{ "id": 1724181, "name": "James W. Moore v. State", "name_abbreviation": "Moore v. State", "decision_date": "1967-01-09", "docket_number": "5239", "first_page": "745", "last_page": "748", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "241 Ark. 745" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "410 S.W.2d 399" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "219 Ark. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1609104 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/219/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 U. S. 478", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166688 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ark. 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1724121 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/241/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U. S. 719", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12047240 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U. S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 407, "char_count": 5187, "ocr_confidence": 0.505, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0810702842992488e-07, "percentile": 0.7590662621643193 }, "sha256": "de14c978774d388c9ccd857c71d077895ee6aaa80d8615c8de9b72b5de875157", "simhash": "1:44b51a16db3eb089", "word_count": 895 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:36:03.113111+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "James W. Moore v. State" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Lyle Brown, Justice.\nAppellant James W. Moore was convicted of possessing stolen goods and sentenced to one year. His appeal is grounded principally upon tke contention that in-custody interrogation violated bis constitutional rights. He cites Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), and Johnson et al. v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882, 86 S. Ct. 1772 (1966).\nShortly after midnight, December 18, 1963, appellant\u2019s parked car was spotted in a wooded area by two North Little Rock patrolmen. The car was kept under surveillance; and when Moore pulled out the police followed. During a chase for a considerable distance at varying high rates of speed, a box was thrown from the passenger side of the Moore car and in clear view of the pursuing officers. Within a matter of minutes Moore was apprehended and charged with driving while intoxicated.\nThe police immediately returned to the point where they saw the box thrown and found it contained several hundred silver dollars. Moore was jailed at approximately 1:00 a.m. Although the immediate charge was DWI, the evidence reflects no intoxication of any substantial degree. At approximately 8:30 a.m. that same morning Sergeant W. A. Tudor of the State Police, Criminal Investigation Division, entered Moore\u2019s cell on the ground floor for the purpose of questioning him. The chronology of their conversation is important and unfortunately not crystal clear. But a close study of the record leads to the conclusion it was in the following order:\nTudor first inquired of Moore whether he had talked to a lawyer and was told that Attorney Tom Ridgeway was on his way to the jail to talk to Moore. (Appellant contends that \u201cat this very moment the interrogation or questioning should have ceased.\u201d)\nTudor then testified: \u201cI told him that I wanted to talk with him briefly where he got this money and before I had a chance to advise him of his rights, he said he didn\u2019t steal the money.\u201d At this point Tudor told Moore that \u201che had a right to remain silent\u201d and that he would make a record of their conversation for use in court. He also said Moore\u2019s lawyer \u201cwas on the way over.\u201d Moore then told Tudor the money was delivered to him by a man he refused to identify; that he knew it was stolen and threw it ont of the ear because \u201che didn\u2019t want to get caught with it.\u201d\nThe foregoing is from the testimony of Sergeant Tudor in chambers. Moore there testified that he made only one statement. \u201c. . .1 just told him flat \u2014 I said, \u2018I havn\u2019t stolen no money, or anything, and I am not going to make any kind of a statement to you.\u2019 \u201d\nIt should also be noted that the circumstances surrounding this short interrogation are far different from those in Miranda and Johnson. Sergeant Tudor and appellant Moore were well acquainted and on friendly terms. No threats, promises, etc., are indicated. Moore was far from being unintelligent.\nThe prerequisites for in-custody interrogation set out in detail in Miranda are not controlling in this case. The decision in that case was rendered June 13, 1966. Appellant\u2019s trial began May 20, 1966. The rules in Miranda are not applicable to cases which started before June 13. Johnson, cited by appellant, so holds, as well as our case of Stewart v. State, 241 Ark. 4, 406 S. W. 2d 313 (September 12,1966).\nThe controlling case is Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964). Escobedo was denied the opportunity to consult with his lawyer and was not effectively warned of his right to remain silent. Such is not the case here. Based on substantial evidence the trial court found Moore had been timely advised of his right to remain silent. Furthermore, while advising Moore of his rights, it was suggested to him that \u201chis lawyer was on his way.\u201d The inquisitor \u2014 not the accused as in Escobedo \u2014 is the one who broached the subject of an attorney, and we find it was clearly understandable to a man of appellant\u2019s intelligence that Sergeant Tudor was saying that Moore might not desire to talk to him until his attorney arrived. Moore, instead of indicating he wanted to first talk with an attorney, proceeded to voluntarily give his explanation of his possession of the stolen money.\nThe contention that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the jury verdict is without merit, as is revealed by the summary recitation of the evidence. Absent his admission to Sergeant Tudor, appellant was placed in possession of property recently taken in the burglary of a home in Oklahoma. Under all the circumstances in evidence, the jury could well have reasoned that appellant had criminal knowledge. No explanation of such possession was offered the jury by appellant. Fields v. State, 219 Ark. 373, 242 S. W. 2d 639 (1951), and numerous other cases, hold that possession of recently stolen prop erty, if unexplained to the satisfaction of the jury, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Lyle Brown, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "W. M. Herndon, for appellant.", "Bruce Bennett, Attorney General; Fletcher Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "James W. Moore v. State\n5239\n410 S. W. 2d 399\nOpinion delivered January 9, 1967\n[Rehearing denied February 6, 1967.]\nW. M. Herndon, for appellant.\nBruce Bennett, Attorney General; Fletcher Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0745-01", "first_page_order": 767, "last_page_order": 770 }