{ "id": 1606906, "name": "Arkansas State Hwy. Commission v. A. L. Young, et al", "name_abbreviation": "Arkansas State Hwy. Commission v. Young", "decision_date": "1968-08-26", "docket_number": "4611", "first_page": "5", "last_page": "9", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "245 Ark. 5" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "431 S.W.2d 265" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "241 Ark. 1033", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1724012 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/241/1033-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ark. 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1702717 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/229/0027-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 391, "char_count": 6148, "ocr_confidence": 0.489, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.06025119611220577 }, "sha256": "72dcc2fb3fcd5b3bcc8f9c6d94020059c9df0a99b4d5ca376c22df7784c19f34", "simhash": "1:3225f2b7bc8e9fba", "word_count": 1052 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:29:50.317094+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Brown & Fogleman, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Arkansas State Hwy. Commission v. A. L. Young, et al" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Paul Ward, Justice.\nThis is an eminent domain proceeding, initiated by the State Highway Commission (appellant here) to condemn 11.18 acres of land belonging to A. L. Young (appellee here) for use in the construction of Interstate Highway No. 40 \u2014 in Crawford County. This is an appeal from a jury verdict in the amount of $52,000 in favor of appellee for the taking of said land. Appellant sought, in the same action, to condemn land belonging to other persons, but they are not parties to this appeal.\nThe only ground relied on by appellant for a reversal, is:\n\u201cThe trial court erred in allowing the testimony of appellee Young and witness Ragge to stand with respect to total damages to entire tracts.\u201d\nTo better understand the issue raised we set out below the necessary undisputed facts involved.\nAppellee\u2019s property consists of three separate parcels of land designated as #330, #360 and #366. We are here primarily concerned with value testimony relating to parcel #330 which consists of 6.8 acres. \u25a0\nDuring the trial appellee and his three witnesses each placed a total valuation on all three parcels, ranging from $65,000 to $74,050. The total valuation on the three parcels was placed at around $23,000 by appellant\u2019s witnesses. However, in fixing said values, appellee and one of his witnesses testified (in substance): (a) that a portion of parcel #330 was best suited for residential purposes; that it could be divided into eight lots \u2014each worth $2,000, and (b) that there were certain farm buildings worth $4,500. The trial court, over appellant\u2019s objection, allowed the above testimony to go to the jury.\nFor the purpose of this opinion it may be conceded (and we understand appellee does concede) that the trial court erred in admitting the introduction of said testimony. In this connection we merely refer to the twc pertinent statements by this Court: In Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Watkins, 229 Ark. 27, 313 S.W. 2d 86, we said:\n\u201cSuch testimony allowed the jury to compare the value of the subject lots in Lakewood Addition without any knowledge of numerous factors that would have to be considered in order to make the comparison fair and equitable. It necessarily follows then that the jury\u2019s verdict would be based on conjecture and speculation.\u201d\nIn Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Griffin, 241 Ark. 1033, 411 S.W. 2d 495, there appears this statement :\n\u2018 \u2018 Of course a verdict rendered by a jury which was partially based on testimony relating to the commercial value of the land, and partially based on testimony relating to the land\u2019s value for residential purposes, would not be proper, but it is for the jury to determine the best and highest use of a landowner\u2019s property.\u201d\nIt is the contention of appellee, however, that the above mentioned error was later corrected by the trial court, and we agree with that contention. At the close of the testimony given by appellee and Bagge, appellant moved the trial court to strike their testimony. Thereupon the trial court announced that it was sustaining appellant\u2019s motion with the following limitations: (1) it would allow the testimony to stand as to the tract, but would exclude the testimony relative to lot value and the farm buildings; and, (2) \u201csubject to my instructions to the jury...\u201d To the above both parties saved exceptions. Thereupon the court, in material part, instructed the jury as follows:\n\u201cNow, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I have allowed some testimony to reach you that should not have gone to you. So I instruct you at this time to disregard and not to consider the testimony of both Mr. Ken Ragge, who just testified, and of Mr. A. L. Young, with reference to the value of the buildings \u2014the two barns, the milk shed and the loading chute' \u2014 on the land taken. You will not consider the value testimony which they gave as to those buildings, nor will you consider, and I instruct you now not to consider, and to disregard the per lot valuation which they place on the undeveloped land, the unsubdivided land where the buildings were that were taken. So you will disregard the value testimony with references to those buildings and the per lot valuation of this land which has not been subdivided and on which the buildings stood that was taken. \u2019 \u2019\nAfter the above the court proceeded, without objection by either side, to hear testimony from other witnesses.\nIf the above actions of the court did not cure the previous error it was, we think, incumbent on appellant to so indicate at the time. We also point out that the court gave many other instructions to the jury which arc not abstracted and to which no objection is made.\nFinding no reversible error the judgment of the trial court must be, and it is hereby, affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBrown & Fogleman, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Paul Ward, Justice." }, { "text": "John A. Fogleman, J.\nI concur in the result because I agree that the admonition given the jury by the court removed any prejudice that there may have been in any error in admission of testimony. I do not agree that there was error in admitting testimony with reference to the evaluation of parcel #330 as eight lots worth $2,000 apiece.\nAs I understand testimony in this case, this property had an 800-foot frontage along the road, the highest and best use of which was for eight building lots which, could be sold for $2,000 each. This is a different situation from that which exists when a landowner trys to show how property could be divided into lots which could be sold only after the land had been developed so that the highest and best use of the property would be for residential building lots. The testimony of the landowner and the valuation expert offered by him would indicate a present market for this 800 feet in lots. This takes the testimony out of the realm of speculation, which is ordinarily the reason for excluding this type of evidence.\nI am authorized to state that Brown, J., joins in this concurrence.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "John A. Fogleman, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas B. Keyes and Kenneth R. Brock, for appellant.", "Robinson and Booth for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Arkansas State Hwy. Commission v. A. L. Young, et al\n4611\n431 S.W. 2d 265\nOpinion delivered August 26, 1968\n[Rehearing denied September 30, 1968.]\nThomas B. Keyes and Kenneth R. Brock, for appellant.\nRobinson and Booth for appellees." }, "file_name": "0005-01", "first_page_order": 29, "last_page_order": 33 }