{ "id": 8723789, "name": "Larry F. WALKER v. KILLOREN ELECTRIC CO.", "name_abbreviation": "Walker v. Killoren Electric Co.", "decision_date": "1967-12-18", "docket_number": "5-4396", "first_page": "752", "last_page": "755", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "243 Ark. 752" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "421 S.W.2d 893" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "66 S. W. 2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ark. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1428316 ], "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/188/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 S. W. 2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ark. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723142 ], "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/179/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ark. 900", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1691639 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/233/0900-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 S. W. 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1891, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ark. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1322256 ], "year": 1891, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/55/0022-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 358, "char_count": 5314, "ocr_confidence": 0.54, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.856319230494445e-08, "percentile": 0.3055898239627098 }, "sha256": "73dfaa2b65c72920ceee92913eaa462955dfc14a0e221301d948b6464f1ec1c9", "simhash": "1:83cbf883dbb506c1", "word_count": 893 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:02:41.806727+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Larry F. WALKER v. KILLOREN ELECTRIC CO." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Lyle BrowN, Justice.\nAppellant (plaintiff below) brought this action to vacate a judgment rendered in his favor in 1950, at which time he was a minor. The demurrer and motion to dismiss the new action, filed by Killoren Electric Company, a corporation, was sustained.\nLarry F. Walker, allegedly four years of age at the time, was injured from the explosion of a dynamite cap in 1948. Appellee, Killoren Electric, was at the time charged with having left the cap on the premises of Larry\u2019s grandfather, where some construction work was being performed. Suit was filed in Madison Circuit Court and judgment entered in 1950. Larry\u2019s mother brought that suit as next friend and was represented by two firms of attorneys. Judgment was entered for Larry for $2,500 and that amount was paid into the registry of the court.\nAfter attaining majority, Larry Walker brought this suit styled \u201cComplaint at Law to Vacate Judgment. \u2019 \u2019 He contends that a settlement was negotiated in 1950 and was the sole basis for the court\u2019s judgment; that the judgment was grossly inadequate; that no medical evidence was submitted to the court; and that Larry is entitled to relief under., the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 29-117 and 29-5.06 (Repl. 1962).\nKilloren\u2019s demurrer alleged that the facts recited in the complaint did not state a cause of action. Additionally, a motion to dismiss was grounded on the assertion that no relief was available under \u00a7\u00a7 29-117 and 29-506. The trial court sustained the demurrer and the motion to dismiss.\nWalker\u2019s appeal raises three points which we will discuss as they are listed.\nPoint I. The trial court erred in holding that %% 29-117 cmd 29-506 afford no relief to Walker. Section 29-117 provides it is not necessary to reserve in a judgment the right of an infant to contest that judgment within one year after attaining majority. Section 29-506 sets forth eight grounds for setting aside a judgment after the expiration of the'term. From an examination of that statute it is apparent that appellant is relying on the last one. \u201cEighth\u201d preserves the right of an infant, after attaining majority, to set aside an erroneous judgment as prescribed in % 29-117.\nThe privilege reserved to infants by % 29-117 is restricted to infant defendants. Woodall v. Moore, 55 Ark. 22, 17 S. W. 268 (1891). Further, this statement from Woodall was reiterated in Selig v. Barnett, 233 Ark. 900, 350 S. W. 2d 176 (1961):\n\u201cWhen infants by their guardian or next friend go into Court to assert their rights, they proceed under the eye of the court, and are supposed to enjoy its care and protection, and conclusions therein reached are as binding upon them as upon persons sui juris/\u2019\nPoint II. The trial court erred in holding that appellant\u2019s motion to vacate did not state a cause of action. It was the court\u2019s view that appellant did not state a cause of action under. \u00a7 29-117. It is evident, from what we have said under Point I,, that the ruling was correct.\nPoint III. The 1950 judgment for the minor plaintiff was in reality a settlement; there was no judicial investigation of the merits of the claim; in those circumstances relief may be had against the judgment. When a minor\u2019s interest is involved and it affirmatively appears from the judgment that tHe court merely embodied a settlement in' its judgment, that judgment is void on its face. Kuykendall v. Zachary, 179 Ark. 478, 16 S. W. 2d 590 (1929). In Kuykendall the judgment recited that the parties appeared in person and by counsel and announced a settlement. On the strength of that announcement the court entered an \u201cagreed judgment\u201d in the amount of the settlement figure. \u201cIt affirmatively appears,\u201d says the opinion, \u201c. . . . that the court found only that a settlement of the minor\u2019s claim had been made, and a decree was rendered in accordance with this settlement.\u201d\nKuykendall does not condemn settlement of a minor\u2019s claim; to the contrary, it is said \u201ccompromise might in many cases he entirely proper and highly advantageous to the minor.\u201d To he raised to the sanctity of a binding judgment it should be determined by the court \u2018 \u2018 as being fair to the minor, and' the approval would, of course, imply such investigation on the part of the court as made the fact appear that the minor\u2019s interest had not been sacrificed.\u201d\nA judgment was similarly attacked in Swindle v. Rogers, 188 Ark. 503, 66 S. W. 2d 630 (1934). Judgment was entered on the same day suit was filed for the minor. Jury was waived, the court considered the complaint, the answer, and heard testimony. Being \u201cwell and sufficiently advised\u201d the court entered judgment for the minor. That judgment was here sustained. Significantly, the record showed that testimony was heard, \u201cthus implying that the minor\u2019s rights had been protected.\u201d\nThe 1950 judgment here challenged shows on its face the appearance of the parties and counsel, ready for trial. The cause was submitted to the court \u201cupon the complaint of the Plaintiffs, the answer of the Defendant and the oral and- documentary evidence adduced . . . .\u201d Such words as \u201csettlement\u201d and \u201ccompromise\u201d appear at no point in the record.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Lyle BrowN, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Faubus & Henson, for appellant.", "Pearson & Pearson, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Larry F. WALKER v. KILLOREN ELECTRIC CO.\n5-4396\n421 S. W. 2d 893\nOpinion delivered December 18, 1967\nFaubus & Henson, for appellant.\nPearson & Pearson, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0752-01", "first_page_order": 774, "last_page_order": 777 }