{ "id": 1727686, "name": "LeFevers v. LeFevers", "name_abbreviation": "LeFevers v. LeFevers", "decision_date": "1966-05-30", "docket_number": "5-3849", "first_page": "992", "last_page": "997", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "240 Ark. 992" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "403 S.W.2d 65" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "226 Ark. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723352 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/226/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ark. 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1694031 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/232/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 P. 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 501, "char_count": 8347, "ocr_confidence": 0.501, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.591356421208395e-08, "percentile": 0.4497105815821695 }, "sha256": "5be60bfb9626ec00c9f4f26f9c1af9999f4df43524fc5f42028eb5511670e318", "simhash": "1:834fa7123d98bf32", "word_count": 1392 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:11:15.698686+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LeFevers v. LeFevers" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Guy Amslbr, Justice.\nThis is an appeal by Deva T. LeFevers and a cross appeal by Ollie M. LeFevers from a decree fixing their property rights under an ante-nuptial agreement.\nAppellant and appellee were married on June 11, 1964, after a brief courtship. They had previously entered into an ante-nuptial agreement. She was a -widow, 48 years of age, and he a rather well to do widower, 67 years old. Both had children by previous marriages. They lived together, apparently nnharmonionsly, until January 17, 1965. He filed suit for divorce on January 19, 1965, alleging indignities.\nAppellant counter-claimed, also seeking a divorce, and either a settlement under the ante-nuptial agreement or, in lieu thereof, her \u2018 \u2018 statutory entitlements \u2019 \u2019 in appellee\u2019s propertju On May 21, 1965, the Chancellor granted appellee a divorce and retained jurisdiction for further orders relative to property rights. A supplemental decree was later entered, fixing the rights of the parties under the pre-marital contract.\nFor reversal, appellant urges that the Chancellor erred in his interpretation of the ante-nuptial agreement. The two provisions in the agreement, which provoke the principal contentions, read:\n\"Now as to assets, property, notes, moneys, accumulated after the marriage in the future, by either or both of these parties, they shall be the owners each of an undivided one-half interest therein; and same shall not be owned as a joint estate or estate by the entirety, except as is herein otherwise set forth and agreed upon.\u201d\n\u201cIn the event of a separation or a divorce of these parties then and in such event it is agreed that the second party, the wife, shall be restored to all her own separate property she had prior to the marriage; also half of any net gain that is made by the joint effort of these parties during coverture; that is to say during their married life. \u2019 \u2019\nThe Chancellor, in a lengthy and helpful memorandum, found, inter alia, that: appellant had $5,000.00 at time of marriage; she received a car as a gift from appellee which is not involved; she invested $2,505.00 on appellee\u2019s recommendation and \u201che has paid this to her,\u201d hence, \u201cthe return to her of the $2,505.00 is all of her original $5,000.00 she is entitled to get back as that is all of it he did not let her manage herself \u2019 \u2019; defendant (appellant) is entitled to one-half of net gains for 1964, on property other than the farm, of $143.29; that farm income after taxes and depreciation was $13,-152.25 for 1964; parties were married five-ninths of 1964; five-ninths of farm income is $7,308.81, from which all costs (including accountant\u2019s fee for $575.00) will be deducted; Mrs. LeFevers is entitled to one-half of five-ninths of the net farm income, tax refund from amended returns to be included; that the Kirby property, consisting of about 12 acres, which was deeded to appellant and appellee, as husband and wife, will be owned by the parties as tenants in common; and a $500.00 fee was allowed appellant\u2019s attorney. The trial judge pointed out that no attorney\u2019s fee pendente lite was sought or awarded.\nIn the part of her brief devoted to argument appellant says \u201cthe essential points in this case are not based upon a conflict in the substantive rules of law, but upon determination of questions of fact.\u201d\nAppellant contends that under the terms of the ante-nuptial agreement she was entitled to have the $5,-000.00, which she owned at the time of marriage, \u201crestored\u201d in full by appellee. Restored is a word of varicus connotations. No authority was cited supporting appellant\u2019s theory of construction and independent research has revealed none. The Chancellor found that Mr. LeFevers had exercised control over only $2,505.00 of the $5,000.00\u2014this he returned\u2014and that he was not responsible for the balance which she either had or had spent as she saw fit. Part of the balance was given to her son, who is a student at the United States Military Academy. The Chancellor gave the parties wide latitude in the presentation of proof on all phases of the case and we are unwilling to say that his finding on this point is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.\nIn connection with the 12 acre \u201cKirby property,\u201d which had been purchased with appellee\u2019s funds during the marriage, the trial judge properly impressed a lien of $150.00 against the one-half interest therein which he awarded appellant because she refused to sign a deed (as she had agreed to do) when appellee could have sold the tract for a profit of $300.00. Had it not been for the fact that her name was included as a grantee in the deed the trial court probably would have decreed that she had no interest at all in the land.\nDuring the marriage appellee acquired what is referred to as the \u201cNew Hope\u201d property. Appellant was not a grantee but she says that she was entitled to a one-half interest in the property. However, the trial court determined, and we think properly, that the \u2018 \u2018 separation or divorce\u201d clause in the prenuptial contract covered only \u2018 \u2018 net gain \u2019 \u2019 on value of property acquired during the marriage.\nAppellant alleges error by the trial court in considering depreciation when determining 1964 farm income. The prenuptial agreement provides that in case of divorce appellant is to have \u2018 \u2018 one-half of any net gain that is made\u2014.\u201d The only proof offered in the trial court was by an expert who said that depreciation is an essential element in determining net income. The Chancellor was justified in accepting this evidence since none to the contrary was offered.\nOn cross-appeal Mr. LeFevers claims error because the trial court allowed Mrs. LeFevers to share in the 1964 farm income. His theory is that the \u201cjoint effort\u201d provision of the divorce clause of the prenuptial agree-ment would not encompass income from the Monroe County farm. There are no citations of authorities in the briefs and our independent research has not been especially fruitful.\nA somewhat analogous situation is found in an Oklahoma case (followed in other jurisdictions) construing a descent and distribution statute dealing with property \u201cacquired by the joint industry of husband and wife during coverture. \u2019 \u2019\nIn disposing of the contention that the widow should not be accorded full benefit of the statute because the property did not result from the \u201cjoint industry\u201d of the husband and wife, the Oklahoma Court said:\n\u201cCounsel followed these statements with quite a lengthy argument upon the meaning of the term \u201cjoint industry,\u201d setting out numerous definitions of the word \u201cjoint\u201d and the word \u201cindustry,\u201d insisting that the word \u201cindustry\u201d means something more than housekeeping, etc., but as to the phrase, \u201cjoint industry\u201d of husband and wife as found in the proviso of the statute supra they submit no authority supporting their contention, and they furnish no argument that convinces us that that phrase does not mean what it says, and we think it has but one interpretation, that is, the industry of a husband and wife, each in his or her recognized sphere of marital activity, and that an attempt to force the interpretation asked by counsel for plaintiff in error \u201cthat the industry or labor must be identical and in the same course of employment and endeav- or\u201d would be to circumvent and abort the natural and socially contemplated marriage relation.\u201d Stone v. Stone, Okla., 206 P. 246.\nIn later cases the Oklahoma Court and others that have followed the Stone case use the terms \u201cjoint industry\u201d and \u201cjoint effort\u201d interchangeably. So we think the Chancellor in this case was justified in awarding appellant a portion of the farm income.\nThat leaves the matter of attorney\u2019s fee and costs, questioned by both parties, to be disposed of. \u00a5e approve of the trial court\u2019s action in awarding appellant\u2019s counsel a fee of $500.00 and in dividing the costs equally between the litigants. Considering the economic status of the parties, we feel that appellant\u2019s attorneys should be awarded an additional fee of $500.00 and that appeal costs should be assessed against appellee. Marques v. Marques, 232 Ark. 9, 334 S. W. 2d 674; Myers v. Myers, 226 Ark. 632, 294 S. W. 2d 67.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Guy Amslbr, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Shaver, Tackett & Jones, Larey & Larey, for appellant.", "Featherston & Featherston} for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LeFevers v. LeFevers\n5-3849\n403 S. W. 2d 65\nOpinion delivered May 30, 1966\nShaver, Tackett & Jones, Larey & Larey, for appellant.\nFeatherston & Featherston} for appellee." }, "file_name": "0992-01", "first_page_order": 1016, "last_page_order": 1021 }