{
  "id": 1600803,
  "name": "Roy C. BARNHILL v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Barnhill v. State",
  "decision_date": "1969-08-25",
  "docket_number": "5422",
  "first_page": "28",
  "last_page": "32",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "247 Ark. 28"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "444 S.W.2d 97"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "74 A. L. R. 2d 1390",
      "category": "reporters:specialty",
      "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "64 A. L. R. 436",
      "category": "reporters:specialty",
      "reporter": "A.L.R.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "24 A. L. R. 1025",
      "category": "reporters:specialty",
      "reporter": "A.L.R.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "242 Ark. 751",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8723458
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1967,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/242/0751-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "233 Ark. 232",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1691699
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1961,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/233/0232-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "208 Ark. 1089",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1478777
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1945,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/208/1089-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 451,
    "char_count": 7706,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.563,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 2.473813880893726e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8068105515031957
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    "sha256": "561b13e0bd03df69e6a89802e503a1f50b547c74efde107a6c61ebe75db9c2af",
    "simhash": "1:af52903bd6a20bd0",
    "word_count": 1313
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:32:29.213565+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Fogleman, J., not participating."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Roy C. BARNHILL v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Frank Holt, Justice.\nThe appellant was charged with violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 75-901 and 75-903 (Repl. 1957), commonly known as the \u201chit and run\u201d statutes. Upon a jury trial he was found guilty and his punishment assessed at one year imprisonment in the county jail and a $500 fine. From the judgment on that verdict comes this appeal. Appellant\u2019s present counsel did not represent him in the trial of the case.\nThe appellant contends that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for a directed verdict at the close of the appellee\u2019s case; in refusing his renewed motion at the close of appellant\u2019s case; and that the verdict is contrary to both the law and the evidence. Thus, appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.\nIt is a well established rule that upon appeal we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and if there is any substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict, then it must be sustained. Ashcraft v. State, 208 Ark. 1089, 189 S. W. 2d 374 (1945); Finley v. State, 233 Ark. 232, 343 S. W. 2d 787 (1961). We review the evidence in accordance with this governing principle of law.\nThere was evidence that the appellant was the driver of a vehicle which ran a stop sign at a street intersection and collided with another vehicle. A witness found Mrs. Robinson, driver of the other vehicle, groping alongside her car in a dazed condition. Appellant was observed sitting in his car which was stopped a short distance from the scene. During the time that witnesses were rendering aid to Mrs. Robinson, the appellant, who was recognized by these witnesses, continued to sit in his car with his head leaning forward. He was asked not to leave the scene. However, before Mrs. Robinson was removed from the scene, the appellant left at a \u201cfast clip\u201d with his tires making a \u201csqualling\u201d noise and turned a street corner at a fast rate of speed. His car was found unoccupied and stuck in the mud a few blocks from the scene. Before he left he did not offer any aid or assistance to Mrs. Robinson or to her benefactors. He did not in any manner offer his identification. Mrs. Robinson was taken to the hospital and her injuries were such that she remained in the hospital for approximately one month. A short time preceding the accident the appellant was observed driving in such a manner that a motorist\u2019s car was forced from the road. Appellant stopped his car on the side of the road and then proceeded in his original direction which was a short distance from the intersection accident. There was evidence that a short time following the accident and also about an hour or hour and a half thereafter when appellant was arrested at his home, his behavior and appearance indicated that he was under the influence of drugs or intoxicating liquor and that he did not appear to be \u201cat his-self\u201d and \u201cdidn\u2019t remember much about\u201d being involved in an accident.\nIn our view we think there is substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict that the appellant did not comply with the pertinent traffic statutes {% 75-901 and \u00a7 75-903) which require that the driver involved in an accident resulting in injury to any person shall stop his vehicle and in every event shall remain at the scene until he has identified himself and his vehicle. Further, that he shall render to any injured person in such accident reasonable assistance, including hospital and medical attention if n\u00e9cessary. Although his identity was known and others were rendering aid, there is evidence that appellant hurriedly left the scene of the accident before Mrs. Robinson was removed and after being requested not to leave.\nAppellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him a new trial for the reason that his court appointed counsel was inadequate because of illness or inexperience. We cannot agree with appellant. Based upon this assertion in Ms motion for a new trial, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing. According to appellant, his attorney was suffering from the flu, had a Mgh fever and was physically unable to properly represent him on the day of the trial. Appellant testified that Ms counsel did not call two witnesses which appellant requested; that he did not propound certain questions that he wanted witnesses to be asked; that he did not offer in evidence certain pictures and voiced insufficient objections. The appointed counsel testified that he was 26 years of age, a 1967 graduate of the University of Arkansas Law School and had practiced law for approximately 17 months. He described his condition on the day of the trial as being \u201cill\u201d rather than \u201csick\u201d from the flu. He testified that Ms illness did not physically or mentally incapacitate him in such a manner that he could not adequately represent the appellant; that he was not aware of any evidence that he failed to present because of his illness; that he had discussed the case with the appellant on occasions for about a year previous to the trial; that it was appellant\u2019s decision not to take the stand in his own behalf, that one witness, a physician, was not called to testify on behalf of appellant because the appellant did not want to subpoena Mm; that he had not refused to present any witnesses or evidence requested by the appellant and that he had conducted the defense according to Ms best judgment; that he had consulted with the appellant about trial strategy and .appellant was made aware that as a witness he was subject to cross-examination about past conduct and perhaps it would not be to appellant\u2019s advantage. This and other aspects of trial strategy were discussed with appellant in conference with other counsel. Appellant himself testified that during these conferences he was advised that he might be asked questions that he \u201cwouldn\u2019t want to answer.\u201d Further, that his counsel did not refuse him the right to testify and .asked Mm if he could add anything to the evidence. Appellant said he declined because he couldn\u2019t remember anything about the accident. The court noted that if appellant\u2019s counsel had appeared to be incapable of defending appellant, it would have, on its own motion, continued the case.\nWe agree with the trial court\u2019s refusal to grant a new trial based upon appellant\u2019s contention of inadequacy of trial counsel. We cannot agree with appellant\u2019s assertion that his counsel, because of inexperience or illness, conducted his defense in such a manner that his trial was a farce and a mockery of justice which denied him a fair trial. The appellant\u2019s court appointed counsel had worked on his case for approximately a year and preceding his trial had successfully quashed one jury panel. Appellant\u2019s complaint about his counsel\u2019s conduct of the case primarily relates to trial strategy or tactics which involve the elements of discretion, and judgment upon which competent counsel might honestly disagree, especially after the event. Therefore, the conduct of appellant\u2019s defense did not constitute the denial to him of a fair trial. Thomas Linville Coleman v. State, 242 Ark. 751, 415 S. W. 2d 549 (1967). See, also, 24 A. L. R. 1025; 64 A. L. R. 436; 74 A. L. R. 2d 1390. The appellant has not demonstrated that he did not have effective assistance of counsel in the trial of his case. To the contrary, it .appears that appellant was provided competent and diligent representation.\nAffirmed.\nFogleman, J., not participating.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Frank Holt, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "E. L. Holloway, for appellant. \u2022",
      "Joe Purcell, Attorney General; Bon Langston and Mike Wilson, Assistant Attys. Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Roy C. BARNHILL v. STATE of Arkansas\n5422\n444 S. W. 2d 97\nOpinion delivered August 25, 1969\n[Rehearing denied September 22, 1969.]\nE. L. Holloway, for appellant. \u2022\nJoe Purcell, Attorney General; Bon Langston and Mike Wilson, Assistant Attys. Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0028-01",
  "first_page_order": 50,
  "last_page_order": 54
}