{
  "id": 8721851,
  "name": "Carl W. WIDMER v. KENNEDY, ALBERS & PHILLIPS, Inc.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Widmer v. Kennedy",
  "decision_date": "1967-11-20",
  "docket_number": "5-4371",
  "first_page": "527",
  "last_page": "530",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "243 Ark. 527"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "421 S.W.2d 609"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "230 Ark. 170",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1700039
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/ark/230/0170-01"
      ]
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:02:41.806727+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Carl W. WIDMER v. KENNEDY, ALBERS & PHILLIPS, Inc."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "J. Fred Jones, Justice.\nAppellant was sued for debt on open account in the Sebastian County Circuit Court by complaint filed on March 28, 1966, and summons was issued and served on the same date. On April 15, 1966, appellant filed a motion in abatement of the complaint to quash summons and set aside service thereof for the reason that the summons was not issued, served, or returned according to law and is wholly insufficient as a writ of process, and therefore no action had been commenced against the appellant. This motion is designated:\n\u201cSPECIAL APPEARANCE OF DEFENDANT MOTION TO ABATE COMPLAINT; TO QUASH SUMMONS AND SET ASIDE PURPORTED SERVICE THEREOF.\u201d\nAppellant appeared specially for the purpose of this motion and on May 4, 1966, the motion was overruled and appellant was given ten days to plead further.\nInstead of pleading further as authorized and directed by the trial court, the appellant, on May 12, 1966, filed another motion almost identical to the one that had been overruled by the court only eight days before. This second motion is designated:\n\u201cSPECIAL APPEARANCE OF DEFENDANT MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION TO ABATE COMPLAINT; TO QUASH SUMMONS AND SET ASIDE PURPORTED SERVICE THEREOF.\u201d\nOn February 8, 1967, answers to request for admissions were filed by the appellees, but no further pleading was filed by the appellant subsequent to his motion which was overruled, and his motion to vacate the order overruling the motion.\nOn February 13, 1967, appellant was advised by letter from the trial judge that the motion to vacate the order overruling the motion to abate and quash, was also then being overruled.\nThe appellant made no effort to plead further and on March 8, 1967, default judgment was rendered against him and a nune pro tunc order was also entered overruling the motion to vacate the order overruling the motion to abate complaint and quash summons.\nOn April 4, 1967, appellant filed a motion to vacate the default judgment for the reason that \u201cno factual or statutory basis exists to support same and no default exists,\u201d and to \u201cvacate the nunc pro tunc order filed March 13, 1967, for the reason that order was not handled in manner prescribed by \u2018Rules for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit.\u2019 \u201d\nThis motion was also overruled on April 11, 1967, and on his appeal to this court the appellant designates the following points for reversal:\n\u201c1. That the trial court erred in not granting appellant\u2019s \u2018motion to abate complaint; to quash summons and set aside purported service thereof;\u2019 and in turn for not granting appellant\u2019s \u2018motion to vacate order overruling defendant\u2019s motion to abate complaint; to quash summons and set aside purported service thereof.\u2019\n\u201c2. That the trial court erred in granting default judgment, and in turn, for not granting appellant\u2019s \u2018motion to vacate default judgment entered on March 8, 1967, and nunc pro tunc order filed March 13, 1967.\u2019\u201d\nArk. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-301 (Repl. 1962) provides as follows :\n\u201cA civil action is commenced by filing in the office of the clerk of the proper court a complaint and causing a summons to be issued thereon, and placed in the hands of the sheriff of the proper county or counties.\u201d\nThis provision simply means what it says. See (Burks v. Sims, 230 Ark. 170, 321 S. W. 2d 767).\nArk. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-1101 (Repl. 1962) is as follows:\n\u201cThe pleadings are the written statements, by the parties, of the facts constituting their respective claims and defenses.\u201d\nArk. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-1103 (Repl. 1962) is as follows :\n\u201cThe only pleadings allowed are:\nFirst. The complaint by the plaintiff.\nSecond. The demurrer, or answer, by the defendant.\nThird. The demurrer, or reply, by the plaintiff.\u201d\nWhen appellant\u2019s motion was overruled and he was given ten days in which to plead further, he was obligated to plead further within the ten days or risk the consequences of judgment on the complaint.\nWe conclude that \u201c pleading further\u201d simply means (as defined in Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-1101, supra), and (as allowed in Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-1103, supra) in addition to what has already been filed, and we hold that when a \u201cmotion to abate complaint; to quash summons and set aside purported service thereof\u201d has been overruled and additional time is given in which to plead further, an additional motion to vacate the order overruling the original motion and restating the original motion, is not a further plea as defined and allowed by statute and within the meaning of the phrase \u201cplead further.\u201d\nCircuit courts are designed for the serious business of settling disputes between individuals, and circuit judges are vested with considerable discretion in promulgating and enforcing court rules for the orderly conduct of the courts\u2019 business.\nAs we are unable to say that the trial court erred on either of the points raised by the appellant, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "J. Fred Jones, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Carl W. Widmer; pro se.",
      "Warner, Warner, Bagon & Smith, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Carl W. WIDMER v. KENNEDY, ALBERS & PHILLIPS, Inc.\n5-4371\n421 S. W. 2d 609\nOpinion delivered November 20, 1967\n[Rehearing denied December 18, 1967.]\nCarl W. Widmer; pro se.\nWarner, Warner, Bagon & Smith, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0527-01",
  "first_page_order": 549,
  "last_page_order": 552
}