{ "id": 1727540, "name": "Griffin v. Monsanto Co.", "name_abbreviation": "Griffin v. Monsanto Co.", "decision_date": "1966-03-07", "docket_number": "5-3807", "first_page": "420", "last_page": "423", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "240 Ark. 420" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "400 S.W.2d 492" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "217 Ark. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8720029 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/217/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N. Y. S. 2d 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 App. Div. 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.", "case_ids": [ 5383481 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad/282/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 F. Supp. 317", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4284999 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/157/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 F. Supp. 763", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4232946 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/113/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S. W. 2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10154553, 1681318 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/368/0089-01", "/ark/236/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 Ark. 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1681318 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/236/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ark. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8720029 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/217/0350-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 394, "char_count": 5758, "ocr_confidence": 0.514, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.449617167834844e-07, "percentile": 0.9452630249871711 }, "sha256": "73befe9fe186a802e5df8dd3701d8f996cf5fd8acfeb701a722e65b285961ea4", "simhash": "1:1ba0ffb1c846ae76", "word_count": 955 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:11:15.698686+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "McFaddin, J., not participating.", "Ward, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "Griffin v. Monsanto Co." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nThomas Talmage Griffin died on May 4, 1962. This action for his wrongful death was brought by the appellants, his widow and children, against the appellee, the decedent\u2019s employer. The appeal is from an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs\u2019 exclusive remedy is under the workmen\u2019s compensation law.\nThe complaint, as amended, asserts that Griffin, while on duty as an employee of Monsanto, was stricken as a result of having inhaled nitric acid fumes. Griffin was taken to a hospital, where, according to the complaint, Monsanto and its agents \u201cneglected to inform the attending physician of the nature of the fumes which said Thomas Talmage Griffin inhaled, to the end that the wrongful and negligent withholding of this information prevented the attending physician from making such a diagnosis and giving such treatment at that time as would have, in all probability, resulted in the attending physician being able to save the life of said Thomas Talmage Griffin.\u201d\nBy another count in the complaint, later abandoned, the plaintiffs charged that the defendant had concealed the true cause of Griffin\u2019s death by representing to the plaintiffs that he had died a natural death as a result of a heart condition. An amendment to the complaint sought punitive damages on the ground that the defendant acted \u201cwith conscious indifference to consequences.\u201d\nThe defendant moved that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice, because the plaintiffs\u2019 remedy was under the workmen\u2019s compensation law. Attached to the motion was an affidavit, conceded by the plaintiffs to be true, stating that Monsanto had complied with the Workmen\u2019s compensation law in all respects, that the plaintiffs had filed a claim for compensation under that law, and that the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Commission had dismissed the claim. The circuit court sustained the defendant\u2019s motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.\nAt the outset we observe that the defendant\u2019s pleading is not properly called a \u201cmotion to dismiss.\u201d If a complaint states a cause of action our code of procedure does not permit the defendant to single out a fact essential to the plaintiff\u2019s case, file affidavits denying that fact, and on the strength of those affidavits seek an order dismissing the action without a trial on the merits.\nThe defendant\u2019s pleading is in substance a motion for a summary judgment. We so treat it. Such a motion cannot be used to submit a disputed question of fact to the trial judge. Testimony submitted with the motion \u201cmust be viewed in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion, with all doubts and inferences being resolved against the moving party.\u201d Russell v. City of Rogers, 236 Ark. 713, 368 S. W. 2d 89 (1963). Judgment should be entered summarily only if the evidence, when so considered, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in the case. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 29-211 (c) (Repl. 1962).\nWe turn, then, to the question whether a summary judgment was proper in the case at bar. As a general rule, if an employee\u2019s compensable injury is later aggravated by the employer\u2019s negligence, as by his sending the injured workman to an incompetent physician, the employee may pursue a remedy under the compensation law for the aggravation of his original injury. As a corollary to that rule the employer cannot be sued at common law, because the compensation act provides an exclusive remedy. Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation, \u00a7 13.21 (1965); Fernandez v. Gantz, 113 F. Supp. 763 (D.C. D.C. 1953); Berry v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 317 (D. C. Ore. 1957); Young v. International Paper Co., 282 App. Div. 750, 122 N. Y. S. 2d 39 (1953).\nHere the defendant\u2019s request for summary judgment, with its supporting affidavit, is deficient in its failure to show that Griffin\u2019s widow and children had a remedy under the compensation act. All that appears is the bare statement that their claim for compensation was dismissed. If, for example, Griffin\u2019s death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, the claim may never have been within the purview of the compensation act. In that event we should not compel the claimants to invoke a nonexistent statutory remedy for their contention that the defendant\u2019s intervening-negligence was a factor in Griffin\u2019s death. Thus there are essential issues of fact still unresolved.\nWe need not say whether the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, without further amendment, asserts such willful action on Monsanto\u2019s part as to bring the case within the rule adopted in Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., 217 Ark. 350, 230 S. W. 2d 28 (1950). Issues such as that can await the full development of the case. At the moment it is enough for us to say that the present record does not justify a summary disposition of the litigation.\nReversed.\nMcFaddin, J., not participating.\nWard, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice." }, { "text": "Paul Ward, Justice,\ndissenting. In my opinion the trial court ivas correct in dismissing appellants\u2019 complaint. Either Griffin was or was not an employee of Monsanto when he was injured.\n1. If Griffin was not an employee, then Monsanto was under no legal obligation to see that he was furnished proper medical attention and treatment.\n.2 If Griffin was an employee, then the complaint does not state a cause of action in circuit court. It only states Monsanto was \u201cnegligent.\u201d To state a cause of action it was necessary to allege Monsanto\u2019s action was \u201cwillful and malicious.\u201d See: Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Company, Inc., 217 Ark. 350 (p. 351), 230 S. W. 2d 28.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Paul Ward, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Bernard Whetstone, for appellant.", "Mahony & Yocum, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Griffin v. Monsanto Co.\n5-3807\n400 S. W. 2d 492\nOpinion delivered March 7, 1966\n[Rehearing denied April 11, 1966.]\nBernard Whetstone, for appellant.\nMahony & Yocum, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0420-01", "first_page_order": 444, "last_page_order": 447 }