{
  "id": 1727586,
  "name": "Lehigh v. Wooley",
  "name_abbreviation": "Lehigh v. Wooley",
  "decision_date": "1966-05-30",
  "docket_number": "5-3918",
  "first_page": "976",
  "last_page": "978",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "240 Ark. 976"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "403 S.W.2d 79"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.487,
    "pagerank": {
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    "word_count": 636
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:11:15.698686+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Lehigh v. Wooley"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Paul Ward, Justice.\nThis litigation concerns primarily the sufficiency of the application required of a qualified elector to vote by absentee ballot. More specifically we are here concerned with the \u201creason\u201d which the elector must assign for his contemplated absence from his voting precinct on election day.\nOn September 28, 1965 a school election was held in the El Dorado School District No. 15. At that election Grady E. Wooley, Frances Duren, Herbert S. Woods, and Charles Van Ness (appellees herein) voted by absentee ballots, but their votes were not counted by Charles H. Lehigh and Eva Mae Combs (appellants herein) who were the election judges on the absentee box.\nOn October 7, 1965 appellees filed a petition for mandamus in the Circuit Court of Union County to compel appellants to count their ballots and certify same to the County Election Commissioners. The Commissioners were also made defendants and the court was asked to compel them to include appellees\u2019 votes in the final results.\nBefore a trial was had on the issues raised the Commissioners agreed to accept appellees\u2019 votes and to include them in the final results. They then asked the court to dismiss appellees\u2019 petition. It appears the trial court recognized that the action of the Commissioners rendered all issues moot, but (a) it refused their r\u00e9quest, and (b) it ordered appellants to count the ballots and certify them to the Commissioners.\nWe think the trial court was correct on both counts.\n(a) Even though appellees had already achieved what they sought to accomplish\u2014have their votes counted\u2014yet the other issue raises a question which is of interest to the voting public and, for that reason, it should be resolved. The trial court was correct in so holding.\n(b) Act 325 of 1949, \u00a7 6, being Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 3-1128 (Repl. 1956) in substance and in all parts material here, provides: The county clerk shall deliver to the applicant a blank statement for him to fill out and sign. The statement is in essential form as follows:\n\u201cI, .........................................., do swear ... I will be unavoidably absent from my voting precinct because of .......................................... (state reason). I am a qualified elector .... \u201d\nsignature\nAddress\u201d\nIt -was stipulated that appellees wrote the words \u201cout of town\u201d in the last blank space as the \u201creason\u201d for being absent. It is appellants\u2019 contention however that the assigned \u201creason\u201d is insufficient and does not meet the requirements of the above mentioned statute. This objection was appellants\u2019 sole ground for refusing to count appellees\u2019 ballots. The burden of appellants\u2019 argument appears to be that it was incumbent upon appellees to explain why it was necessary for them to be \u201cout of town\u201d. The trial court held that the \u201creason\u201d given by appellees was a substantial compliance with the statute, and we agree with that holding.\nWe do not believe the legislature meant for an absentee voter to explain in detail the \u201creason\u201d for being absent on election day. If a real and convincing \u201creason\u201d should be required, then it follows that someone would have to judge the sufficiency of that reason. Such a procedure could easily result in an elector being compelled to divulge personal secrets in order to exercise his constitutional right of suffrage.\nAppellants lay much stress on the words \u201cunavoidably absent\u201d as meaning the elector must give a good reason why he will be \u201cabsent from town\u201d. We point out however that the elector is only required to give a good reason why he will be \u2018 \u2018 absent \u2019 \u2019 from the voting precinct. We then submit that if the elector is \u201cout of town\u201d on'election day he will \u201cbe unavoidably absent\u201d from his voting precinct.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Paul Ward, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Thomas A. Glaze, for appellant.",
      "No brief filed for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Lehigh v. Wooley\n5-3918\n403 S. W. 2d 79\nOpinion delivered May 30, 1966\nThomas A. Glaze, for appellant.\nNo brief filed for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0976-01",
  "first_page_order": 1000,
  "last_page_order": 1002
}