{ "id": 1600712, "name": "SULPHUR SPRINGS RECREATIONAL PARK, Inc. v. CITY OF CAMDEN, ARKANSAS et al", "name_abbreviation": "Sulphur Springs Recreational Park, Inc. v. City of Camden", "decision_date": "1969-12-01", "docket_number": "5-5079", "first_page": "713", "last_page": "717", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "247 Ark. 713" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "447 S.W.2d 844" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "218 Ark. 772", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1612040 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/218/0772-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S. W. 2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1907206 ], "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/362/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ark. 989", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1691709 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/233/0989-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 Ark. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719630 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/242/0340-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 372, "char_count": 5860, "ocr_confidence": 0.593, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.001086213725981e-07, "percentile": 0.8523946762919382 }, "sha256": "1ee12bd20f4c010764443cdd0b9c93adeb59a7d217c4e776bab410abd4f3a85f", "simhash": "1:96ebf53d010f0717", "word_count": 976 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:32:29.213565+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SULPHUR SPRINGS RECREATIONAL PARK, Inc. v. CITY OF CAMDEN, ARKANSAS et al" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Lyle Brown, Justice.\nFor the background facts in this case see Sulphur Springs Recreational Park, Inc. v. City of Camden et al, 242 Ark. 340, 414 S. W. 2d 113 (1967). After our decision dismissing that appeal for want of a final order, plaintiff-appellant subsequently sought and was granted another hearing. As a result of the last proceeding, the court again refused to strike the answer of the City of Camden and the individual codefendants. Secondly, on motion of the defendants, the court dismissed the complaint because .at the time of the filing of the suit the corporate plaintiff\u2019s charter was nonexistent. Notwithstanding the charter was subsequently reinstated, the trial court held that the reinstatement was not retroactive to the date of forfeiture. Sulphur Springs Recreational Park appeals from those two rulings.\nThe Refusal of the Court to Strike the Answer. Recreational Park filed its complaint at Camden on January 14, 1965. Near the top of the complaint was printed \u201cG. E. Snuggs, Lawyer, El Dorado, Arkansas.\u201d The complaint was signed \u201cG. E. Snuggs, Solicitor for Plaintiff.\u201d Fifteen days later the defendants filed an answer and left a copy in the clerk\u2019s office for plaintiff\u2019s counsel. The copy was picked up by plaintiff\u2019s counsel on February 10, 1965. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-362 (Repl. 1962 and Supp. 1967) sets out the manner in which an answer is to be served. Here is the pertinent portion:\nService upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his last known address, or if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court.\nAppellant argues that since Mr. Snuggs\u2019 .address was shown on the complaint as \u201cLawyer, El Dorado, Arkansas,\u201d the copy of the answer should not have been left with the clerk but should have been mjailed to Mr. Snuggs; and that the failure to follow that procedure requires that the answer be stricken. The contention is without merit. The attorneys for the defendants testified that they did not know Mr. Snuggs\u2019 mailing address ; that is, no specific address in El Dorado was listed; that no address of any kind appeared below Mr. Snuggs\u2019 signature where such addresses are commonly listed; and that the fine print \u201cLawyer, El Dorado, Arkansas\u201d was inconspicuous and was overlooked. In fact the attorneys were not sure Mr. Snuggs had an office in El Dorado. Whether counsel had knowledge of Mr. Snuggs\u2019 mailing address was a question of fact and we cannot say he preponderantly showed that knowledge to have been possessed by opposing counsel. Additionally, appellant does not claim any prejudice; in fact it is not disputed that appellant\u2019s counsel obtained a copy of the answer from the clerk within ten days after it was timely filed.\nThe Dismissal of the Complaint. The corporate charter of appellant was revoked by a governor\u2019s proclamation dated February 1, 1952, for nonpayment of franchise taxes. This suit was filed January 14, 1965. The corporation was reinstated on May 1, 1968. Appellees moved for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it was filed at a time when the corporate entity was extinct; and that the rescission of the forfeiture was not retroactive.\nAppellant did not have corporate status at the time the suit was filed. Not being in existence it possessed no capacity to sue. The subsequent reinstatement did not vest it with continuing existence from date of origin. Moore v. Rommel, 233 Ark. 989, 350 S. W. 2d 190 (1961). The restoration of the corporate status before trial creates no right to prosecute the initial complaint. Clark Estate Co. v. Gentry, 240 S. W. 2d 124 (Mo. 1951).\nAppellant says there was no authority for revocation of its charter. That argument is based on the erroneous assumption that it is a nonprofit organization; the fact is that it is chartered as a business corporation.\nAdditionally, appellant argues that appellees\u2019 answer in effect admitted appellant\u2019s status as a corporation. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-1121 (Bepl. 1962) states that the alleged status of a party plaintiff, such as a corporation, shall be admitted unless specifically denied in the answer. In their answer the appellees did not set up a specific denial of the alleged status of plaintiff as a corporation. In April 1967 appellees inquired by interrogatories of 'the status of the corporation. Appellant refused to supply the information on the ground that the answer admitted the corporation\u2019s legal existence. Thereafter appellees amended their answer and alleged the forfeiture of the charter.\nWe have many times held that it is within the inherent power of the trial court, within certain general limitations, to permit the amendment of pleadings. In Bridgman v. Drilling, 218 Ark. 772, 238 S. W. 2d 645 (1951), we said:\nWe have repeatedly stated that the trial court is vested with broad discretion in allowing amendments to pleadings under Ark. Stat. \u00a7 27-1160 in order to effectuate the manifest purpose of the statute to permit the trial of litigation upon its merits.\nOf course the particular facts in each instance are significant. Here the appellees timely filed an answer. Before the case was finally called to trial the defendants discovered that the corporation was not in existence at the time the suit was filed. Appellees filed an amendment asserting that fact and the amendment was accepted by the court. We cannot conceive that amendment to have affected the substantial rights of the plaintiff. Therefore we are unable to say that the court abused its broad discretion pertaining to the allowance of amendments to pleadings.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Lyle Brown, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "G. E. Snuggs, for appellant.", "Gaughan, Laney, Barnes & Roberts, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SULPHUR SPRINGS RECREATIONAL PARK, Inc. v. CITY OF CAMDEN, ARKANSAS et al\n5-5079\n447 S. W. 2d 844\nOpinion delivered December 1, 1969\n[Rehearing denied January 12, 1970.]\nG. E. Snuggs, for appellant.\nGaughan, Laney, Barnes & Roberts, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0713-01", "first_page_order": 735, "last_page_order": 739 }