, the defendant was asked on cross-examination about other convictions which he readily admitted, but he denied other crimes for which apparently there had been no trial or conviction. The prosecuting attorney asked the defendant specifically if he had cashed a check in Lucille Brent\u2019s Cafe. He answered \u201cno\u201d. The prosecuting attorney then said: \u201cI ask the Court\u2019s indulgence. I sent after some records and they will be here in just a minute.\u201d\nThe prosecuting attorney then proceeded to question-the accused about other check writing offenses. The record is not exactly clear at this point as to whether the State\u2019s attorney was using the alleged records in such manner as to lead the jury to believe that he was examining the accused from official records of charges against him, but apparently this was being done. The attorney for appellant then stated that if other records were to be introduced, he would like to discuss the matter in chambers. Finally, the Court and counsel retired to chambers and there, in the course of the discussion, the prosecuting attorney said: \u201cI, at the time of this objection, am doing nothing more or less than looking at old information sheets with which the man was charged, specific checks and the specific name . . .\u201d. The Court then asked: \u201cAre these convictions according to the witness?\u201d The prosecuting attorney replied: \u201cThey are charges.\u201d The Court sustained the defendant\u2019s objection, but did not grant the motion for a mistrial.\nIn view of the fact that the cause is being reversed on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not deem it necessary to rule on the above assignment of error any more than to point out that although it is proper for the State\u2019s attorney, in good faith, to ask the defendant on cross-examination about the commission of, or the conviction for, other offenses, he should not attempt to get before the jury in an indirect way, or otherwise, the fact that the defendant has been charged, indicted, or accused of other crimes.\nThe appellant was charged by felony information with forging the name of James Odam to a check drawn on the Morrilton Security Bank in the sum of $38.00. Billy F. Davidson, Assistant Cashier of the First State Bank (not the Morrilton Security Bank on which the check was drawn) was called' by the State as a witness regarding the alleged forged check. The name of James Odam appeared on the check as maker and the name James Payne appeared on the back of the check as endorser. The witness, Mr. Davidson, testified:\n\u201c Q. At this time I hand you a check dated October 19, 1962, and ask you if you can, how it came into your hands originally?\nA. \"Well, that\u2019s the one thing I can\u2019t tell you, how it got into our bank. Presumably, someone cashed it at the window, but who, we don\u2019t know, but its possible it came to us on a deposit and they didn\u2019t put a stamp on it or write their name on it.\u201d\nThe witness then testified that the check was forwarded to the Morrilton Security Bank and was returned by that bank with the notation \u201cSig. Inf.\u201d written in pencil at the end of the name of the endorser on the back of the check. The witness further testified that the notation on the back of the check along side the endorsement means, in banking circles, that the signature does not correspond; that the known signature at the bank does not correspond with the signature on the check. He further testified: \u201cWe get them quite often, but not too often, occasionally.\u201d The witness then stated that they (the bank) wrote to James Payne, whose name appeared on the check as endorser. The State attempted to prove by the witness what James Payne said, but, of course, such evidence was excluded by the Court as hearsay.\nThe State produced as a witness Dr. Orlando W. Stephenson, who testified as an expert, and said, in effect, that the defendant\u2014appellant Johnson, had written the check in question, but apparently, to reach that conelusion it required about 30 days work on the part of the witness in comparing the handwriting on the check with known specimens of Johnson\u2019s writing.\nOther than the testimony of Dr. Stephenson, there is no competent evidence in the record that the defendant signed the name of James Odam on the check, and there is absolutely no evidence that James Odam\u2019s name was forged. In order to constitute the offense of forgery it is necessary that there be an intent to defraud. Ferrell v. State, 165 Ark. 541, 265 S. W. 62; Rickman v. State, 135 Ark. 298, 205 S. W. 711. Of course, if one has permission to sign another\u2019s name to the instrument in question, there could be no forgery.\nAlthough the circumstantial evidence shows that there is such a person as James Odam who has a checking account at the Morrilton Security Bank, Odam was not called as a witness, and neither was anyone from the bank on which the check was drawn. The mere fact that one person signs another person\u2019s name on a check or other instrument does not necessarily mean that a forgery has been committed.\nWhether Odam authorized someone else to sign his name could have been proved very easily by calling him as a witness. There is nothing in the record indicating that he was not available as a witness, and certainly someone could have been called from the bank on which the check was drawn and Odam\u2019s signature card could have been produced or its absence explained. It does not appear that Dr. Stephenson ever examined a signature of Odam known to be genuine. It might be asked why did the defendant not do these things. The answer is that the burden was on the State to prove the defendant guilty, the burden was not on the defendant to prove his innocence.\nThe evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict, but the case does not appear to have been fully developed; therefore, the cause is reversed and remanded for a new trial. Poole v. State, 234 Ark. 593, 353 S. W. 2d 359; Anderson v. State, 226 Ark. 498, 290 S. W. 2d 846; Grigson v. State, 221 Ark. 14, 251 S. W. 2d 1021.", "type": "majority", "author": "Sam Robinson, Associate Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Felver A. Rcnvell, Jr., for appellant.", "Bmee Bennett, Atty. General, by Leslie Evits, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Johnson v. State.\n5082\n370 S. W. 2d 610\nOpinion delivered September 23, 1963.\nFelver A. Rcnvell, Jr., for appellant.\nBmee Bennett, Atty. General, by Leslie Evits, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0917-01", "first_page_order": 949, "last_page_order": 952 }