{ "id": 1724119, "name": "Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn. et al v. Faber Padgett et ux", "name_abbreviation": "Life & Casualty Ins. v. Padgett", "decision_date": "1966-11-07", "docket_number": "5-3921", "first_page": "353", "last_page": "358", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "241 Ark. 353" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "407 S.W.2d 728" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "234 Ark. 878", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1688321 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/234/0878-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N. W. 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1919, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Wis. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 8693606 ], "year": 1919, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis/169/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 S. W. 2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8735185 ], "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/336/0897-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Mo. 879", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 8735159 ], "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/336/0879-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2607269 ], "year": 1871, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/62/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 U. S. 534", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3605214 ], "year": 1898, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/172/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ark. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1693999 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/232/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S. W. 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ark. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719027 ], "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/148/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S. W. 1004", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ark. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1576800 ], "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/132/0282-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 598, "char_count": 8289, "ocr_confidence": 0.521, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2589948964843766e-07, "percentile": 0.7824158860226986 }, "sha256": "e36c68d9d74b585b07de7869f3e93b8693726a58dd00b38c09f2507c6707499e", "simhash": "1:bd4745c652964779", "word_count": 1426 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:36:03.113111+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn. et al v. Faber Padgett et ux" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nFaber Padgett and his wife brought this action against the appellants, Life & Casualty Insurance Company of Tennessee and its agent, A. J. Skinner, to recover damages for injuries sustained when Skinner assaulted and beat Padgett with a heavy stick of wood. The jury\u2019s verdict, against both defendants, awarded Pag'dett $15,000 as actual damages and $35,000 as punitive damages. Mrs. Padgett\u2019s cause of action is no longer in issue. The verdict was against her claim, and she has not appealed.\nThe first question is whether there is substantial evidence to support a finding that Skinner\u2019s tortious assault was committed in the prosecution of his employer\u2019s business.\nThe testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Padgett is so similar that we need not narrate it separately. On the afternoon of February 22, 1965, Skinner called at the Padgetts\u2019 home, a few miles from Conway, to collect premiums upon policies issued to the Padgetts. A dispute arose about whether the Padgetts were behind in the payment of one weekly premium. Skinner attempted to convince the couple, by his collection records, that there was a delinquency, but the Padgetts insisted that their payments were current. Finally Padgett said that he would write to the company and let them straighten it out. Skinner .stamped the floor with anger and said: \u201cWell, you do that.\u201d\nTwo or three times during the altercation Padgett asked Skinner to leave the house. Eventually Skinner did leave, closing the front screen door behind him as he stepped from the living room to the porch. At that point Padgett said: \u201cDon\u2019t come back to my house any more, Mr. Skinner. If that\u2019s the kind of a man you are, I don\u2019t want to have any dealings with you whatsoever.\u201d Skinner answered: \u201cThere ain\u2019t nobody going to tell me what I can do and what I can\u2019t do.\u201d With that Skinner put down his satchel of papers, seized a heavy piece of firewood, re-entered the house, and struck Padgett repeatedly about the head. That Padgett suffered serious injuries is not denied.\nCounsel for Life & Casualty, in arguing that it was entitled to a directed verdict, cite several out-of-state decisions holding that an employer is not liable for his employee\u2019s intentional tort unless the nature of the employment is such as to make the use of force not unlikely. That principle seems really to be a liberalization of the law\u2019s bygone reluctance to hold a master liable for his servant\u2019s intentional torts. \u201cThere was once a great deal of conceptual and procedural difficulty in the way of holding the master for the deliberate and other willful wrongs of his servant in any case where such acts were not specifically commanded. . . . But all this is now a matter of history.\u201d Harper & James, Torts, \u00a7 26.9 (1956). Prosser takes much the same view, pointing out that the tendency of the modern cases is to hold the employer liable when, as here, the employee loses his temper and attacks the plaintiff during a quarrel arising out of the employment. Prosser, Torts, p. 478 (3d ed., 1964).\nWe think the law as it stands today is fairly summarized in the Restatement of Torts, where it is said that the master is subject to liability for his servant\u2019s intentional tort \u201cif the act was not unexpectable in view of the duties of the servant.\u201d Restatement, Torts (2d), \u00a7 245 (1958). For a quarrel to arise in the course of an employee\u2019s attempt to collect money is certainly \u201cnot unexpectable.\u201d The jury might well have concluded that disputes over money matters are of such common occurrence that Skinner\u2019s conduct could not reasonably be said to be unforeseeable.\nOur cases have not been out of step with the trend elsewhere. Not infrequently, in cases similar to this one, our main concern has been whether a dispute arising out of the employment was continuous up to the time of the intentional wrong. Such a case was Bryeans v. Chicago Mill & Lbr. Co., 132 Ark. 282, 200 S. W. 1004 (1918), where we said: \u201cIf the quarrel which was started by Breysacre in telling Bryeans that he would have to stop bothering the men in the shop was continuous to the time of the killing, and the killing grew out of such quarrel, then Breysacre at the time of the killing was acting in the scope of his employment. But if the quarrel which was thus started had ceased for an appreciable interval, however short, and was then renewed through the fault of Bryeans and the killing was the result of the quarrel thus renewed by Bryeans, then Breysacre at the time of the killing was not acting within the scope of his authority.\u201d We adhered to that view in American Ry. Express Co. v. Mackley, 148 Ark. 227, 230 S. W. 598 (1921), although there we found from the undisputed proof that there had been an interruption of the quarrel and that the employee renewed it the next day for personal reasons having nothing to do with his employment.\nIn the present case we think it clear that the jury might justifiably have found that the dispute arose out of Skinner\u2019s employment and continued to its conclusion without interruption. Indeed, that was the purport of Skinner\u2019s own testimony, who insisted that he acted merely in self-defense, Padgett being the aggressor.\nThe remaining questions have to do with the award of punitive damages. The appellants contend that under our holding in Dunaway v. Troutt, 232 Ark. 615, 339 S. W. 2d 613 (1960), the plaintiffs waived their claim to punitive damages by suing two defendants and that the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiffs to introduce proof of the financial worth of both defendants.\nIn the Dunaway case we relied upon Washington Gas Light Co.,v. Lansden, 172 U. S. 534 (1898), for our conclusion that a plaintiff waives his right to punitive damages simply by asserting such a claim against two or more defendants. In fact, the Lansden case did not go that far. There the court merely approved the majority rule that one who sues two or more defendants for punitive damages waives his right to prove the financial condition of any one of them. The conrt went on to say: \u201cThis rule does not prevent the recovery of punitive damages in all cases where several defendants are joined.\u201d See also Note, 15 Ark. L. Eev. 208 (1961).\nWe think the law was correctly stated in the Lansden case and that we misconstrued that holding- in Dunaway v. Troutt. In the court below the Padgetts were permitted to prove that Life & Casualty had a net worth of about sixty-one million dollars and that Skinner had a net worth of about one thousand dollars. Under the Lansden case the admission of that evidence was reversible error.\nPadgett\u2019s attorney argues that regardless of the rule in the case of independent tortfeasors proof of financial worth should be allowed when the defendants are employer and employee. That argument is not sound. The reason for the rule \u2014 that one defendant should not be punished on the basis of another defendant\u2019s wealth \u2014applies just as well to employers and employees as to others not standing in that relation. Hence the rule, as one might expect, is applied in master-servant cases. Chicago City Ry. v. Henry, 62 Ill. 142 (1871); Dawes v. Starrett, 336 Mo. 879, 82 S. W. 2d 43 (1935); McAllister v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 169 Wis. 473, 173 N. W. 216 (1919).\nDoes the erroneous admission of the testimony about the appellants\u2019 financial means affect the judgment for actual damages as well? In law cases two issues may be so interwoven that an error with respect to one requires a retrial of the whole case. Mowery v. House, 234 Ark. 878, 355 S. W. 2d 275 (1962). That is the situation here with reference to the compensatory and exemplary damages. It is hardly possible that the jury did not take each into consideration in fixing the other. Furthermore, the inadmissible proof of the defendants \u2019 worth may have influenced the jury in its assessment of compensatory damages. The only way in which we can with certainty protect the appellants from the possibility of prejudice is to grant a new trial upon all issues.\nBeversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "George F. Hartje Jr. and Chowning, Mitchell, Hamilton & Burrow and Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, for appellants.", "Guy H. Jones, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn. et al v. Faber Padgett et ux\n5-3921\n407 S. W. 2d 728\nOpinion delivered November 7, 1966\nGeorge F. Hartje Jr. and Chowning, Mitchell, Hamilton & Burrow and Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, for appellants.\nGuy H. Jones, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0353-01", "first_page_order": 375, "last_page_order": 380 }