{
  "id": 1606855,
  "name": "Lois Thomas Grumbles v. Harold Bernard Grumbles",
  "name_abbreviation": "Grumbles v. Grumbles",
  "decision_date": "1968-09-09",
  "docket_number": "4625",
  "first_page": "77",
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      "cite": "245 Ark. 77"
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      "cite": "431 S.W.2d 241"
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      "cite": "238 Ark. 355",
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:29:50.317094+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Harris, C.J. & Brown, J. dissent."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Lois Thomas Grumbles v. Harold Bernard Grumbles"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Paul Ward, Justice.\nThis is the second appeal by these parties. See Grumbles v. Grumbles, 238 Ark. 355, 381 S.W. 2d 750.\nIn the first case appellant, the wife, was granted a divorce from her husband, appellee here. In that case, the trial court (on April 24, 1963) granted appellant custody of their two children, and ordered appellee to pay child support and $154 per month as alimony. Later appellee became eleven months delinquent in payment of alimony \u2014 a total of $1,694.\nOn June 14, 1967 appellant filed in chancery court a \u201cPetition for Contempt Citation\u201d against appellee. The petitioner alleged that, in spite of frequent demands, appellee was delinquent in the above mentioned amount, and is in contempt of court. In the prayer appellant also asked for \u201ca reasonable sum for the services of her attorney\u201d.\nAnswering the above petition, appellee filed an answer, stating: (a) admits being delinquent as alleged; (b) admits he has ignored repeated demands; (e) denies he is in contempt or that he should pay said amount \u201cbecause of the harrassment and persecution of the petitioner\u201d. Later appellee, in a response to appellant\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment, paid the sum of $1,694 in to the registry of the court \u201cfor satisfaction of his past due alimony\u201d.\nNo testimony was offered by either side, and the issues of contempt, alimony, and attorney\u2019s fee were presented to the trial court on the pleadings.\nOn June 29, 1967 the court (a) ordered the clerk to pay to appellant the sum of $1,694 in full payment of past due alimony; (b) ordered that appellee \u201cshould be purged of contempt\u201d, and; (c) took under submission \u201cthe issue of attorney fees\u201d. Appellant was \u201cgranted 20 days to plead\u201d further.\nNo further pleadings were filed, and on December 18, 1967 the trial court entered an Order denying a fee for appellant\u2019s attorney. It is from the above Order that appellant prosecutes this appeal.\nIt is our conclusion that the trial court was correct, and that its holding must be sustained.\nArk. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 34-1210 (Eepl. 1962), in pertinent parts, reads:\n\u201cDuring pendency of action for divorce or alimony the Court may allow the wife . . . reasonable fee for her attorneys . . . and the Court may allow additional attorneys fees for the enforcement of payment of alimony ...\u201d (Our emphasis.)\nAs is indicated by tbe word \u201cmay\u201d above, our courts have consistently held for many years that allowances of alimony and attorney fees are matters that lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. See: Plant v. Plant, 63 Ark. 128, 37 S.W. 308; Gladfelter v. Gladfelter, 205 Ark. 1019, 172 S.W. 2d 246, Lewis v. Lewis, 222 Ark. 743, 262 S.W. 2d 456, and McGuire v. McGuire, 231 Ark. 613, 331 S.W. 2d 257. In the Plant case the court, in 1896, was construing Sand & H. Dig. sec. 2512 and in the Gladfelter case the court, in 1943, was construing Pope\u2019s Dig. \u00a7 4388 \u2014 both sections being the same as the present statute copied above. In the McGuire case the Court, in construing \u00a7 34-1210, made the following statement:\n\u201cThis Court has said many times that the granting of support and attorney\u2019s fee are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion\u201d.\nWe find nothing in the record before us \u2014 -and appellant points to none \u2014 from which we could reasonably conclude the trial court abused its sound discretion in this instance.\nAccordingly, the holding of the trial court should be, and it is hereby, affirmed.\nHarris, C.J. & Brown, J. dissent.\nCarleton Harris, Chief Justice.\nIf the record reflected that Mr. Grumbles had become delinquent in the alimony payments to his ex-wife because of financial inability to pay, I would agree that no attorney\u2019s fee should be allowed. However, this was not the situation. As mentioned by the majority, in his response to appellant\u2019s petition for relief, Mr. Grumbles admitted that he was delinquent as alleged; admitted that he had ignored her repeated demands, but denied that he was in contempt, or that he should pay the amount sought because of the \u201charassment and persecution\u201d of Mrs. Grumbles. No testimony was offered, and appellee paid the sum of $1,694.00 into the registry of the court to satisfy the past due alimony.\nNo evidence was taken, and I accordingly do not know whether Mr. Grumbles is well off financially, or on the verge of bankruptcy. Likewise, the record fails to reveal whether Mrs. Grumbles is financially \u201cwell fixed,\u201d or barely able to \u201cmake ends meet.\u201d I presume, however, that appellee\u2019s failure to pay was not predicated upon financial reasons, for if such were the case, he would certainly have set it up as a defense\u2014 and he would have been unable to pay the money. At any rate, when one becomes delinquent in making payments ordered by a court, I think that certainly the burden is upon him to establish a valid reason for not making the payments. This was not done.\nThe fact remains that Mrs. Grumbles waited eleven months to receive the alimony \u2014 and was only able to obtain it after court proceedings were instituted. Under these circumstances, I think a reasonable fee should have been allowed.\nI therefore respectfully dissent.\nLyle Brown, Justice. I would reverse and remand with directions that proof be taken on the issue of contempt. If we knew the facts we might readily agree that Grumbles was not in contempt. Since he was cited to show cause, and since he was admittedly delinquent, I think the husband should come forth with his proof.\nWe would then have a record to evaluate.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Paul Ward, Justice. Carleton Harris, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Arnold, Hamilton & Streetman for appellant.",
      "Carneal Warfield for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Lois Thomas Grumbles v. Harold Bernard Grumbles\n4625\n431 S.W. 2d 241\nOpinion Delivered September 9, 1968\nArnold, Hamilton & Streetman for appellant.\nCarneal Warfield for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0077-01",
  "first_page_order": 101,
  "last_page_order": 104
}
